Secret Japanese Overture(s) To NEI Government

Secret Japanese Overture(s) To NEI Government

Tom Womack
Tom Womack

July 5th, 2010, 3:45 am #1

Per a "MOST SECRET" cablegram dated December 28, 1941 the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London quotes a "secret source" to report that the Japanese as of that date were making a last-minute peace overture to the Netherlands East Indies Government. Reportedly, if the Dutch accepted an immediate stoppage of hostilities and ceased aid to "Japan's enemies" than the Japanese would protect the NEI and leave its then government intact. If the offer was rejected than the Dutch could expect immediate attack on Borneo and other points.

The source of this information isn't revealed and I haven't any other reference to the claim. However, this claim - albeit unconfirmed - would fall right in line with unknown reason(s) for Japan not attacking Dutch territory earlier in the war. While American, British and Siamese territory was attacked on the first day of the Pacific War, Dutch territory was completely unmolested. Not until January 10 was Dutch territory attacked in force at Tarakan.

This timeline would make perfect sense if the Japanese indeed did issue such an offer to the Dutch. Has anyone else ever heard of such an offer and/or do you have more information?

Thanx!
Tom
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Kit
Kit

July 5th, 2010, 4:56 am #2

Hi Tom,

There is confirmation that Japan did not declare war on the NEI until 11th January 1942, per

http://planetcoh.gamespy.com/View.php?v ... tail&id=20

One must assume, I think, that in the month transpiring between the war erupting 'twixt Japan and the British Commonwealth and the U.S. in early December 1941, and the subsequent war between Japan and the NEI, there were serious diplomatic discussions on how that latter conflict could be avoided.

Wouldn't this information be best confirmed in the postwar writings of the senior Dutch civil, military, and naval officers in place in Java when the surrender to the Japanese took place? We know from recent discussion that Admiral Conrad Helfrich left his memoirs, but I think several people frequently taking part in this forum have read those, likely including yourself, and would be familiar with such a revelation. If memory serves, Governor-General A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer (1936-42) was a closely reticent person, but not so his successor, Hubertus Johannes van Mook (1942-48), who wrote a book or two after the war ended. Any clues there? And how about the army commander on the island, Lt. Gen. Hein ter Poorten, did he write anything revelatory postwar?

Kit
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Melmoth the Wanderer
Melmoth the Wanderer

July 5th, 2010, 6:10 pm #3

Per a "MOST SECRET" cablegram dated December 28, 1941 the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London quotes a "secret source" to report that the Japanese as of that date were making a last-minute peace overture to the Netherlands East Indies Government. Reportedly, if the Dutch accepted an immediate stoppage of hostilities and ceased aid to "Japan's enemies" than the Japanese would protect the NEI and leave its then government intact. If the offer was rejected than the Dutch could expect immediate attack on Borneo and other points.

The source of this information isn't revealed and I haven't any other reference to the claim. However, this claim - albeit unconfirmed - would fall right in line with unknown reason(s) for Japan not attacking Dutch territory earlier in the war. While American, British and Siamese territory was attacked on the first day of the Pacific War, Dutch territory was completely unmolested. Not until January 10 was Dutch territory attacked in force at Tarakan.

This timeline would make perfect sense if the Japanese indeed did issue such an offer to the Dutch. Has anyone else ever heard of such an offer and/or do you have more information?

Thanx!
Tom
Guys,

I must say this sounds rather suspicious, but not altogether impossible to me. What is the source again? Also, I'm not sure it's terribly meaningful in the final analysis.

The Dutch declared war against Japan on December 8th, as we know.

The Dutch and British had already begun destroying the Northern Borneo oil installations on Dec. 8/9, and although the first bombing of Tarakan occurred before Xmas, IIRC, it scrupulously avoided the oil installations. The Japanese seized the NW Bornean oil installations--largely destroyed--within the first two-three weeks (approx.) of the war. Needless to say they were infuriated at that point.

If anything this sounds like a ploy by the Japanese--who were far more desperate than most readers grasp--to preserve (through subterfuge, in all likelihood) whatever oilfields they could...

In view of the absurd Japanese Economic Mission's demands of 1940-41, led by Kobayashi & Yoshizawa, respectively, and in which Hubertus van Mook was the principal Dutch negotiator--and he published his memoir in 1944, or during, not after, the war, BTW--I find it terribly difficult to imagine the Dutch actually believed the Japanese could be trusted to do what they stated. By the same token, I don't doubt that the Japanese would have said virtually ANYTHING to get the oil facilities intact, and moreover, that many atrocities were committed against Westerners in this phase of the NEI campaign because they were not able to do so.

Additionally, the big oil corporations had had to be dragged into the demolition schemes kicking & screaming, as one might well understand. THEY, like all oil businesses, would have been quite happy to sell oil forever to Satan Himself as long as he paid them their fee...

So, whatever they may have said to the Dutch--through "secret" channels (which I do no doubt existed, although this British note has a distinctively British air of a paranoid mistrust as well; think of the Vichy French & the French navy, etc.) or elsewhere--I don't believe for one instant that they would have permitted the Dutch to continue to administer the NEI!! (This was a fantasy the NEI Dutch clung to, nonetheless, for some time even after Java fell.)

This sounds as though either the Japanese were desperately trying through diplomatic hairsplitting to preserve what they could after seeing the British/Dutch resolve in NW Borneo to destroy the field, etc. or that the British were being fed a line of clever disinformation, something the Japanese would have been perfectly capable of accomplishing.

That the Japanese timetable for the First Stage Operations included such diplomatic quibbling is patently false, and could be easily disproved, I think. But, that's another issue.

MthW
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Joined: December 29th, 2007, 8:30 pm

July 5th, 2010, 10:17 pm #4

Per a "MOST SECRET" cablegram dated December 28, 1941 the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London quotes a "secret source" to report that the Japanese as of that date were making a last-minute peace overture to the Netherlands East Indies Government. Reportedly, if the Dutch accepted an immediate stoppage of hostilities and ceased aid to "Japan's enemies" than the Japanese would protect the NEI and leave its then government intact. If the offer was rejected than the Dutch could expect immediate attack on Borneo and other points.

The source of this information isn't revealed and I haven't any other reference to the claim. However, this claim - albeit unconfirmed - would fall right in line with unknown reason(s) for Japan not attacking Dutch territory earlier in the war. While American, British and Siamese territory was attacked on the first day of the Pacific War, Dutch territory was completely unmolested. Not until January 10 was Dutch territory attacked in force at Tarakan.

This timeline would make perfect sense if the Japanese indeed did issue such an offer to the Dutch. Has anyone else ever heard of such an offer and/or do you have more information?

Thanx!
Tom

Hello Tom,

I never heard of read about this before.

I checked the standard work of de Jong, his "Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Second World War"
but could find nothing about it.

The main reason of the Japanese attack to the South was oil (and rubber).
Any overture to the NEI government by Japan would IMO be considered as unbelievable.

On 19 december 1941 nine Japanese aircraft bombed and strafed Pontianak in NW Borneo,
killing about 200 people (mainly Chinese).

Regards,
Arie



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Tom Womack
Tom Womack

July 6th, 2010, 1:56 am #5

Per a "MOST SECRET" cablegram dated December 28, 1941 the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London quotes a "secret source" to report that the Japanese as of that date were making a last-minute peace overture to the Netherlands East Indies Government. Reportedly, if the Dutch accepted an immediate stoppage of hostilities and ceased aid to "Japan's enemies" than the Japanese would protect the NEI and leave its then government intact. If the offer was rejected than the Dutch could expect immediate attack on Borneo and other points.

The source of this information isn't revealed and I haven't any other reference to the claim. However, this claim - albeit unconfirmed - would fall right in line with unknown reason(s) for Japan not attacking Dutch territory earlier in the war. While American, British and Siamese territory was attacked on the first day of the Pacific War, Dutch territory was completely unmolested. Not until January 10 was Dutch territory attacked in force at Tarakan.

This timeline would make perfect sense if the Japanese indeed did issue such an offer to the Dutch. Has anyone else ever heard of such an offer and/or do you have more information?

Thanx!
Tom
From Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs London. I. 29812 70/185. December 28, 1941.

914. MOST SECRET

Reported from secret source that the Japanese are now making a last-minute attempt to persuade the Netherlands East Indies Government to accept immediate stoppage of hostilities and aid to Japan's enemies. If accepted the Japanese will protect the Netherlands East Indies leaving the administration untouched. Should the Dutch refuse immediate action against Dutch Borneo and possibly other
may be expected.

A telegram is being addressed by the War Office to the Commander-in-Chief Far East 60557 and repeated to the Commander-in-Chief India.

Copy - War Cabinet
Mr. Shedden
Col. Hodgson

28.12.41

--------------------

I found the original document online in the Dutch National Archives in The Hague. However, I can't download, copy or print it since it is part of a larger batch of documents (some 200 pages IIRC) that must be purchased. Nonetheless, the document is definitely authentic and original; whether or not the original source can be considered equally trustworthy is anyone's guess.

The source remains unidentified and no where is this mentioned in any other documents...British, Australian, Dutch or American. That said, I really do think that this is definitely something that could have happened. Think about it, the Japanese immediately declared war on just about every western nation but the Dutch.

For the latter they waited until mid-January to declare war. I don't think this event had anything to do with the start of actual invasion operations (i.e. landings on Tarakan) since that was more/less dictated by the need to secure their flank by invading the Philippines. However, I can easily see the Japanese trying to pressure the Dutch into accepting a cease-fire in the time it took them to secure a foothold in the PI.

But as Melmoth said, any peace with the Japanese would have merely turned the NEI into a puppet state of the Empire. You can look at French Indochina to see what would have eventually happened. All the Japanese wanted was a foothold from which they could eventually wrest control from the Dutch. But unlike the French, the Dutch maintained an independent, free-willed government-in-exile in London. The Dutch had also been very, very wary of Japanese intentions since the 1920s and this concern didn't go away just because Japan promised to "play nice."

In all honesty, I'm inclined to believe that this COULD have happened. Whether or not it actually did is a whole 'nother issue. I would suspect that the secret source could have been a sympathetic contact in a enemy or neutral government, such as Germany or Spain (probably not Portugal given the Allied occupation of Timor). I would strongly bet that any such request would have gone directly to the NEI government as the Japanese were trying hard to separate that body from the influence and direction of Queen Wilhelmina's government in London.

Perhaps it was merely discussed in the halls of that particular government. Or it could have been thrown out as a possibility but someone then realized that the Dutch would have never considered the request and it was never formally put to them. In any event, given the timing, I think this deserves greater attention.



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Melmoth the Wanderer
Melmoth the Wanderer

July 6th, 2010, 2:55 am #6

Tom et al.,

This may well have occurred, but it altered nothing AFAIK.

The Japanese timetable for the First Stage Operations (DAI ICHI DAN) was adhered to pretty closley, and the only significant delay that I know of--against Davao & Jolo--was due to escort shipping shortages. This in turn pushed back the Tarakan operation some 10 days--as it was originally to take place about the first of January--and threatened to upset their timetable for seizing Java itself, but adjustments were made accordingly and the plans went ahead more or less as scheduled (perhaps give or take a day or two).

There was some juggling of schedules in the attack on PALEMBANG which was due, I believe, to deciding upon the best airbase to use against Sumatra; also, the invasion of AMBON was changed from FEB 6 to a few days earlier (?)--This was originally planned to have been a companion piece to operations against KOEPANG.

The seizure of and utilization of Tarakan is certainly in the original operational orders of NOV. 5, 1941, later amended on 17 NOV (Ultrasecret serial 1, Part 99). So, too, are the seizure of MENADO, BALIKPAPAN, KENDARI, BANDJERMASIN, SURABAJA & BATAVIA. These same operational orders state: "Key points in the NETHERLANDS INDIES will be subject to air attack in the following order: (a) Menado, Kendari; (b) Balikpapan, Kendari; (c) Bandjermaisn, Makassar, and if the situation requires, Sorong, Ambon, and Koepan(g)."

What we see in this is a far from atypical Japanese mode of conducting business. The military had already made ITS plans; the politicians and diplomats would have to follow suit as best they could. It is not realistic to imagine that diplomats were controlling events at that stage, although it plays into Western thinking. However, IMHO, the Japanese didn't operate that way at all. [The nonsense re Portuguese Timor might serve as an illustration of this, come to think of it. The Japanese had already captured Koepang, but waited until FEB 7, 1942 to decide officially to take Portuguese Timor...allegedly after making precisely the same offer to the Portuguese (who were not yet at war with Japan): if they didn't offer resistance, etc. Eventually the Japanese said that they were compelled to seize Portug. Timor "as a measure of self-defense"--or, their standard euphemistic doublespeak for military aggression used since 1931 (and before) in Manchuria.]

Last but not least, this question raises the ugly suggestion of possible collusion with the NEI authorities, and I find that equally difficult to accept.

FWIW (again),

MthW
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Tom Womack
Tom Womack

July 6th, 2010, 4:34 am #7

Hi Melmoth (and others)...

Why did Japan wait until January 11, 1942 to declare war on the NEI? In all my 35 years of researching the NEI campaign I have yet to see or hear a persuasive case as to why this occurred.

I'm certainly no conspiracy theorist by any means and I don't for a millisecond think that the NEI government would have collaborated or conspired with the Japanese on such a proposal. I've been studying this topic (as have many of us) far too long to believe that. They (the NEI government) simply would not have even contemplated such an offer.

Likewise, your information on the movements and timetables of the IJA/IJN is equally solid. But that said, it's not so much the MILITARY activity that one needs to examine as much as the POLITICAL activity. As you spelled out (and which I agree with 100%), the Japanese military was running the show...period...end of discussion...there was no civilian presence.

Why did Japan wait until mid-January to declare war on the NEI when they declared war on the UK/USA very early on? If one goes back into newspaper and military intelligence reports (both Australian and Dutch) from the mid/late 1930s there are numerous examples of ludicrous Japanese demands. Many want to essentially turn the NEI into a Japanese protectorate; there are also a number of demands that called for the Dutch to simply relinquish their territorial claims to Netherlands New Guinea (not just open it for colonization) and turn it over to Japan.

I'm not saying that this report of secret negotiations was true (at least as presented in the memo anyway). But when one looks at it in the context of the nutty "pie in the sky" demands made by Imperial Japan in the decade leading up to the Pacific War it doesn't necessarily sound so fantastic. And while the Japanese weren't about to stop their invasion to negotiate, it never hurts to have some brute force in play to help motivate your opponent to talk.

In any event though, I don't think the proposal ever made it to the Dutch in any form.
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Kit
Kit

July 6th, 2010, 2:22 pm #8

Although all of the preceding inputs have a strong dose of truth in their preambles, sorry, lads, I think you're barking up the wrong tree in your conclusions. The only question on the table is did it happen--and from Tom's inputs, the signal in question is authentic. The signal indicates such overtures were being made, NOT they were about to be made. To put the question differently, were the Japanese talking and were the Dutch listening? As with all of you, I have no info to confirm or deny, but I think it hardly beyond possbility to conclude that such talks did occur, although likely not at the highest levels. The Netherlands homeland had been conquered and the Dutch Indies' position was at best tenuous. It would appear from Melmoth's first cynical....but highly realistic....response that such talks were hardly beyond reason. Just to remind, the Japanese desired the riches available in the East Indies, and they had to sweep away anyone standing in their way: take arms at once against Britain and America as the tough guys guarding the door, but once inside, take a somewhat different tact with the smart guys hoarding the treasure and controlling its distribution, with whom (they hoped) they could deal. One important thing in such talks is psyching the other guys out, including some scare tactics: the initial air raids on north Borneo, whose casualties were mainly Chinese and thus expendable in both Japanese and Dutch eyes, but implicit was the warning: THIS could happen to you....and your families.

Melmoth, thanks for correcting the date of van Mook's first book as 1944, but you neglected to point out that as a wartime publication, it would have cast the author in a positive light and contained not a little propaganda and bee-ess. By necessity, it would have been very light indeed on secrets and sensitive information, with the whole truth and nothing but the truth among the first casualties. Anything about these alleged prewar negotiations would decidedly have NOT been part of the text. [And by the way, from an Australian perspective, Japanese atrocities were not just a time phase, but a continuing reality throughout the war.]

I suppose I believe that such talks actually happened has to do with a couple of things that Nelson has said, more than once, in this forum: (a) That the Allies perceived the Dutch Indies, if not immediately, but very soon, as just another defencive waystop in the Malay Barrier. Clearly, the Dutch, many of whom had been born in the Indies, did not share that perception, but looked to the Indies, particularly Java, as the be-all and end-all. (b) Although the relationship was close between the Brits and the Dutch, the basis of a long alliance following the Anglo-Dutch naval wars of a very long time before, at the highest levels was not particularly close between the NEI and US governments. In fact, the Dutch in the Indies wished the appearance of keeping the Yanks at arm's length, as America was clearly the bete noire of Nippon. With local government officials much closer spatially to the Philippines, that was another matter, because they saw their salvation with the Americans, so best keep them happy by selling their cruisers a bunkerload of oil every now and again. And as Melmoth so rightly points out, it would have been the private oil companies selling the black gold, at least until the government appropriated these assets for the duration.

Not to ramble on, but...

1. Yes, the Japanese military had their firm hand on the reins, but they certainly advised senior civil officers of their impending schedule of conquest, and might have muttered something like, "If you think that approaching the Dutch in the interim, in ANY chance of getting their oil and petrol intact, go for it."
2. Yes, that schedule of conquest, with a few minor modifications here and there, carried on regardless, and these talks had no effect on things in either the long or short runs.
3. As Melmoth has pointed out more than once, the Dutch had a good intelligence service, and with all likelihood trusted the Japanese and their overtures with a very large grain of NaCl. That does not rule out mid-level civil officers listening and reporting back to Batavia or Bandoeng.

It does seem, at least to me, from both the signal in question and the delay in the Japanese declaration of war that the Japanese talked and the Dutch, at least at some level, listened. In regard to those few aggressive acts from the air, what during that period was the IJN doing about, and to, Dutch vessels on the high seas and in the area offshore of the NEI?

To nearly end with a couple of things Tom just posted:

> And while the Japanese weren't about to stop their invasion to negotiate, it never hurts to have some brute force in play to help motivate your opponent to talk. >

I couldn't agree more.

> In any event though, I don't think the proposal ever made it to the Dutch in any form. >

I couldn't agree less. After all, you yourself presently black and white documentation that it did. That it fell on relatively deaf ears, as suggested above, is something else again. You asked the very good question, but now you are answering it with virtually no proof.

Back to my original question if postwar authors revealed this business, I would point out that such an ultra-sensitive issue would have remained ultra-secret for years after the war's end.

Kit
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Melmoth the Wary
Melmoth the Wary

July 6th, 2010, 4:10 pm #9

Hi Melmoth (and others)...

Why did Japan wait until January 11, 1942 to declare war on the NEI? In all my 35 years of researching the NEI campaign I have yet to see or hear a persuasive case as to why this occurred.

I'm certainly no conspiracy theorist by any means and I don't for a millisecond think that the NEI government would have collaborated or conspired with the Japanese on such a proposal. I've been studying this topic (as have many of us) far too long to believe that. They (the NEI government) simply would not have even contemplated such an offer.

Likewise, your information on the movements and timetables of the IJA/IJN is equally solid. But that said, it's not so much the MILITARY activity that one needs to examine as much as the POLITICAL activity. As you spelled out (and which I agree with 100%), the Japanese military was running the show...period...end of discussion...there was no civilian presence.

Why did Japan wait until mid-January to declare war on the NEI when they declared war on the UK/USA very early on? If one goes back into newspaper and military intelligence reports (both Australian and Dutch) from the mid/late 1930s there are numerous examples of ludicrous Japanese demands. Many want to essentially turn the NEI into a Japanese protectorate; there are also a number of demands that called for the Dutch to simply relinquish their territorial claims to Netherlands New Guinea (not just open it for colonization) and turn it over to Japan.

I'm not saying that this report of secret negotiations was true (at least as presented in the memo anyway). But when one looks at it in the context of the nutty "pie in the sky" demands made by Imperial Japan in the decade leading up to the Pacific War it doesn't necessarily sound so fantastic. And while the Japanese weren't about to stop their invasion to negotiate, it never hurts to have some brute force in play to help motivate your opponent to talk.

In any event though, I don't think the proposal ever made it to the Dutch in any form.
Tom,

I do not doubt something may have been going on behind the scenes. What I doubt is the following:

1) That it had ANY bearing on the conduct of the campaign,

2) That the NEI Dutch -- or gov't in exile in London --had any illusions about its meaning or validity.

Japan's "diplomacy" from the late Twenties (say, after the killing of Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria) had almost no rational basis, and its verbiage can be dismissed as often as not as self-serving & duplicitous.

This episode also brings to mind "secret negotiations" (little more than vague diplomatic feelers really) between Japan & the USSR in late 1944, bearing on ending the war sooner rather than later.

Why the tardy declaration? I honestly can't say, but Machiavellian shenanigans definitely comes to mind.


MthW

P.S.--Yes, I understand that Van Mook's book would not be a useful source for ultrasecret information, but the wartime publication date would've been significant for other reasons: the hoped for and declared return of Dutch rule in the NEI after the war.

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Tom Womack
Tom Womack

July 6th, 2010, 6:09 pm #10

Per a "MOST SECRET" cablegram dated December 28, 1941 the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London quotes a "secret source" to report that the Japanese as of that date were making a last-minute peace overture to the Netherlands East Indies Government. Reportedly, if the Dutch accepted an immediate stoppage of hostilities and ceased aid to "Japan's enemies" than the Japanese would protect the NEI and leave its then government intact. If the offer was rejected than the Dutch could expect immediate attack on Borneo and other points.

The source of this information isn't revealed and I haven't any other reference to the claim. However, this claim - albeit unconfirmed - would fall right in line with unknown reason(s) for Japan not attacking Dutch territory earlier in the war. While American, British and Siamese territory was attacked on the first day of the Pacific War, Dutch territory was completely unmolested. Not until January 10 was Dutch territory attacked in force at Tarakan.

This timeline would make perfect sense if the Japanese indeed did issue such an offer to the Dutch. Has anyone else ever heard of such an offer and/or do you have more information?

Thanx!
Tom
I have been doing some additional digging and have SOLID proof that Japan indeed DID MAKE peace overtures to the NEI Government...sort of.

A British memo dated January 9, 1942 clearly spells out the chain of events. The memo is from no less than Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary and are based on a conversation he had with Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs E.N. van Kleffens earlier that same morning. The initial report detailing Japanese peace overtures was initially funneled to London through Duff Cooper, the Resident Cabinet Minister in Singapore. His "secret source" remains unnamed, although my best "SWAG" would be perhaps a sympathetic German official or another diplomatic official from a 3rd party nation.

Cooper first discussed the matter with General H.R. Pownall, British Commander/Chief in Singapore. They discussed whether or not to mention it at all to the Dutch. Cooper then had a conversation with the Dutch Consul-General in Singapore who had not heard of the proposal. However, the Dutch diplomat did express surprise that Dutch territory had not yet been attacked by the Japanese. Indeed, several other memos in the same file indicate that no attacks on the Dutch territory had been made, but that they could be expected at any time.

Duff Cooper then notified London that the Japanese were trying to enact a separate peace agreement with the NEI government. Some 10 days earlier (i.e. late December 1941) a member of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs approached the Dutch diplomatic counsel in Japan. Although under home confinement, the Dutch consul was asked to broadcast a series of proposals "in the name of humanity" aimed at ending hostilities between the NEI and Japan.

Per the British memo dated January 9, the Dutch diplomat refused outright and demanded that any such message(s) be sent through proper diplomatic channels. The Dutch government fully agreed with his response and van Kleffens reported that no subsequent notes were received from the Japanese Government in either Europe or the NEI. He also stated that any such proposal would hold absolutely no interest for the Dutch government.

Eden notes that van Kleffen did not suggest making any counter-proposals or related conditions in order to buy more time for the NEI to prepare. This was apparently not done since no formal offer was apparently ever received by the government/exile. However, van Kleffens did apparently state that the Dutch would be willing to "play" the Japanese [Eden's comment] and/or delay their answer in order to buy time. But the two men agreed that any future course of action would have to be decided if/when the Japanese offer was received and the matter was left as a bring-forward at a future meeting.

On a related note, this course of action would be very much in line with Japanese prewar efforts to isolate the NEI from the Dutch government/exile in London and encourage independent action. Even if not the proverbial "smoking gun" it very strongly backs up my contention that the Japanese did not declare war on the Dutch until January 10 because they hoped to enact a separate peace.

Remember from you heard this first kids and cite accordingly:)

HTH...
Tom



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