Debriefing 05/10/2005

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Debriefing 05/10/2005

Joined: 05 Jul 2007, 02:18

15 Aug 2007, 01:28 #1 ... _notes.pdf
Notes on the 7 July Debriefing at London Guildhall
5 October 2005

held under the auspices of
the Civil Contingencies Secretariat,
London Resilience and the Procapites Project
Prof David Alexander (

NB: the following pages offer a transcription of the notes I took on 5
October 2005. They report aspects of what the various speakers said
during their talks at the Guildhall. For details of what actually happened on
7 July 2005 please see my article on the London bombings.

Phil Woolas MP, Minister for London Resilience
"As many lives were saved on 7 July 2005 by the swift evacuation as were lost in the
murderous attack."

Dr Gareth Davies, Medical Incident Officer
BASICS - British Association for Immediate Care - has a medical incident officer pool.
The air ambulance for London, a helicopter and car service, has 30 helicopter doctors
and flight paramedics. They have a monthly meeting on prehospital care.

Lessons from 7 July:
- there is a need for senior experienced clinicians at the site
- there is a need for a robust 24-hour response, not merely a daytime one
- do not rely on mobile phones for emergency communication
- improve protection for first responders
- airborne capacity is important in an easily gridlocked city like London
- do not attempt to practise routine medicine
- to expedite the recovery of patients use potent drugs

At Aldgate station (the LT "Widened Lines") the scene stalled. Some 208 patients
needed moving to hospital. Thus a critical care envelope was opened at the scene. The patients with minor injuries were transported first in buses. Ambulances took multiple patients. In the first wave there were not four but eight or nine incidents [given that victims came out of underground stations from both ends of the bombed trains.] A 24-hour response would involve volunteers and create quite variable capacity. In effect only a partial immediate response would be available.
Communications: paging, texting, emails, UHF radios, runners, not just mobile phones. CBRN protection: personal alarms for staff. Chemical agent monitoring.

Regarding traffic gridlock, multiple sorties are very important. The London helicopter
ambulance made 18 sorties only to deploy staff and drugs, not to move patients.

Stephen House, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police
July 7th was the most testing operational challenge faced in the 176-year history of the London Metropolitan Police Force (the "Met"). It was the first time it had ever had to ask for assistance from other British police forces. The post-event investigation will be the largest in British criminal history. Its cost to the Met alone is £100 million.
One lesson learned is the need to speed up the learning cycle. Exercises can help this process. In July 2005 the "Atlantic Blue" exercise had just happened. It was a four-day event. As the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) manual shows, a multi-agency response is the only valid one.

Dilemma: in London should we ask agencies, including the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), to decamp to the periphery of the city, to avoid gridlock, be safer and have more space? If we do, could they successfully get back to central London? The SCG is linked to COBR the UK Government's Cabinet Office Briefing Room [i.e. national-level strategic command].

Since 1999 the three London police forces have Operation Benbow, which defines their joint command structure.

Heat was a major problem in underground operations.

In the first hour of the emergency there were 42,000 telephone calls to the central
casualty bureau service.

The temporary mortuary [see below] lasted months.

Each and every telephone call to the police is part of the investigation. Every call has the potential to destroy public confidence in the police's response if the public cannot get through.

In a certain sense the bombings were not a disaster, but four linked major incidents.
London life carried on and recovered quickly. The sight of uniformed police officers on the streets in the centre and suburbs acted as a form of reassurance to the general public.

Meetings at the Gold [i.e. strategic] level went on for two weeks, and they were restarted at the attempted bombings on 21st July. How would the forces involved cope with a sustained bombing campaign?

Dr James Hart, City of London Police Commissioner
The City of London Police (CoLP) were in charge of the 400-metre cordons.
In terms of the crime-scene investigation, detectives rapidly deployed in order to recover evidence and get information from first witnesses.
The business community is very important to the CoL Police. Pagers, email and
conference calls were made to give factual information to the business community. This forms part of Project Griffin.
The CoLP works regularly with the Met and the British Transport Police (BTP) in making preparations for public order events, and in the assignment of specialist resources to each other's territories. For a cross-border event, command and control protocols have been put in place in order to have a single chain of command.

"Some of the information we [the CoLP] provided was confused", including information on when it was safe to leave buildings and how to make one's way home, given transportation shut-downs in central London. The mass media replayed information video clips given out at press conferences up to four hours after they had ceased to be current.

Pagers are more robust means of communication than mobile telephones. Pagers and e-alerts can reach up to 2000 contacts simultaneously.

Andy Trotter, Deputy Chief Constable, British Transport Police
It is vitally important to have a mass media strategy and to provide a joined-up media response. Messages given out to the public need to be supported by information. The Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre in Parliament Square, Westminster, was used as a media centre. Media conferences were also held at King's Cross station. The BTP monitored the media in order to help stop them putting out old, stale messages. The force's media strategy was regularly reviewed. However, the media want regular updates on the situation, and these are very difficult to provide. Feeding them information stops them causing mischief. Also, they need to be provided with vantage points for filming and still photography. They want data and figures, but these are easy to misuse. The BTP has dedicated spokespersons supported by press minders.

Roger Gomm, Police Superintendent and Tactical Commander ("Silver, London")
Tactical ["silver level] command was set up in a special operations room in New
Scotland Yard [the London police headquarters in the City of Westminster]. Its call sign was 'GT'. The gold [strategic] commander was Chris Allison. Bronze [operational] commands were set up at Edgware Road, Russell Square, Tavistock Road and Aldgate. They dealt with traffic control, crime control, communications and community relations. They set up information cells for media liaison. Command was defined by role, not rank in the police service.

Bruce Mann, Central Government Cabinet - Civil Contingencies Secretariat
The response involved a combination of preparedness and consequence management.
The former ensured that on the day there was a good availability of hospital beds, burns
units, etc. On 7 July London mortuaries were working at about 50 per cent capacity. A temporary mortuary was needed. It was set up and running within 60 hours of the start of the emergency.

A family assistance centre was set up in 48 hours, but was needed much sooner [but
see another view reported below].

A code of conduct has been agreed with the British press, but some foreign journalists did not follow it. In two cases foreign journalists tried to get into hospitals to interview injured people and doors had to be locked.

The casualty bureau had an 0870 number and there were complaints that it was not
free. The casualty bureau telephone system eventually broke down under the intensity of calls. About 43,000 calls were logged between 1500 and 1600 hrs on the day. Some 12,000 missing persons were reported.

Not all blue-light services yet have a communications system to TETRA standard.
The preferential access system to the cellular telephone network was not invoked in all incidents. Some first responders were reliant on mobile phones in a situation of network saturation.

Reports of conflict between the national and London Resilience news bureaux were
unfounded. There was no conflict during the first 48 hours.

Ron Dobson, London Fire Brigade Assistant Commissioner
Mr Dobson is also a member of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority.
Ten (i.e. all) Fire & Rescue Units (FRUs) were deployed within one hour of the start of
the incidents. Not all FRUs contain identical sets of equipment. There is a need to find a way of restocking fire appliances if equipment is impounded by the police.

RART (for London Underground) provided rescue and recovery trolleys for movement along the rail tracks underground in order to move equipment and personnel to the immobilised trains.

As three of the four incidents occurred underground, there were remarkably few multiple 999 [i.e. emergency, 112-type] calls from members of the public.
It is very important to have a London Fire Brigade officer at silver command at New
Scotland Yard [police headquarters--see above]. Hand-held radio transmitters do not work well in subsurface environments and hence did not work well at the scene.
A multi-agency response requires strong training, for example, regarding terminology.
Martin Flaherty, Director of Operations, London Ambulance Service
The London Ambulance Service (LAS) opened a fallback control room. The main LAS
headquarters is at Waterloo. The decision to restrict responses to normal 999 calls was taken very quickly. At the time of the incidents London Ambulance was holding a senior managers conference at Milwall Football Ground, and so 100 managers were already in one place.

Bronze [i.e. operational] ambulance command dealt with triage, loading, safety, medical work, parking, clearing, and equipment. The British Red Cross and St John's Ambulance Brigade [a volunteer medical service] were also heavily involved.
Attention had to be devoted to organising capability to respond to ongoing incidents, as it was not known whether more incidents were to come. TRIM, Trauma Risk Management, was employed. A dedicated senior spokesperson was quickly appointed (but was not in place beforehand).

Four incident response cells were put together in succeeding days for future response.
"Knowing people personally is really important. It makes relationships flourish on the
Communications between gold and silver commands using mobile phones were very
difficult. Pagers, which work on a different technology, were subsequently reintroduced. Hospitals were inundated with calls for information from the public. It was therefore difficult for London Ambulance Service to contact the hospitals.

Julie Dent, Chief Executive Officer, Southwest London Strategic Health Authority
About 1200 beds were made available in London hospitals by 1100 hrs on 7 July. Some 350 casualties were taken to Accident & Emergency and 300 were treated at site. Eleven hospitals were used. In total, 103 patients were detained in hospital.
It is important to be precise in the use of language. For example, do "casualties" include the dead, or only people who are alive and need medical help?
St Bartholemew's Hospital had 200 television crews outside trying to get interviews. It also received 47,000 telephone calls from members of the public.
Now, all hospitals in London must have a dedicated telephone line connected only to the
National Health Service gold command.

Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London
Virtually half of Londoners must have had the general fear that someone they knew
would have been travelling in the general area of the attacks at the appropriate time. It is thus not surprising that the telephone network quickly reached saturation.
Since 11 September 2001 there have been nine planned terrorist attacks on London. Eight were stopped and one succeeded. People's risk assessments were based on the fact that 56 deaths in four years is not such a great number. Do not underestimate people's ability to make realistic assessments of risks to their own lives.

Tim O'Toole, Managing Director, London Underground
The attacks of 7 July 2005 caused the most serious operational crisis that London
Underground has faced since World War II.

Adrian Dwyer, Counter-Terrorism Advisor, British Transport Police
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) drive the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) away from London stations, but on the other hand they were not suicide bombers. In contrast to the IRA bombing campaigns, the new reality is one of multiple, simultaneous attacks, mass casualties and no warning. White powder, incidentally, is probably not anthrax, which is almost invisible. If you can't see it, it might be anthrax, but how would you know?

"If you cannot be sure of a future event, but you know the odds, that is risk. If you don't know the odds, that is uncertainty." (F. Knight, 1921)

Peter Hendy, Managing Director, Transport for London - Surface Transport
In London, 16 private contractors run buses from 90 garages, each of which has control over a few services. Hence the system is very resilient but it is difficult to send messages to.
Centre Comm is the name of the London Bus control centre. In the immediate wake of the bombings the decision was taken to withdraw buses from the central zone but to keep them running outside zone 1. Mass road closures had left buses stranded in traffic.
Fare collection was eventually suspended (a very rare occurrence).
Andy Barr, Network Co-ordination Manager, London Underground
Incident management: dealing with the actual incident.
Consequence management: managing the fallout of the incident, including the
Recovery management: restoring service across the system. This took about four
On London Underground 200,000 passengers were evacuated from trains and stations within one hour. Two thousand five hundred staff were on duty at stations.
The day after the incidents, 80 per cent of the service on LU was active.
LU and BTP had to mount an investigation in order to understand the scene of the crime, which in one case was 250 metres long. After this there is a need formally to hand back the site, in suitable condition to be restored. Some LU rolling stock has asbestos in it. On 2 August a full service was resumed. Thirty tonnes of carriage in a tunnel are very difficult to remove. During the recovery, 25-30 skilled people were needed to manage the three sites around the clock. The operations team was separated from the recovery team. They had separate jobs.

LU interfaces with the British Transport Police, who in turn interface with the
Metropolitan Police. On the day, LU encountered some inconsistency in being able to get personnel through police cordons.

Peter Rogers, Chief Executive Officer, Westminster City Council
At 1655 hrs on 7 July HAC [see below] was chosen as the site of the temporary London mortuary. Westminster City Council (WCC) was chosen as the lead authority. The mortuary was located in the extreme south of the London Borough of Islington. The site was not approved in advance and the owners demanded compensation for lost income. Hence, commercial arrangements and contracts need to be in place beforehand.

Care has to be taken to avoid cross-contamination of evidence from different sites. It was not true, as stated earlier, that the family assistance centre took 48 hours to set up. An interim solution was in place in 17 hours. It was housed in a converted leisure centre, which turned out to be an inappropriate place. This was also a crime scene reception centre. People coming through the door needed to be cared for but also represented a source of information. A website ( was set up to convey long-term information.
The response to such an emergency needs to be capable of being scaled up. The
emphasis, as always, is on planning, rather than merely networks. More resilience is needed. If the bombs had gone off on 21 July, personnel who had been working flat out for two weeks would have been asked to continue working despite
being utterly exhausted.

Kevin Gordon, British Transport Police, and Murial McLelan, Salvation Army
The London mass Fatalities Working Group includes subgroups on the welfare of staff
and victims' relatives, and on burial and cremation procedures. In London there are eight regular mortuaries. Ten locations had been identified as possible sites for a temporary mortuary. The structure itself is of modular design. There has to be good prior planning, as mortuary equipment can take up to seven months to
order and supply.

After the tsunami of 26 December 2004 the Fulham [west London] mortuary was
"enhanced" to cope with all the repatriated UK victims. On 7 July the military sports ground of the Honorary Artillery Company (HAC) was chosen as the site to assemble the temporary mortuary. At any single moment in time 250 staff worked at the site. This complex facility was completely self-contained. It had its own generators; water was tanked in and sewage tanked out. Bodies were chilled in refrigerators. The autopsy suite had six separate pathology workstations. All 52 victims and the four terrorists were identified within six days.

Radiography facilities were set up and used. Anthropologists and odontologists were
used to identify victims (in all cases by dental records). Police fingerprint experts and police photographers were used. All wore protective clothing. A 24-hour canteen was in operation (security services were guarding the site around the clock).
A family viewing area was set up. This involved the best possible facilities to enable
family members to view and identify bodies with dignity. There was very careful attention to detail. Chairs were brought in from the Mayor of London's parlour. Hundreds of plants were brought in and a garden of remembrance was included at the site near to the family viewing area. People could use it as a place for reflection. Faith rituals were all available (such as the ritual washing of hands) but there was no religious symbolism in the family viewing area. Families were brought to the sites from a hotel by family liaison officers.

The Family Assistance Centre was set up on 8 July by Westminster City Council. A day later it was moved to the Queen Mother Sports Centre, and on 12 July to the Royal Agricultural Halls. On 19 August it was moved to a more long-term location. The requirements for a family assistance centre include adequate floor space, security, interview facilities, quiet rooms, facilities for children and a communal area.
But Duncan, what men believe isn't important - it's our actions which make us right or wrong. - Alasdair Gray - Lanark

Joined: 24 Jan 2006, 22:57

29 Nov 2007, 10:51 #2

Another set of de-brief notes for the same 'LONDON BOMBINGS - 7th JULY 2005' conference on 6th December 2005, held at the Guildhall in London.
REPORT TO: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
REPORT FROM: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
DATE: 6th December 2005
1.1 To inform the Joint Committee of the attendance by the Chief Emergency
Planning Officer and other members of the Cleveland Local Resilience
Forum at a conference in London relating to the lessons learned from the
bombings which occurred on 7th July 2005.
1.2 To examine the lessons learned and consider what impact and/or
implications they may have in the Cleveland area.
That Members note the report
3.1 A conference was held at the Guildhall in London on 5th October 2005 to
examine and disseminate information on the terrorist incidents of the 7th
July 2005 in London and share lessons that had been learned by the
responding organisations and agencies. The conference also touched on
the incidents of the 21st July.
3.2 The conference was attended by the following members of the Cleveland
Local Resilience Forum:
Derek Bonnard, Assistant Chief Constable, Cleveland Police
Paul Walker, Chief Executive, Hartlepool Borough Council
Paul Joyce, Director – Business Development, Cleveland Fire Brigade
Judi Evans, British Red Cross
Denis Hampson, Chief Emergency Planning Officer
3.3 The conference was attended by 240 delegates from the United Kingdom,
United States of America, Canada and several European Countries and
was facilitated by Alun Evans, Director of Civil Resilience in the Office of
the Deputy Prime Minister. The morning session was opened by Michael
Snyder, Chairman of the Policy and Resources Committee of the
Corporation of London, whilst the afternoon session was opened by Ken
Livingstone, Mayor of London. Phil Woolas MP, Minister for Local
Government, was the Government’s representative at the conference.
4. Summary of Significant Points / Lessons Learned
4.1 There were 19 speakers who gave presentations at the conference and
represented just about everyone in the London Resilience Forum. It lasted
7 hours and the Chief Emergency Planning Officer recorded the salient
points from the presentations. These are shown at appendix ‘A’.
4.2 Most of the organisations involved have gone through a number of internal
debriefs and have identified a number of immediate and useful lessons,
many of which were purely internal issues and will be promulgated further
within their respect agencies and organisations. Of course due to the
nature of the incidents in London and the ongoing enquiries it is expected
there will be further lessons learned. Many points that were raised were
specific to an incident occurring in a city like London and could not be
equated to this area, for example rescuing persons from and working in
underground rail tunnels.
4.3 The overarching key lessons were:
(a) The key to a successful resolution is effective inter agency working.
(b) There is a need for effective Command and Control structures and
procedures that have been tested and exercised.
© Key staff who will respond to incidents must be pre-identified and
understand their roles and responsibilities.
(d) Speed of response is essential.
(e) Do not rely on mobile phones – consider use of pagers for
emergency contact and call out.
(f) Communications procedures for getting timely and accurate
information out to the general public and businesses needs to be
(g) A more co-ordinated media strategy was required.
(h) Staffing capacity frequently not given sufficient attention, especially
during protracted incidents – “coping with tiredness”.
(i) Access procedures for non ‘blue light’ personnel through Police
(j) There will be an information vacuum in the first 30-45 minutes.
(k) Funding – Bellwin Scheme is not applicable to terrorist related
incidents. A direct request for assistance would need to be made to
central government.
5. Impact / Implications within ‘Cleveland’
5.1 Whilst many of the points raised were specific to an incident occurring in a
metropolitan area, many could be superimposed onto the Cleveland area
but maybe on a smaller scale and/or different scenario. When considering
the key lessons shown in 4.3 above, the impact/implications for
‘Cleveland’ may be:
(a) Whilst not being complacent, Cleveland has effective inter-agency
working primarily through a number of factors, including:
• Emergency Planners from the Local Authority’s and emergency
services all working out of the joint Emergency Planning Unit.
• A structured and vibrant Local Resilience Forum.
• Involvement in a successful exercise calendar / regime which
consistently tests and exercises such inter-agency working.
• The geography of the area and having the local authority
boundaries co-terminus with police and fire brigade districts.
• Production of a multi-agency Cleveland Major Incident Procedures
Manual that provides the framework within which agencies are
able to work together in a co-ordinated and beneficial manner.
(b) Again, Cleveland has through many of the factors shown immediately
above, effective Command and Control structures. These are
regularly tested through exercises, predominantly with the chemical
and nuclear power industries.
© Within the Major Incident Response Plans prepared by Emergency
Planning Officers for all four Councils there is great emphasis placed
on key staff being identified and understanding their roles and
responsibilities. A primary role of the Emergency Planning Officer is
to ensure such staff received adequate training and plans are
exercised and tested.
(d) Speed of response is an integral part of planning, day to day
activities and exercising undertaken by the emergency services
(e) Over recent times, the Emergency Planning Unit and Councils have
moved away from pagers for emergency contact and call out
procedures, mainly due to communications providers withdrawing
from the market. This policy is now being reviewed and it is likely
pagers will be re-introduced.
(f) The Cleveland Communications Strategy is seen nationally as best
practice for warning and informing the public. However it is constantly
under review and is presently being revised to move it forward from
CEPO docs/ JEPC / London Bombings – Dec 05 4
just chemical and power station operators being the instigators of the
message. The work of the Cleveland Media Emergency Forum is
focused on the need to progress awareness, warning and informing
procedures and practices.
(g) Again this is the primary focus of the Cleveland Media Emergency
Forum. Each Council has its own media response plan ‘owned’ by
the Media / Public Relations Officer.
(h) The need for Managers to be aware of staffing capacity and
weariness of staff particularly in possible gruesome and protracted
incidents is part of training and exercises. The Emergency Planning
Officers whose role involves advising Chief Officers during incidents
are acutely aware of these needs.
(i) Whilst procedures for getting non ‘blue light’ staff through police
cordons are written into plans, this is a frequent frustrating issue in
an operation sphere and one that the Inspector in charge of the
Police Emergency Planning Unit is attempting to address.
(j) Trying to educate the media to the fact that there may be an
information vacuum during the first 30-45 minutes of an incident is
difficult but through better liaison through the regional and Cleveland
media forums it is hoped this will improve, whilst one needs to be
(k) Issue identified on ‘Bellwin Scheme’ funding will be inserted into
appropriate plans.
Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Report dated: 3rd November 2005

Appendix ‘A’

Other Main Points from the Presentations
Note: Virtually every speaker stated that ‘responders’ should not rely on mobile
phones. Therefore it is not repeated in the significant / salient points made
by individual presenters.
Phil Woolas, MP
• London resilience is based on an effective partnership and sharing of
ideas, with people being willing and committed to working as a team.
• Lives were saved trough the swift evacuation of persons from the
• Planning and exercising is the way to resilience.

Dr Gareth Davies, London hospitals and Head of London Air Ambulance
• Good fortune – air ambulance holding monthly meeting with 30 doctors
and paramedics present.
• Need demonstrated for senior experienced clinicians at scene.
• Airborne capability used to move doctors, paramedics and medical
equipment across gridlocked roads. Air ambulance not used to carry
• Need for improved protection / protective equipment for medical staff.
• Major trauma of this kind has impacts, maybe long term, on staff.
Stephen House, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service
• Cost to the Metropolitan Police so far - £100 million.
• Had conducted an exercise (Atlantic Blue) within the last year which had a
similar scenario to the terrorist incident on 7th July
• Have command strategy which allowed Met Police to command all three
Police forces (Metropolitan, City of London and British Transport Police).
This allowed single chain of command for a cross border event.
• Casualty Bureau – received 42,000 calls in the first hour – totally
• Since the 7th July, great deal of time and effort placed on community
reassurance which has placed a strain on police resources. Local
Authority Chief Executives’ heavily involved in this activity.
• Admitted that resources were stretched to the limit for several weeks and
had there been a continuous bombing campaign they could not have

James Hart, Commissioner of Police for the City of London
• News media were better than the Police in the initial stages in getting
• Not sufficient information was given to businesses re evacuation, leaving
buildings, returning to work etc. Clearer direction was needed.
• Business continuity plans for businesses was shown to be essential.
• Pager and e mail system that was used for alert purposes was much more
reliable and quicker than mobile phones.

Andrew Trotter, Deputy Chief Constable, British Transport Police
• Management of the media is essential and is not just a response activity.
• Need both a media conference centre and sub centres, with designated
spokespersons from “responding agencies”.
• CCTV proved invaluable in gathering evidence and for crowd control, but it
needs to be working and well maintained.
• Command structure of ‘Gold’, ‘Silver’ and ‘Bronze’ effective.

Bruce Mann, Head of Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office
• 110,000 calls to the Information Line within first 24 hours.
• Ensure distinction made publicly between Casualty Bureau and
Information Line.
• Do not rely on mobiles – there was too much reliance on them and they
failed. (Cabinet Office conducting urgent review of mobile phone
resilience in emergencies)
• Utilisation of Family Assistance Centre effective and publicly accepted.
Ron Dobson, Assistant Commissioner, London Fire Brigade
• Multi agency working is essential and there must be trust and
• Fire Officer deployed full time to SO13 (Counter-Terrorism)
• Staff responded / were deployed without knowledge of Gold.
• No agency should do things in isolation – need co-ordination.
• Need for better clarity of terminology used by different agencies.
• There must be a plan – it cannot be developed ‘on the day’.
• Improvements need to be made for informing staff and their relatives.
• Fire appliances and equipment became impounded at ‘crime scenes’ –
need for continuity plans to re-stock these resources.
• Must consider psychological welfare of staff involved.

Martin Flaherty, Deputy Chief Ambulance Officer, London Ambulance
• First 45 minutes – information vacuum.
• 50 ambulances deployed from 5 other ambulance services.
• Need for ‘hot debriefing’ of staff to gather information / potential evidence.
• Need for ‘loggists’ at critical locations.
• Liaison between Department of Health, Health Gold and the Ambulance
Service requires improvement.
• Direct lines to hospitals necessary – normal communications became
• Better distribution of casualties between hospitals required.
• Information management was very difficult, due to volume and sources.

Julie Dent (‘Health Gold’), Chief Executive, South West London SHA
• Information management – excessive amount of information which was
difficult to distil but greater problem was getting accurate information.
• Made 1200 beds available across London, but only 103 casualties
admitted to hospital.
• Early clamour for casualty information and breakdown of figures caused
• Need dedicated phone line from ‘Health Gold’ to Multi-Agency Gold.
• Terminology needs clarification e.g. to Health, the word casualties means
people who need care – for Emergency Services it also includes
deceased persons.

Tim O’Toole, Managing Director, London Underground
• Ensure staff dedicated are trained and understand their roles and
• Ensure your staff do not have to rely on the media for information.
• Need identified for more CCTV cameras and upgrading of present system.

Peter Hendy, Managing Director – Surface Transport, Transport for London
• Withdrew buses from central zone but couldn’t get advice from Police.
• Not sufficient co-ordination of press statements regarding public transport,
when it would be in-instated etc.
• Need clearer public messages to both staff and public.

Any Barr, Network Co-ordination Manager, London Underground
• Need to start building the recovery stage whilst still dealing with the
management of the incident.
• Delegate member of staff to be the Liaison Officer with Government Office
/ COBRA – vast demand for information.
• Must have pre-arranged protocols for getting key staff through Police

Peter Rogers, Chief Executive, Westminster City Council – Gold Recovery Group
• 7th July was confusion.
• Faith and race dimensions were challenging.
• Tried and tested Temporary Mortuary plan is essential.
• Need an Imprest Store for Mortuary, with quick re-ordering regime.
• Resources need to be planned and scalable.
• Ensure contact details are correct – call out arrangements tested.
• Have and utilise mutual aid arrangements.
• Providing a memorial garden at short notice and dealing with floral tributes
created problems.
• Procedures in respect of (a) anticipating and (b) using the media better
were exposed.
• Local authorities must be receptive to the needs of victims.
• Funding is a key issue.

Kevin Gordon, Project Manager, London Mass Fatalities Working Group &
Major Muriel McClenahan, Salvation Army, Project Manager Welfare Plan

• Size of temporary mortuary will stay the same no matter how many deaths
there are – there are only finite number of pathologists and mortuary
• Temporary Mortuary – open 0800 x 2000 daily – 250 staff on site at any
time. Tanked water in and sewage out.
• Used chilled refrigeration units rather than vehicle trailers.
All victims were identified through dental records.
• 56 deaths, including 4 bombers, – 1285 body parts.
• Body / family viewing area required – have a floral garden within it and
main room should have no religious symbolism present.
• Need a national register of mortuary technicians.
• Family Assistance Centres will become a feature during all future major
In some ways she was far more acute than Winston, and far less susceptible to Party propaganda. Once when he happened in some connection to mention the war against Eurasia, she startled him by saying casually that in her opinion the war was not happening. The rocket bombs which fell daily on London were probably fired by the Government of Oceania itself, "just to keep the people frightened." -- George Orwell, 1984

Joined: 04 Dec 2005, 17:55

11 Sep 2010, 20:27 #3

Code: Select all
Some strange figures from Andy Barr.
Casualty Figures
• The number of fatalities was 52 (excluding the bombers.)
• 7 from the Liverpool Street / Aldgate incident.
• 7 from the Edgware Road incident.
• 24 from the Kings Cross / Russell Square incident.
• 14 from the bus
Follow the numbers.