2010-11-03 Hearing Transcripts

Circumstances at each of the four scenes immediately following the explosions.

2010-11-03 Hearing Transcripts

Joined: 26 Nov 2005, 01:46

03 Nov 2010, 15:42 #1

Oral Judgement on RIPA / Closed process

Witnesses: Alan Treacy LAS, Tony Biles LFB MIAT, Gary Burnham Tube Lines ERU, Richard Travers MPS EXPO, Andrew Meneely DC Scotland Yard & Forensics Examiner
Statement of: Kenneth Murphy LAS (read)

Code: Select all

Hearing transcripts

3 November 2010 - Morning session

1 Wednesday, 3 November 2010
2 (10.00 am)
3 (Draft ruling removed pending approval)
4 (11.00 am)
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. Timetable?
6 Discussion re timetable
7 MR KEITH: My Lady, I hope you will allow me to say on
8 behalf of all the Bar that we are very grateful for the
9 speed and self-evident thoroughness with which my Lady
10 has given judgment.
11 In relation to timetable, my Lady, the arguments
12 have been trailed for longer in advance than those
13 in April and they are narrower in scope. In those
14 circumstances, may I invite you to invite everybody to
15 consider within one week, rather than the 14 days
16 I think we had in April, any challenge to my Lady's
17 ruling?
18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. Mr O'Connor?
19 MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: We agree, my Lady.
21 MR HALL: Madam, we are just taking instructions about how
22 swiftly we can move. I understand the need to go as
23 quickly as possible. Seven days is very tight.
24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is, but you have had quite a long
25 time to consider the various permutations, Mr Hall.


1 MR HALL: I understand. There are a lot of people to
2 consider the permutations, unfortunately. Can I just
3 wait until that call is made or perhaps get a message to
4 you? But I'm reluctant to formally concede seven days
5 at this stage until those have been taken.
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does anybody else have any
7 submissions? Right. Well, I think, Mr Hall, I will say
8 seven days subject to hearing further argument from you,
9 if you are instructed to put forward other submissions.
10 Mr Hall, could I also urge those whom you represent
11 to pursue, if my ruling stands, the possibility of
12 finding a way whereby Counsel to the Inquests could see
13 the RIPA material? I am concerned about the argument
14 which I did take very much on board that, if my counsel
15 are to do their job properly, and I am not to remain, as
16 Mr O'Connor put it, metaphorically naked, that Counsel
17 to the Inquest should see it.
18 Now, I looked through the Act. I can see how
19 prosecuting counsel get access to RIPA material in
20 a criminal trial, but I wasn't quite sure how the
21 Secretary of State's lawyers do and, if there's any way
22 through that quagmire, I would be really grateful.
23 MR HALL: I follow.
24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Even if it was only for the Secretary
25 of State, for example, technically to instruct counsel


1 to present the material to me, not to argue it, but just
2 to present it. It seemed to me there ought to be a way
3 through it.
4 MR HALL: I follow.

6 Very well, back to the hearing, I think, Mr Keith.
7 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes. May I invite you to call
8 Alan Treacy?
9 MR ALAN TREACY (sworn)
10 Questions by MR KEITH
11 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?
12 A. Alan Treacy.
13 Q. Mr Treacy, at the time of the making of your statement
14 in 2005 you'd worked for the London Ambulance Service
15 for 19 years as a paramedic?
16 A. I did.
17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Treacy, I'm sorry you have been
18 kept waiting. I think you were here yesterday as well.
19 A. I was, yes.
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I am very sorry, I'm afraid we do our
21 best not to inconvenience witnesses, but sometimes it
22 just happens.
23 A. I understand.
24 MR KEITH: On that morning, were you crewed with
25 a Mr Philip Green in an ambulance?


1 A. I was.
2 Q. Was your call sign N, November, 315?
3 A. I believe so.
4 Q. If I may summarise it for you, I think you were called
5 to attend Liverpool Street just after 9.00, but on the
6 way you were diverted to Aldgate?
7 A. I think we actually got to Liverpool Street and we
8 diverted after we got to Liverpool Street.
9 Q. Did you speak to somebody at Liverpool Street who said
10 "There's nothing happening here"?
11 A. I believe so.

12 Q. If we could have on the screen [LAS565-6], we can see at
13 the top:
14 "N315", which is your call sign, "Redbase. CAC: No
15 reply."
16 Then at the bottom of the page at 09.11, N315:
17 "Redbase. CAC: Go ahead. You're sending us to
18 Liverpool Street, but you have also sent us another call
19 down. Which one do you want us to go on?" [LAS565-7]
20 There was plainly some debate with CAC as to where
21 you should go. If we could then look at page 17 [LAS565-17], at
22 09.21, second from the bottom, "CAC: N315 dispatched to
23 CAD 761, Aldgate."
24 Can you just tell us what that text message means,
25 as far as you understand it?


1 A. I would imagine that someone from the CAC has dispatched
2 us to Aldgate.
3 Q. Right. Does the time 09.21 seem to you to be about
4 right in relation to the time at which you were
5 dispatched to Aldgate?
6 A. I've got no idea.

7 Q. You can't say. All right.
8 When you arrived, do you recall there being already
9 in attendance another ambulance crew, crewed by
10 a Mr Cumner and a Ms Ray?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. We know they arrived somewhere around 09.14, so that
13 would put your attendance at 09.21, if it was about
14 right.
15 Did you go down to the tunnel?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Did you go down on your own or with somebody else?
18 A. I went down with a colleague.
19 Q. Now, do you recall who it was?
20 A. It was Craig Cassidy.

21 Q. Do you recall, when you went down with him, whether or
22 not he had already been down?
23 A. No, he hadn't.
24 Q. Or was this his first trip down?
25 A. We sort of arrived more or less together, and we went


1 down together.
2 Q. What did you take with you?
3 A. I know I took a paramedic bag, but I probably -- I must
4 have taken a defibrillator as well, and probably
5 a dressings kit.
6 Q. Could you keep your voice up, please, Mr Treacy? It's
7 very hard to hear in this large courtroom.
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. What makes you think you may have taken a defibrillator?
10 A. Because I used a defibrillator on the scene, so I must
11 have taken one down with me.

12 Q. Right. Could we have on the screen [INQ8380-1]? This is
13 a plan that you marked.
14 Do you recollect through which door you entered the
15 carriage?
16 A. I think it was double doors D6.
17 Q. That's certainly the door referred to in your statement.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Was the first person you saw a young female at the point
20 at which you've marked A?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Can you tell us, please, what you recall of her?
23 A. She was -- as I say, a young female. She was gravely
24 ill and she was in an unusual position where she was
25 more or less wrapped around a handrail that was, if


1 I recall, bent over as well.
2 Q. Was there anybody near her or helping her?
3 A. She was laying across the laps of a couple of people,
4 and I think there might have been another female helping
5 her or holding her, I can't remember exactly.
6 Q. In your statement, you say you were told that the girl
7 had been verbalising a few minutes before you arrived.
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. I don't know whether that was an expression actually
10 used at the time, but somebody must have told you that.
11 Do you recall who it was?
12 A. I think it was a female. I can't remember if it was the
13 female who was sitting or a different female.

14 Q. Or possibly the female who was assisting her and holding
15 her?
16 A. Possibly.
17 Q. When you arrived, could you see any signs of movement or
18 of consciousness?
19 A. No.
20 Q. What did you do?
21 A. I did, briefly, pulse check, checked her over briefly
22 and decided that she needed to get on to the ground to
23 render further aid, if it was necessary.
24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, I'm finding it hard to
25 hear. I don't know if Mr and Mrs Taylor are as well.


1 MR KEITH: I am too, Mr Treacy. Could you please keep your
2 voice up. So --
3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You have to compete with the fan,
4 apart from anything else, Mr Treacy.
5 A. I'll try, I'll try.
6 MR KEITH: You checked her pulse. Was that in her wrist or
7 her neck?
8 A. In her neck.
9 Q. Do you recall what signs, if any, there were of a pulse?
10 A. There was no pulse.
11 Q. There was no pulse?
12 A. No pulse.
13 Q. You said that she needed then to be placed on the ground
14 for to you render further aid. What further aid were
15 you anticipating giving her?
16 A. I was anticipating opening her airway and seeing if
17 there was any further signs of life and, if not, then
18 she would have been deceased.

19 Q. Your statement records how she was gently removed from
20 around the pole and laid on the ground. Having laid her
21 down, what further tests did you carry out?
22 A. I decided to put an ECG on her just to make sure there
23 was nothing further I could do, rather than -- I know
24 we're only supposed to open the airway and, if they
25 don't breathe, then that's it, they're dead. But


1 I decided, because she was so young, she might be viable
2 to respond well to resuscitation efforts, but
3 unfortunately, she was in asystole, her pupils were
4 fixed and dilated, so at that point I decided that there
5 was nothing I could do, unfortunately.
6 Q. When you say that the reading was asystolic, what does
7 that mean?
8 A. There was no organised electrical activity in the heart,
9 it was just a straight line.
10 Q. No electrical activity in the heart, just a straight
11 line?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Because there was no electrical activity and a straight
14 line, did that have some bearing on whether or not she
15 could be resuscitated, for example, by use of
16 a defibrillator?
17 A. You can't defibrillate somebody if they're asystole.

18 Q. Can you give us some idea of how long you tended to the
19 young girl for?
20 A. Minutes, probably, minutes.
21 Q. In your statement -- sorry, in your plan, you have then
22 marked a person as being located at point B. We'll see
23 in a moment that, according to your statement, that was
24 a deceased male, possibly blond or fair-haired, but
25 I want to ask you first about whether you are sure that


1 B was the correct spot.
2 Is it possible that the next person you then tended
3 to was further along the carriage nearer the bomb, or
4 are you sure that they were in the double door area near
5 D6, that is quite close to the first person, the young
6 lady you tended to?
7 A. After consideration, I think I might be wrong on that
8 position.
9 Q. What makes you think you might be wrong, not just
10 because I have put it to you, but ...
11 A. No, because I remember, where Carrie was, there was
12 no -- as far as I was aware, there was no injuries
13 further in that carriage, they were all further down
14 towards the bombsite.
15 Q. Where, now, do you think person B may have been?

16 A. Further towards the -- where the bomb went off.
17 Q. In the double door area D7, D6, perhaps, nearer the
18 bomb?
19 A. The -- probably more D8.[Richard Ellery, this is not the 1st witness to place him at D6 rather than D8]
20 Q. Sorry, I've said D7, I meant to say between D7 and D8,
21 right. Tell us, please, what you can recall of
22 person B.

23 A. From recollection, he was a young, fair-haired male with
24 a blue and white striped shirt on.
25 Q. Was he moving?


1 A. No.
2 Q. Were there any signs of life?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Did you again undertake a test of his pulse?
5 A. I did.
6 Q. Neck or wrist?
7 A. Neck.
8 Q. Did you again apply an ECG?
9 A. I believe so.
10 Q. What was the reading?
11 A. Again, asystole again.
12 Q. That is to say there was a flatline and no electrical
13 activity?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Does that therefore mean that there was simply no
16 purpose to be gained in applying a defibrillator
17 machine?
18 A. Correct.

19 Q. In your statement, you also describe how there were
20 a number of people on the floor of the carriage adjacent
21 to seats 20 and 21, and you've marked their position as
22 C. Tell us, please, what you can recall of them.
23 A. I believe it was two people. One had severe head
24 injuries and, from recollection, the other one was --
25 had some limbs missing, and that's as far as I can


1 recall on that.
2 Q. Was their state such that there was nothing to be gained
3 in seeking evidence of a pulse?
4 A. No, they were clearly dead, they were clearly dead.
5 Q. No further steps were taken by you to ascertain whether
6 life was extinct?
7 A. No.
8 Q. You've marked on your plan, at D, the location of yet
9 a further person. Can you recall, please, what you
10 remember of D? [Shouldn't this be the position of Richard Ellery?]
11 A. I can't recall too much about that at all, to be honest.
12 Q. In your statement, you say there was at least one male
13 deceased person on the floor at the position marked D.
14 So you must certainly, at the time of your statement,
15 have recollected that he was male.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Do you recollect anything at all about the extent of his
18 injuries?
19 A. Not now.
20 Q. Do we take it from the fact that you made an observation
21 that he was dead that there was, at the time, nothing,
22 it seemed to you, that could be done for him?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. You describe in your statement also the treatment of
25 a lady in the rear of the carriage who had lost her left


1 hand, we know that to be Kira Mason, and she was in the
2 vicinity of 15 and 16, and also a lady, Martine Wright,
3 who had -- you described them as horrific lower leg
4 injuries, who was near 18, and who had a tourniquet
5 applied and a man at 17 who also had had a traumatic
6 amputation and had a rudimentary tourniquet applied.
7 Did you tend to them?
8 A. I don't think so. I think my colleagues were attending
9 to both those.
10 Q. So after you had moved through the carriage and seen the
11 people at A, B, C and D, what did you do?
12 A. I just assisted my colleagues in extracting the people
13 out the carriage.
14 Q. That meant getting them out of the wreckage, helping
15 them being stretchered out --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- and assisting the Fire Brigade in that process?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. There were obviously a number of Fire Brigade
20 firefighters there at this time. Whilst you were
21 progressing through the carriage and, firstly, looking
22 after the young lady at A, do you recall where your
23 colleagues were, in particular Mr Cassidy?
24 A. He was further down the carriage towards double doors
25 D8. He went to that side.


1 Q. So he went there first, whereas you went --
2 A. I think he came in with me at D8 -- D6 initially, and
3 I might have said to him "I can cope. You go to the
4 other carriage", because we couldn't physically get from
5 D6 to D8 without actually going out of the train because
6 of the amount of debris between.

7 Q. Do you recall any other paramedics being in the near
8 vicinity of these casualties?
9 A. I remember Steve Jones being somewhere on the train,
10 I can't, I can't --
11 Q. Do you recall whether he was there throughout or may
12 there have come a time when he left the train?
13 A. I've got no idea.
14 Q. You can't recall. Were there any other people who may
15 have been paramedics that you recall in the carriage?
16 A. I know there were other paramedics there, but I couldn't
17 tell you who they were.
18 Q. You don't know who they were. Now, one more question,
19 please, in relation to the person at B, who we now know
20 was in the vicinity of D8. You placed an ECG machine on
21 him and ascertained that he was asystolic.
22 Do you recall there being any other signs, were
23 there any signs that he had been treated; for example,
24 was there an oxygen mask on his face, of any type?
25 A. I don't recall there being one.


1 Q. Do you recollect anybody else approaching B and
2 providing medical assistance, perhaps the HEMS doctor
3 who we know was on the train?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Nobody else?
6 A. No.
7 Q. You mentioned earlier that you had taken a defibrillator
8 and you thought that you had because, as you've just
9 told us, you'd used it. On whom did you use it?
10 A. On Carrie Taylor and the gentleman at B, in figure B.
11 Q. Just so that we're clear about this, is that a different
12 piece of equipment from the ECG device --
13 A. No, it's the same, it's a small defibrillator.
14 Q. Lastly, I want to ask you about, in general terms, what
15 you did that day. Could we have, please, on the screen
16 [LAS21-4]?
17 You refer in the middle of the page to a conscious
18 decision to enter the scene, despite reservations that
19 you had for your own safety, and you felt an obligation
20 of care to the victims of the blast. If we could then
21 have it off the screen, please. Did there come a time
22 when there was some discussion of the risk of secondary
23 devices?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you recall whether that moment came whilst you were


1 still tending to casualties in the carriage?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. So did you, therefore, consciously decide that,
4 notwithstanding that risk, you would stay?
5 A. Yes.
6 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. Will you stay there,
7 please?
8 A. Thank you.
10 Questions by MR COLTART
11 MR COLTART: Just two or three questions, Mr Treacy, if we
12 may, on timings.
13 I think we've established that you arrived at
14 Aldgate at about 9.21. We know, at that stage, that in
15 the entrance to the Tube station there were various
16 meetings going on and discussions between the various
17 members of the emergency services. Were you involved in
18 any of those discussions or meetings before you went
19 down to the platform and on to the carriage?
20 A. I had a brief discussion with my colleagues as to the
21 situation, because obviously Tony and Andrea arrived
22 first, so I just quickly spoke to them and they said
23 "There's casualties downstairs, they've declared a major
24 incident".
25 My colleague, Phil Green, I asked him to stay up to


1 triage casualties coming up, and I decided that I would
2 go down and do what I could downstairs.
3 Q. So you were pretty swiftly downstairs and onto the
4 platform?
5 A. It probably took less than 30 seconds to a minute.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Who was your colleague going to
8 triage?
9 A. Anybody coming up. There was -- by that stage, there
10 was at least three colleagues upstairs who could deal
11 with anybody coming up, so I thought I was better
12 employed downstairs on the train.
13 MR COLTART: You went with Craig Cassidy?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Are you able to recall now whether this was to be his
16 first trip down on to the carriage or whether he had
17 already been down once and come back up again?
18 A. No, this was his first trip.
19 Q. Finally this, please: are you able to estimate how long
20 you were dealing with Ms Taylor when you first got on to
21 the carriage before you went over and applied your ECG
22 machine to the young man at point B?
23 A. It would be a guess, but I would say five minutes maybe.
24 I could be wrong on that.
25 MR COLTART: We appreciate it's very difficult now. Okay,


1 thank you.
3 Questions by MR SAUNDERS
4 MR SAUNDERS: You've obviously had a chance, Mr Treacy, to
5 look at your statement before coming in to give your
6 evidence. At the conclusion of it, in dealing with
7 Aldgate before you then go on to deal with moving to
8 Russell Square,
you say on the carriage you recall
9 seeing Steve Jones, the motorcycle paramedic. My Lady,
10 it's your page 3.
11 Your colleague, Phil Green, also came on board.
12 Now, you've just told the gentleman that was asking
13 questions, and her Ladyship, that Mr Green was triaging
14 upstairs. There was obviously a point where he moves
15 from there on to the carriage.
16 A. That's right.
17 Q. "[They] also came on board ... in addition to the HEMS
18 doctor and the colleague I initially went underground
19 with."
20 You've told us, and confirmed, that that colleague
21 would be Cassidy, Craig Cassidy?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Did you go underground before the HEMS doctor arrived?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. We have heard evidence already, Mr Treacy, that next to


1 Carrie Taylor, as you know her to have been, was another
2 young lady called Fiona Stevenson. You've described
3 already Carrie's position on the lap of Crystal Main who
4 was in seat number 22.
5 In seat 21, the young man called Bruce Lait, who's
6 described how he had Fiona Stevenson positioned on top
7 of him. You were responsible for removing Carrie.
8 I think that's right, isn't it?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you at any stage remove the young lady next to
11 Carrie, who we know to be Fiona Stevenson?

12 A. I don't recall doing that. [Has anyone mentioned Fiona apart from Bruce Lait?]
13 Q. You again have -- and we appreciate it's a long time
14 ago -- mentioned that position C -- can we have back
15 your plan so that you have it in mind, [INQ8380-1]? Thank
16 you very much indeed.
17 Position A is obviously Carrie, Carrie Taylor.
18 Position C you've described as being two people, not
19 three.
20 A. From my recollection, it was two.

21 Q. Yes. We understand that there were originally two but,
22 by the end, when all of those who survived and were
23 living and able to be moved were moved, Fiona Stevenson
24 ends up in that vicinity. What the Stevensons are
25 trying to find out is who was it that may have moved


1 her. Do you understand?
2 A. I do.
3 Q. But at the time you're there, your recollection was,
4 when you made your statement on 30 November, there were
5 two at position C.

6 A. If that's what I said, yes.
7 Q. In fairness to you, you said:
8 "I saw two people on the floor of the carriage
9 adjacent to seats 20, 21."
10 That's what you've marked there. Then you go on to
11 describe them, and how badly injured, "but sufficient
12 that I could tell it was two people" is what you say.
13 But you can't help, you have no recollection of
14 maybe moving somebody to free Mr Lait who, after that
15 happens, we're told was able himself to get off the
16 carriage and to go back to the Underground?
17 A. I've no recollection of moving that lady.
18 Q. You don't remember, in fact, a male getting off the
19 carriage either?
20 A. There were a number of walking wounded who got off at
21 that time.
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. And at the time, it was full of smoke, it was pitch
24 dark. I had a small torch that I was trying to work
25 with.


1 Q. Your concentration was on Carrie at that moment?
2 A. Exactly.
3 MR SAUNDERS: All right. Thank you very much indeed,
4 Mr Treacy.
6 Questions by MS SHEFF
7 MS SHEFF: Just following on from that, Mr Treacy, of those
8 two people that you saw at C, was it one of them who had
9 the severe head injuries?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Was that a woman with long dark hair, can you remember?
12 A. I can't remember.
13 Q. Maybe wearing denim, a denim jacket?
14 A. I can't recall.
15 Q. You can't tell what gender that person was, but it was
16 certainly one of the two with a head injury?
17 A. Yes, possibly at the time I could have been able to tell
18 you, but five years later, I can't remember.
19 Q. Were those two bodies on top of each other?
20 A. I seem to recall them on the floor next to the seats,
21 adjacent to each other. I can't say for sure whether
22 they were on top of each other.
23 Q. Do you think the person with the severe head injury was
24 actually on top of the person underneath?[Why not refer to his statement?]
25 A. I can't remember, I can't remember.


1 Q. I know, it's very difficult after this time.
2 A. I've tried hard to forget for the last five years.
3 Q. Of course, and a hugely traumatic scene.
4 A. Yes.
5 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much for trying to assist us.
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Sheff. Any other
7 questions?
8 MS SIMCOCK: My Lady, I don't know if Mr Taylor has any?
9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Taylor, would you like to ask your
10 questions now?
11 This is Mr Taylor, the father of Carrie.
12 Questions by MR TAYLOR
13 MR TAYLOR: Good morning, Mr Treacy.
14 A. Good morning.
15 Q. I'd just like to ask you a few questions about Carrie.
16 You were the person that actually saw Carrie.
17 You say when you first arrived and saw Carrie, you
18 said that she was gravely ill. That doesn't say to me
19 that she was actually passed away. Did you get the
20 sense that she had passed away straightaway or perhaps
21 at a later time?
22 A. She was certainly pulseless when I checked her
23 initially.
24 Q. She had no pulse?
25 A. She had no pulse.


1 Q. No breathing?
2 A. No breathing, no pulse.
3 Q. There was no gurgling noise, no noise coming from her at
4 all?
5 A. She made no noise at all.
6 Q. You say there was a lady doctor with her, a lady with
7 her?
8 A. There was possibly a lady with her, but she was
9 certainly across the lap of a young lady.
10 Q. Across the lap of a young lady. You didn't see a lady
11 doctor, a Dr Quaghebeur, with her, supporting her?
12 A. There were a number of people still milling around on
13 the train at that point, I'm not quite sure who -- she
14 may well have identified herself as a doctor, I can't
15 recall.
16 Q. Okay. Now, when someone is asystolic, I think the word
17 is, flatlined, basically, there's no point in using
18 a defibrillator machine because it doesn't work,
19 basically?
20 A. It doesn't work for that.
21 Q. What can you do after that? Can you use CPR on
22 a patient?
23 A. If it was an individual patient and not a major
24 incident, you could use -- for someone who is in a blunt
25 trauma cardiac arrest, you could use CPR for five


1 minutes and, if there was no pulse after five minutes,
2 we would stop.
3 Q. Obviously, this was a mass casualty incident. Can you
4 use drugs on them? Can you use a drug on them, can you
5 use atropine or --
6 A. You can use adrenalin and atropine for asystole.
7 Q. That's the normal procedure you would do if you went to
8 a single --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. But in this case, obviously, you were concerned about
11 other people?
12 A. I was, and the major incident -- our protocols are just
13 to open the airway and, if there's no sign of pulse or
14 breathing after that, then we don't normally continue,
15 but because Carrie was so young, I decided to go a bit
16 further and see if there was any possibility of a pulse,
17 but, unfortunately, there was nothing.

18 Q. At that time, your other colleague was going around and
19 he was putting the triage numbers on other people, was
20 he?
21 A. I was not aware of what he was doing, sorry.
22 Q. Now, you helped remove Carrie from the pole, the metal
23 pole.
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Did anybody else help you?


1 A. From recollection, I don't remember anybody being there,
2 but that's my recollection now. It might have been
3 different at the time.

4 Q. I would imagine that would be quite difficult.
5 Had the pole pierced Carrie's body?
6 A. No.
7 Q. From there, you took Carrie and you laid her on the
8 makeshift stretcher?
9 A. We -- initially, I laid her on the floor, initially, to
10 open the airway and put the defibrillator pads on, and
11 then, from there, we put her on a stretcher and got her
12 off the train.
13 Q. Okay. Basically, what injuries did you notice with
14 Carrie?
15 A. I didn't see any -- I don't recall seeing any injuries.
16 Q. None at all?

17 A. Not from recollection. I can't remember.
18 Q. Thank you very much, sir.
19 A. Sorry I can't be more helpful than that, but I just
20 don't remember any injuries on her.
21 MR TAYLOR: Thank you very much. Thank you for what you
22 did.
23 A. I'm sorry I couldn't be more useful.
24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Ms Simcock?
25 Questions by MS SIMCOCK


1 MS SIMCOCK: I wonder if we could clarify the timings of
2 your arrival, Mr Treacy. Could we have on screen,
3 please, [LAS565-15]?
4 There's an entry there at 9.20, third from the
5 bottom, if that could just be highlighted. Your
6 ambulance was call sign N315, is that right?
7 A. I believe so, yes.
8 Q. We see there "N315 at RVP". Timed at 9.20. When you
9 went to Aldgate station, where did you park your
10 ambulance?
11 A. We parked behind Tony Cumner's ambulance, first
12 ambulance on scene.
13 Q. Which was call sign N301, also mentioned there. When
14 you arrived on scene, how long do you think it took you
15 from attending and parking up your ambulance to getting
16 to the train? I appreciate timings are difficult.
17 A. Less than one to two minutes. Just however long it took
18 to walk down there, basically.
19 Q. Can I ask you about how you received the call to attend
20 an incident initially at Liverpool Street and then to
21 Aldgate? Were you on station at the time?
22 A. We were.
23 Q. Does that mean you were physically at the ambulance
24 station?
25 A. That's correct, yes.


1 Q. Do you remember how you received the call to attend?
2 Was it a verbal instruction?
3 A. It was via telephone.
4 Q. Was that instruction also by telephone followed up by
5 a call being sent to your mobile data terminal in the
6 ambulance?
7 A. I think the system is that both are sent simultaneously,
8 they call us and the call is sent down to the MDT as
9 well, and in the ambulance.
10 Q. Does it sometimes occur that you are given an
11 instruction on station to attend and it only later comes
12 through to your mobile data terminal when you're
13 en route?
14 A. It's possible, yes.
15 Q. Can you recall, if that was the case, on the day?
16 A. I don't recall that.
17 Q. Just dealing with when you went down to the train, then,
18 your recollection, so we're clear, is you went down with
19 Craig Cassidy a paramedic, is that right?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. You stayed on the train and never left until you leave
22 finally at the end, is that right?
23 A. I stayed on the train until it was declared a crime
24 scene by the police and we left then.
25 Q. So you're not one of the paramedics who goes back up to


1 the surface and returns to the train?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Mr Cassidy's evidence was that he also went down to the
4 train, remained on the train, and never left until he
5 finally left the scene. Do you remember him being with
6 you on the train throughout?
7 A. He was further down the carriage throughout -- he wasn't
8 physically with me, but he was on the train with me,
9 yes.
10 Q. Just finally, can we have on screen, please, [LAS-CAP-42]?
11 You've been asked about a defibrillator machine. Is
12 the top picture there the picture of the defibrillator
13 you had on the day?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. That's what you used on Carrie Taylor and
16 Richard Ellery?
17 A. That's right.
18 MS SIMCOCK: I'm very grateful, thank you, my Lady.
19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Any other questions for
20 Mr Treacy?
21 Thank you very much, Mr Treacy. I have a question.
22 As far as you were concerned, there you were on the
23 train trying to help these desperately injured people.
24 Did you ever get the impression that there weren't
25 enough paramedics to help or that there wasn't enough


1 equipment?
2 A. We could always do with more help, obviously, but
3 I think more paramedics would probably have just got in
4 the way, basically, because a lot of the people were
5 walking wounded, so as soon as they were triaged, we got
6 them off, then it was just a case of getting people who
7 were trapped or injured off. So we probably had enough
8 resources there.
9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you weren't aware of calls for
10 either more people or calls for stretchers or anything?
11 Things seemed to be there when you needed them?
12 A. I asked for stretchers and the Fire Brigade conveyed
13 that to my colleagues upstairs and we got stretchers.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Was there any delay in your asking
15 for stretchers and, when you actually needed them,
16 having them there?

17 A. No.
18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, that's all I have to ask you.
19 Thank you very much, Mr Treacy. I'm sure it's of great
20 comfort to people like Mr and Mrs Taylor, and indeed
21 others, to know that you bravely risked your life to go
22 and try and help their daughter and the other
23 desperately injured people. Thank you very much.
24 A. Thank you.
25 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Hay will read the next statement and


1 call the next --
2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I am wondering whether --
3 MR KEITH: Yes, my Lady, that may be a convenient point.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I am told we have a lot to do and,
5 therefore, I am being asked to shorten the break. Can
6 we survive on five or ten minutes?
7 MR KEITH: We hope to take a slightly more brutal approach
8 to some of the read evidence this afternoon, so there
9 may be a little room for manoeuvre.
10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: All right, I think that, given that
11 we had a long judgment to start with, we'll take
12 a ten-minute break.
13 (11.38 am)
14 (A short break)
15 (11.48 am)
17 MR HAY: My Lady, may I read the statement of Kenneth Murphy
18 dated 3 December 2005, which has the usual declaration
19 of truth?
20 Statement of MR KENNETH MURPHY
21 "I am employed by the London Ambulance Service
22 NHS Trust as a team leader. I am stationed at Waterloo
23 ambulance station. I have worked for the London
24 Ambulance Service for 20 years and I have been a team
25 leader for three years, I am a fully qualified


1 paramedic.
2 "As a team leader, I am responsible for supervising
3 between 16 and 20 staff. On Thursday, 7 July 2005,
4 I was working a 6.30 am to a 3 pm shift. I was crewed
5 up with Eoin Walker on an ambulance, our call sign was
6 Echo 104 (E104). Eoin was driving the ambulance that
7 shift and I was attending. We were actually working out
8 of Bloomsbury ambulance station, which is a satellite
9 station of Waterloo.
10 "At around 9.10 that morning we were at
11 University College Hospital, Euston Road, when one of
12 the receptionists told me there had been a doctor
13 en route to work and he had been evacuated from a Tube
14 train because of a power surge. As a result of being
15 told this, I called our control room at the LAS
16 headquarters to see whether any incidents had been
17 reported. A member of control room staff told me they
18 were receiving multiple calls to incidents at Aldgate
19 and King's Cross Underground stations and I was to make
20 my way to King's Cross.[But he went to Aldgate instead! KX or Russell Square were much closer]
21 "Whilst en route we were listening to radio messages
22 being passed between other LAS staff attending the
23 incidents and Control. One message came over from
24 a unit at Aldgate requesting that 30 ambulances attend
25 that location, that it was a major incident with


1 multiple casualties and fatalities. I do not know who
2 passed that radio message, other than to say it was
3 a male and obviously one of the first crews to arrive at
4 Aldgate.

5 "Upon hearing the message, I told Eoin, who was
6 driving, to head for Aldgate station. We arrived at
7 Aldgate at approximately 9.20.
On arrival, I recall
8 seeing Andrea Ray and Tony Cumner, colleagues from
9 Waterloo ambulance station. Andrea had been given the
10 role of Bronze parking, and I believe Tony was busy
11 triaging casualties who were emerging from the
12 Underground platforms. Within five minutes of me
13 getting to the scene, I was given a handheld radio and
14 told by Tony Parnell, who is a duty station officer with
15 the LAS, to go to the train and assess what was
16 required.
17 "I recall asking a number of firemen to accompany me
18 underground. We took with us a number of stretchers
19 from one of the LAS vehicles on the scene.

20 "We made our way to the platform. I did not see
21 many people. I believe the majority of the casualties
22 and passengers who were able to walk had by this time
23 been brought to the surface. Once I got to the
24 platform, I could not really see the train, so
25 I descended some steps onto the lines and saw the train


1 about 100 metres into a tunnel. Together with the
2 firemen I made my way towards the train. I was at this
3 stage aware that there had been an explosion on one of
4 the train carriages.
5 "I can recall that, as we made our way towards the
6 train, I was seeing human body parts along the tracks.

7 I saw part of someone's head. The hair was singed.
8 I concentrated on getting to the train to try to help
9 any casualties who were still alive.
10 "On reaching the train, I saw there were some lights
11 on in the train, but they were very dim and everything
12 seemed to be covered in soot. When we reached the
13 carriage that had been the seat of the explosion, I saw
14 that the roof had been folded back, the sides had been
15 blown out, and there was a large hole in the floor.
16 I saw one of my LAS colleagues, Steve Jones, at the
17 carriage. He told me he thought there were four live
18 casualties on the carriage. I was still on the train
19 lines when I saw Steve. He told me it was difficult to
20 assess the scene inside the carriage due to the
21 positions of the casualties and the body parts in there.
22 "I climbed on to the carriage into the area where
23 the doors had been blasted off and I saw Dave Lockey.
24 I know Dave quite well. He is a consultant at the
25 Royal London Hospital and worked on the Helicopter


1 Emergency Medical Services. Dave was wearing a red HEMS
2 flying suit. He said that I would be better positioned
3 on the tracks outside the carriage so that he could pass
4 the casualties out to me and I could organise their
5 evacuation up to the surface. I asked one of the
6 firemen to return to the main station above ground and
7 tell the senior ambulance officer that we required five
8 more medical staff at the carriage and enough firemen to
9 carry at least five stretchers.
10 "The intention was to have a paramedic or emergency
11 medical technician accompanying each casualty from the
12 train to the surface, the stretchers being carried by
13 the firemen. When I was actually standing in the
14 carriage, I can recall seeing some severely injured and
15 traumatised people, but I cannot say which casualties
16 were alive or dead and I could not say now where within
17 the carriage they were. I was concentrating totally on
18 what Dave was instructing me to do.
19 "I think there was another doctor in the carriage
20 and possibly a police officer or a fireman, but I cannot
21 be sure. I got back down onto the tracks and Dave
22 passed the first casualty out to us. The casualty was
23 male. He was not really conscious, but he was moaning.
24 This man had sustained significant lower limb injuries.
25 One of his legs, I think the right leg, had completely


1 gone below the knee. The only description I can give of
2 this man is that he looked to be in his 40s and was
3 smartly dressed in a suit, shirt and tie.
[Andy Brown?]
4 "He was lifted from the carriage and placed on to
5 a stretcher. I think he had already been placed on an
6 intravenous drip whilst still in the carriage. With the
7 help of firemen, this casualty was carried on
8 a stretcher along the lines and up to ground level.
9 I accompanied him.
10 "When we got into the station foyer, a female HEMS
11 doctor asked me about the casualty and I quickly briefed
12 her. She administered Ketamine[see amtte's post about memory loss] to him for pain relief
13 and told us to get him to hospital. The man was put
14 into the rear of an ambulance and we took him to the
15 Royal London Hospital. I remained with the man in the
16 back of the ambulance, which was driven by a City of
17 London Police officer."
18 My Lady, Mr Murphy then goes on to explain how, once
19 he had done that, he returned to Aldgate but was then
20 sent to King's Cross where he, too, assisted with
21 a significantly injured casualty, taking that casualty
22 to hospital.
23 My Lady, the next statement which is listed to be
24 read is that of Mr Eoin Walker, Mr Murphy's crew mate
25 that day.


1 My Lady, in truth, his statement does not add very
2 much to that of Mr Murphy's. Unless there is any
3 objection, I was intending dispensing with reading that
4 statement.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well. Thank you.
6 MR HAY: My Lady, may you invite to you call Tony Biles?
8 Questions by MR HAY
9 MR HAY: Mr Biles, can you give your full name to the court,
10 please?
11 A. It's Tony Alexander Biles.
12 Q. Mr Biles, in 2005, you were a London Fire Brigade
13 station officer and you were attached to the
14 Multi-agency Initial Assessment Team?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Can you just explain to us what that team was?
17 A. MAIAT was a government pilot being run. It was for
18 a dedicated CBRN response to the capital. It was
19 consisting of specialist officers from the three
20 emergency services.
21 Q. How many MAIAT teams were there in London in 2005?
22 A. There was one team.
23 Q. How many officers did that comprise of?
24 A. It was consisting of 48 personnel divided into four
25 teams covering one shift for a 24-hour period.


1 Q. Can you just explain to us how that differs from the
2 Metropolitan Police EXPO officers, or explosives
3 officers?
4 A. MAIAT was an initial assessment team for CBRN, it wasn't
5 involved in explosives
6 Q. On 7 July 2005, I think you became aware around about
7 8.50 in the morning that there had been an explosion at
8 Liverpool Street Underground station?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. I think, although you tried to gather further
11 information at that point, it was decided that you
12 should be deployed to the scene and try to gather
13 information en route?
14 A. That's correct, I took the decision to deploy the team
15 straightaway and gather further information whilst
16 en route.
17 Q. How successful were you at gathering that information
18 en route?
19 A. The initial attendance was going to be Liverpool Street.
20 Whilst en route, my deputy actually contacted the City
21 of London Police control room, confirmed that there had
22 been an explosion, which then changed to a power surge,
23 which then changed back to an explosion on a train,
24 that was received from the City of London Police control
25 room, and we requested an RVP, which was given as


1 Liverpool Street junction at Bishopsgate.
2 Q. At any point, were you informed that there had actually
3 been a train crash rather than an explosion or a power
4 surge?
5 A. Yes, there was also information received back that there
6 was a train crash as well.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: A question, an "RVP"?
8 A. Rendezvous point, sorry, my Lady.
9 MR HAY: One to add to the list of acronyms, my Lady.
10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Not all the acronyms are as obvious
11 as that one, I'm afraid.
12 MR HAY: Did you actually arrive at Liverpool Street RVP?
13 A. Yes, we did, yes.
14 Q. Was it there that you were told to go to Aldgate?
15 A. Yes, liaised with a City of London Police sergeant who
16 instructed us that the actual incident was taking place
17 at Aldgate. Although there was persons decanting from
18 trains at Liverpool Street, they redirected us to
19 Aldgate.
[Including 204?]
20 Q. Do you recall approximately at what time you arrived at
21 Aldgate?
22 A. I suggest it was approximately 09.20 to 09.25. We did
23 start a log but, during the course of the operations, it
24 became untenable to maintain that log due to the number
25 of resources of personnel that I had available to me.


1 Q. Perhaps if we could have up on the screen [COLP18-6], and
2 I think we can see at 09.27.25, CPC3, who I believe is
3 Chief Inspector Fallows, has radioed to the control room
4 saying:
5 "MIAT coordinator with me to go to the scene."
6 Would that be referring to you?
7 A. It could possibly be.
8 Q. That seems to fit with your recollection of the time you
9 arrived at Aldgate?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. On arrival at Aldgate, what were you told had happened?
12 A. I liaised with a chief inspector from City of London
13 Police who had informed me there had been an explosion
14 on the train.
15 Q. Were you provided any further detail other than that?
16 A. Not at that time, no.

17 Q. In your role as part of the MAIAT team, presumably you
18 were concerned about both secondary devices but also the
19 prospect that the explosion or any secondary devices
20 could be CBRN?
21 A. That's correct, yes.
22 Q. Because of that, what did you do?
23 A. I instructed my team to don the appropriate personal
24 protective equipment, PPE, and make ready our detection,
25 identification and monitoring equipment that we had


1 available.
2 Q. Did you also take steps to sweep the outside of the
3 station for secondary devices?

4 A. Yes, whilst I was liaising with the inspector from the
5 City of London Police, I requested whether the front of
6 the station had been swept for secondary devices,
7 whether the area of the explosion had been swept to
8 declare it explosively safe, and secondary devices.

9 Q. Given the difference between your role and that of the
10 Metropolitan Police Service explosives officers, you
11 waited for the explosive officers to confirm there were
12 no secondary devices --
13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. -- on the train, or in the tunnel?
15 A. I had to wait before that was confirmed before
16 potentially deploying my resources.

17 Q. Now, we've heard from many members of the emergency
18 services in London Underground that, although they were
19 aware of the risk of secondary devices, the majority --
20 I think all of whom we have heard from -- opted to stay
21 in the tunnel and on the train.
22 Is it right that any concerns that there may have
23 been about secondary devices or CBRN didn't prevent
24 anyone from going down to the tunnel or train?
25 A. It did not prevent anyone going down.

�To those who are afraid of the truth, I wish to offer a few scary truths; and to those who are not afraid of the truth, I wish to offer proof that the terrorism of truth is the only one that can be of benefit to the proletariat.� -- On Terrorism and the State, Gianfranco Sanguinetti

Joined: 26 Nov 2005, 01:46

03 Nov 2010, 16:49 #2

Morning session continued
25 A. It did not prevent anyone going down.


1 Q. Can I just ask you briefly about communications at the
2 scene?
3 A. Mm-hmm.
4 Q. To what extent were you hindered by the mobile phone
5 network effectively being full to capacity?
6 A. Pretty soon after arrival, the Vodafone system that
7 I was operating on went down
. So I had to dispense with
8 that method of communicating with my deputy team leader,
9 and use him as a runner backwards and forwards from the
10 vehicles and other emergency services personnel.
11 Q. At the time, you, yourself, didn't have a radio?
12 A. We had Metropolitan Police issue radios, which wasn't
13 sufficient at that time, because we was communicating
14 with the Command team that was in attendance. So there
15 was no requirement for me to actually communicate with
16 a control room.
17 Q. We've heard some evidence that there were concerns that
18 radios may detonate a secondary device. Is that
19 something that you were aware of at the time?
20 A. It's part of our procedures that we shouldn't use
21 handheld radios within a certain amount of distance.

22 Q. Because of that, you then need to implement a system of
23 runners to ensure that communication is effective?
24 A. No, for this incident, I used a runner solely because my
25 mobile phone had ceased to operate.


1 Q. So the same concern about radios detonating a secondary
2 device doesn't extend to mobile phones?
3 A. It does, yes, but not on this particular occasion. My
4 runner was solely because my mobile phone had crashed.

5 Q. I see. There came a point, I understand, when the
6 Metropolitan Police explosives officers informed you
7 that Aldgate wasn't a CBRN incident?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Because of that, you and your teams were redeployed to
10 the other incidents occurring in London?

11 A. Prior to that, we convened a Silver meeting, where it
12 was declared that all saveable life had ceased or any
13 rescues.
It was at that time that a decision was made
14 to redeploy MAIAT to the other locations which we was
15 aware of now as multi-sited events. I had to take the
16 decision there, because of multi-sited events, to split
17 the team in two. I then contacted the special
18 operations room at New Scotland Yard to determine the
19 location of the other events, split the team in two; one
20 vehicle went to Edgware Road and I then went to
21 Tavistock Square first and then on to King's Cross
22 later.
[Not Russell Square?]
23 Q. I just want to ask you, briefly, about Tavistock Square
24 and King's Cross. At Tavistock Square you were also
25 informed -- was it fairly quickly -- that it wasn't


1 a CBRN incident?
2 A. As soon as I approached the scene, I was notified by
3 an explosives officers driver that there was no CBRN
4 involvement there. I contacted the special operations
5 room again and informed them and I was then redeployed
6 to King's Cross.
7 Q. Are you able to say at what time approximately you
8 arrived at King's Cross?
9 A. I have no idea of the timescale.
10 Q. The Silver meeting at Aldgate, we understand, was at
11 about 10.30. Does that seem right to you?
12 A. It's possible, yes.
13 Q. Using that as perhaps a starting point, are you able to
14 say how long after that you think you might have arrived
15 at King's Cross?
16 A. I would suggest it would have been 10.50 to 11.00 at
17 Tavistock Square and then approximately 11.15, 11.20
18 King's Cross.

19 Q. When you arrived at King's Cross, there was less
20 clarity, was there, as to whether or not it may be
21 a CBRN incident?
22 A. It couldn't be confirmed, because I attended a Silver
23 meeting with a senior divisional officer, Terry Adams
24 and Assistant Commissioner Nick Collins,
25 them to a Silver meeting where that question was asked


1 and it couldn't be confirmed.
2 Q. Despite that, a large number of the emergency services
3 had already been down to the track?
4 A. Had already been, yes.
5 MR HAY: Mr Biles, thank you very much. I have no more
6 questions for you, but others may.
7 Questions by MR COLTART
8 MR COLTART: Just one matter, if I may. I want to clarify
9 this position in relation to secondary devices and the
10 use of radios. Within what radius of a potential
11 secondary device site should one not use a handheld
12 radio?
13 A. We have got certain set procedures, but, my Lady,
14 I think that's --
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I was just wondering, Mr Coltart, are
16 we venturing into territory where perhaps people would
17 rather not comment? Might it assist those who plant
18 devices to know the answer to that question.
[Censorship of questioning!]
19 MR COLTART: It might do. I certainly don't want to cause
20 any difficulties. I can see that people immediately
21 have stood up to my left.
22 MR HAY: My Lady, all I was going to add to my learned
23 friend's comments was that this witness may have
24 concerns about passing sensitive information into the
25 public domain.


1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think that's the point --
2 MR COLTART: I think we'd gathered that, but I am grateful
3 for --
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- the witness and I were taking up,
5 weren't we, Mr Biles?
6 MR COLTART: I don't want details and I can withdraw that
7 particular question. I'm only interested, I suppose,
8 because we've had quite a lot of evidence from quite
9 a lot of emergency responders that they would like to
10 have used their radios at the carriage but they were
11 unable to do so, which is why they were running out onto
12 the platform and hoping to get a signal once they were
13 there.
14 So perhaps can I limit myself to asking this further
15 question, which is: how well-known was that policy, that
16 radios shouldn't be used in that situation? Was this
17 something which one might have expected everybody to
18 know?

19 A. We have got policies and procedures within the London
20 Fire Brigade that stipulate certain distances.

21 MR COLTART: What I'm minded to do, my Lady, is that I'm
22 conscious in the back of my mind of having read material
23 which has been disclosed in the course of the
24 proceedings which deals with radio communications in
25 more detail.


1 The better course of action might be, rather than
2 seeking to do this on the hoof, to go back and look at
3 that material again and, if it's necessary to do so, we
4 can revisit this issue in February.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The Greater London Assembly might
6 well have had information they put in the public domain
7 that might assist.
8 MR COLTART: Yes, I'll have another look at the material.
9 We can see where that takes us, perhaps.
11 MR COLTART: Thank you.
12 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.
13 MS SHEFF: No, thank you, my Lady.
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No other questions?
15 MS BARTON: I have, if I may, my Lady.
17 Questions by MS BARTON
18 MS BARTON: May I raise this point with you: it was put to
19 you that the CBRN concerns did not delay the response
20 and there was a particular point at which CBRN concerns
21 were raised by you, wasn't there? There was a City
22 police officer, Chief Inspector Fallows, outside the
23 station, to whom you spoke, do you recall?
24 A. No, I only spoke with Chief Inspector -- sorry,
25 Inspector Paul Barnard and Chief Inspector Dave Roney.


1 Q. Okay. Well, you recall speaking to Mr Roney and, at
2 that point, there was some discussion about City police
3 officers with dogs searching the track. Is that right?
4 A. That's another procedural issue, my Lady.
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Oh, the witness is suggesting he
6 feels it may be sensitive information?
7 MS BARTON: Right.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The question is coming from an
9 advocate representing the City of London Police, if
10 that --
11 A. There was specialist City of London Police officers
12 deployed in the site.

13 MS BARTON: All I wanted to ask you about was this: that
14 City of London Police officers were standing by you when
15 you had a conversation, during which you asked them
16 whether they had CBRN protective equipment --
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. -- and whether they had respirators?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. What you were doing, because that was your role, was to
21 warn them of the risks that there might be in deploying
22 into the tunnel?
23 A. That's correct, but they volunteered to go down.
24 MS BARTON: Thank you.
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Biles?


1 Thank you very much, Mr Biles. Thank you for coming
2 to assist.
3 A. Thank you.
4 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call Richard Travers?
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Travers, if any questions are
7 asked of you which you feel would reveal sensitive
8 information, please just indicate.
9 A. I will, my Lady.
10 Questions by MR HAY
11 MR HAY: Mr Travers, can you give your full name to the
12 court, please?
13 A. Richard William Travers.
14 Q. Mr Travers, in 2005, you were an explosives officer with
15 the Metropolitan Police Service?

16 A. That's correct, yes.
17 Q. Forgive me perhaps for asking an obvious question. What
18 actually is the function of an explosives officer?
19 A. Mainly, in layman's terms, bomb disposal.
20 Q. On 7 July 2005, you were notified that an explosion had
21 occurred, is that correct?
22 A. No, we had -- in our base location, when monitoring the
23 computer-aided dispatch system, we saw that there was an
24 incident that was unfolding, so preempting being
25 required at the scene, we forward deployed ourselves


1 down to that area.
2 Q. That incident, was it at Aldgate or Liverpool Street?
3 A. Initially, it was at -- being reported at
4 Liverpool Street, but it transpired that it was Aldgate,
5 and we did go direct to Aldgate eventually.

6 Q. Do you recall roughly what time you dispatched to the
7 scene?
8 A. It was round about 8.45, I believe.
9 Q. We know that the bomb appears to have been detonated
10 about 8.49.
11 A. Right.
12 Q. Just to help you, in your statement dated 7 July, you
13 said at approximately 08.51. Is that more likely to be
14 accurate?
15 A. It was -- we were pre-deployed to reports coming out of
16 the CAD of smoke coming out of the ticket office at
17 Liverpool Street station. So it would have been very
18 shortly after the device had functioned, yes.
19 Q. Perhaps if we could have up on the screen [COLP21-3],
20 there we can see at the top 08.51.26:
21 "Seems to have been a bit of an explosion opposite
22 the Great Eastern Hotel." [The site of the Deutsche Bank/Israeli Stock Exchange meeting]
23 Then a little bit further down, 08.55.32:
24 "Some form of explosion in the ticket office at
25 Liverpool Street station."


1 Was it the latter one at 08.55.32 that you responded
2 to?
3 A. That was the one we were looking at. We weren't
4 officially tasked at that stage. Like I said, we
5 started to forward deploy ourselves.
6 Q. Eventually, you made your way to Aldgate Underground
7 station?
8 A. That's correct, yes.
9 Q. Initially, you performed the role of searching for
10 secondary devices in the train in the tunnel, is that
11 correct?

12 A. That's correct. The initial role really was to identify
13 and ascertain there had been an explosion. There was
14 still some confusion as to whether it had been a power
15 surge or there had actually been an explosive device.

16 Q. Are you able to say approximately what time you
17 conducted that part of the search?
18 A. It would be round about 9.20 to 10.00.
19 Q. Once you had completed that sweep, I think there was
20 then what's referred to, I think, as a "cooling-off
21 period"?

22 A. Yes.
23 Q. That was at about 10.30, is that right?
24 A. It was about then, yes. I did get tasked to another
25 incident at that time.


1 Q. Which was the other incident?
2 A. It was a suspect vehicle at High Holborn, I believe it
3 was. As you can appreciate, after that one, we had many
4 calls out -- call-outs. So it was ...
[The evacuation of Holborn police station took place at 10.00am]
5 Q. You then returned to the scene at Aldgate where you
6 conducted an examination of the second carriage.
7 A. That's correct, yes.
8 Q. Can we have up on the screen [INQ10280-7], please? If we
9 could focus on the bottom.
10 That's a plan of the second carriage and the X marks
11 the area where it's believed to be the explosion
12 occurred.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Does that accord with your recollection?
15 A. It does, yes.
16 Q. We've heard lots of descriptions as to the damage which
17 was done to the carriage, but from your perspective as
18 an explosives officer, can you just explain to us what
19 you saw?
20 A. The floor of the carriage had been pushed outwards, the
21 sliding doors had been buckled and, I can't remember if
22 they were missing or not, but I think they were just
23 buckled and there was damage to the roof area as well,
24 all of which indicated that there had been an explosive
25 event there that had taken place actually on the floor


1 of the carriage.
2 Q. At that time, was there any visible evidence for you to
3 determine what type of explosive device it was?
4 A. There wasn't, no.
5 Q. Were you able to reach a view as to the amount of
6 explosive that had been used?
7 A. I was, yes. Using past experience, we have indicators
8 of damage and the like and we use amounts of military
9 plastic explosive as a comparator to say what size it
10 was, and it would appear to have been between 5 and 10
11 pounds of explosives.
12 Q. That's something which you deduce from the damage which
13 was done to the carriage?
14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 MR HAY: Mr Travers, thank you very much. I have no further
16 questions for you, but others may.
17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions?
18 Ah, Mr Hill?
19 Questions by MR HILL
20 MR HILL: Officer, may I just ask you, I think, three or
21 four matters?
22 The first is this: did you do anything at the scene
23 at Aldgate which in any way impeded the work of treating
24 casualties and assisting survivors to get out of that
25 bombed carriage?


1 A. Not at all. When I arrived there, there were lots of
2 emergency services tending to the injured down there.
3 Obviously, a lot had been made of the threat of
4 secondary devices. I made it my job to go down there
5 and check to make sure there were no secondary devices.
6 Our main priority is to save life. Life was being saved
7 at the time. If we'd found a secondary device, then
8 I would have dealt with it there and then.
9 Q. Does it follow from what you've said that your
10 procedures at the scene, from first search to subsequent
11 search, would have entitled you to demand the withdrawal
12 of all personnel from that carriage?
13 A. Normal protocols would do, yes. But in these
14 circumstances, no, it wouldn't.

15 Q. Can I just ask you this: in probably not the first but
16 the second search of the carriage -- we know you went to
17 the scene twice --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- did you have the assistance of other officers,
20 British Transport Police officers who, at your
21 deployment, helped in searching the carriages of that
22 train?
23 A. I did, but I limited them to the carriages nearer the
24 back.

25 Q. Right. Was that a search that was during the first


1 period?
2 A. That was the first period, yes.
3 Q. Right. So that was before you being withdrawn from the
4 scene at around 10.30 to attend to a suspect vehicle or
5 package elsewhere in the City?

6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. All right. Just can I confirm this through you: that
8 subsequently after your return to Aldgate, some time
9 around or shortly after 11.00 that morning, you then
10 effectively handed over the scene to another
11 Anti-terrorist Branch officer as the division was called
12 at the time, DC Meneely?

13 A. That's correct, yes.
14 Q. Did you walk him through the scene prior to handing over
15 to him as prime scene examiner?
16 A. I did, yes.
17 Q. So I think it was at about midday, after that
18 walk-through, that DC Meneely took control --

19 A. Right.
20 Q. -- partly through your handover?
21 A. Yes.
22 MR HILL: Thank you.
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Travers?
24 Mr Coltart?
25 MR COLTART: My Lady, forgive me for bobbing up. It just


1 occurs to me that if there is any witness who could
2 assist us with the question of secondary devices and
3 radios, and if it's proper for him to do so, then this
4 might be that witness.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Were you in court, Mr Travers, when
6 the question about using radios and the possibility of
7 secondary devices was asked?
8 A. I wasn't, my Lady, no.
9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You weren't. Would you feel able,
10 without revealing any kind of sensitive information, to
11 answer any questions about protocols, whatever, about
12 using radios, if there's a possibility of a secondary
13 device?
14 A. I will try to, yes.
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But you must not reveal anything that
16 you think will --
17 A. No, no, I won't.
18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Have a go, Mr Coltart.
19 Questions by MR COLTART
20 MR COLTART: Equally, tell us if these are matters outside
21 your technical expertise as opposed to your general
22 expertise, but is there a protocol, as far as your team
23 is concerned, about the use of either radios, handheld
24 radios or mobile telephones when you are concerned about
25 secondary devices?


1 A. Protocol will normally only kick in when there is
2 a confirmed device.
3 Q. Right. So if there's just the possibility of a device,
4 and a sweep is being undertaken, as it were, in the
5 absence of either knowledge or specific information,
6 then is there no protocol about the use of radios or
7 phones; they could be used, in other words?

8 A. Again, it's really down to individuals. There is no
9 protocol for that situation.
10 Q. Just to be clear about this, there's no set protocol
11 that, at an incident such as this, where there may be
12 a danger of a secondary device, emergency responders
13 should not use either their radios or their mobile
14 phones?

15 A. There is no protocol that I'm aware of.
16 MR COLTART: That's very helpful. Thank you.
17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Mr Taylor,
18 I'm sorry.
19 Questions by MR TAYLOR
20 MR TAYLOR: It's more an observation rather than a question,
21 sir. You say a radio can set off a secondary device.
22 A mobile phone can set off a secondary device.
23 Now, on the trains that day, we know there were
24 hundreds of people using the trains that day, they were
25 all trying to get through on their mobile phones.


1 likelihood of a secondary device exploding, surely those
2 mobile phones would have set it off?

3 It is just an observation to me that, you know, the
4 protocols of using a radio or mobile phones when there's
5 a secondary device possibly there gets thrown out the
6 window.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think, first of all, Mr Travers
8 told us there is no protocol if there's only the
9 possibility of a secondary device. So it's a question
10 of, if there were a confirmed secondary device, do you
11 feel able to answer the question/observation that, given
12 everybody these days carries a mobile phone, there's no
13 point in having the protocol because they might well be
14 using them?
15 A. Without going into percentages and the total risk, it is
16 not a given that a radio or a mobile phone will set off
17 a device. There is a possibility.

18 MR TAYLOR: Thank you very much.
19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor.
20 Thank you very much, Mr Travers. It goes without
21 saying that you do a brave job every day of your life,
22 so on behalf of my fellow citizens, thank you.
23 A. Thank you, my Lady.
24 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Gary Burnham.


2 Questions by MR KEITH
3 MR KEITH: Would you give the court your full name, please?
4 A. Gary Keith Burnham.
5 Q. Mr Burnham, in 2005, we know that you were employed by
6 Tube Lines as a duty manager on the Emergency Response
7 Unit.

8 A. That's correct, yes.
9 Q. There's been some debate in the paperwork that we have
10 available to us as to what the ERU, the Emergency
11 Response Unit, does. So I'd like to ask you, please,
12 firstly, what does the ERU generally deal with?
13 A. It deals with any emergencies that come up on the
14 Underground system which could be anything from minor
15 things like animals on the track to people under trains,
16 broken rails, train derailments, we've also attended
17 bigger incidents like on Network Rail Paddington,
18 Potters Bar, and different things like that. So any
19 emergencies that come up.

20 Q. We know that you, as we'll hear in a moment, were
21 directed to go to Aldgate on the morning of 7 July. But
22 it's also obvious that not all emergency services,
23 including the ERU, could be sensibly expected to go to
24 the scene of an incident, because they would interfere
25 with each other's functions and operations.


1 Is there some sort of protocol that dictates whether
2 or not you are expected to be first at the scene to deal
3 with casualties, to deal with the immediate aftermath of
4 an incident, by contrast to perhaps going a little later
5 to seeing what the impact of the incident is on the Tube
6 network?
7 A. We would get called at the same time as the London Fire
8 Brigade and the police and the other emergency services.

9 If you take, for example, when there's a person under
10 the train, we would attend at the same time. We would
11 then liaise with the Fire Brigade, who are in charge of
12 the incident, and then assist them in the removal of the
13 body, if it's somebody who's deceased or if it's a live
14 casualty, because we've got the technical knowledge of
15 the trains, obviously that's our area of expertise, and
16 we carry the equipment that can lift trains, move
17 trains, you know, we know how to open doors and check
18 that the site is safe for emergency services to work.
19 Q. Where there are severely injured or perhaps dying
20 casualties, in a situation where they are accessible,
21 would you expect to be called to the scene to assist in
22 the removal of casualties from a Tube carriage?

23 A. We would be there at the same time. Whether we would
24 be, when we actually get on scene, required to help --
25 I mean, if I use Paddington for an example, although it


1 was a Network Rail incident, we used our track trollies
2 to bring stretchers back to the platform. So obviously
3 that is a possibility, yes.

4 Q. But where your role will not actively assist in the
5 preservation of life, where the other emergency services
6 don't feel that you are needed to assist in a primary
7 response, might you, therefore, be at a scene but not be
8 called upon to assist until a bit later?
9 A. Possibly so, yes. It's never actually happened like
10 that.

11 Q. On 7 July, you were directed to go to Aldgate but we
12 understand that you may not have arrived until a little
13 later, 10.00, 10.30,
it was your rest day and there was
14 a team already there?
15 A. That's correct, yes.
16 Q. Was Mr Fulcher, Gary Fulcher, one of the emergency
17 response units who was there?
18 A. That's correct, yes.
19 Q. When you arrived, were you aware whether or not the
20 Emergency Response Unit had already carried out any
21 functions at Aldgate?
22 A. As far as I can remember, when they had actually turned
23 up theirselves, that they hadn't actually done anything
24 because the scene had already been closed, if you like,
25 as the cooling-off period, as I know it
. So anybody who


1 was actually alive, who was going to come out, had
2 already come out by the time that the team had attended.
3 Q. In other words, in relation to the primary duty on
4 everybody of preserving life and saving casualties and
5 bringing out the walking wounded, there was nothing more
6 that the ERU could have done?
7 A. At that stage, no.
8 Q. You had a meeting, I think, with the Silver control for
9 London Underground and also with Scotland Yard
10 anti-terrorist officers?
11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Did you go down to the train and start assessing what
13 needed to be done to allow the investigation of the
14 scene to continue by the Metropolitan Police?
15 A. That's correct, yes. Myself, my colleague,
16 Gary Fulcher, a senior fire officer and the
17 anti-terrorist squad officer who was there, went down
18 and I just advised the officer who's in charge basically
19 it was safe for his investigation to carry out. He
20 asked me a few questions, you know, as to what was what,
21 making sure the train was safe, it wasn't going to move,
22 the electric was off, and we had short-circuiting
23 devices in place.
24 Q. Did you put those short-circuiting devices yourself?
25 A. My colleague, Gary Fulcher, put one of them down, I know


1 that. There were some already on the track, I believe.

2 Q. No doubt you remained on duty to assist with any
3 difficulties or issues that arose in relation to damage
4 to the tunnel, anything to do with the movement of the
5 train and so on.
6 A. That's correct, yes.
7 Q. In your observations at Aldgate, were you able to
8 ascertain whether or not there were any differences in
9 terms of the damage, the extent of the damage caused at
10 Aldgate as opposed to the other scenes which we know you
11 also examined?
12 A. The damage to the train at Aldgate to me seemed worse
13 than what it was at the other two sites, yes.
14 difference being because of the size of the tunnel. If
15 you look at Russell Square, it's in an enclosed tunnel
16 so I'm guessing that the explosion seemed to go down the
17 train as opposed to outwards. So the train definitely
18 seemed to have more damage at Aldgate.
[More than Edgware Road?]
19 Q. Was there any damage to the tunnel structure itself at

20 Aldgate?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Do you recall for how long the process continued of
23 examining the tunnel, of carrying out the forensic
24 investigations that necessarily ensued?
25 A. For the whole of the incident?


1 Q. For Aldgate?
2 A. Oh, for Aldgate? I spent the whole day there, but there
3 was teams down there for at least another week or so
4 after that, but I went down on the initial assessment,

5 I was probably down there for probably 20 to 30 minutes,
6 then we came out, and then I went back down again in the
7 afternoon because there was some talk of being asbestos,
8 so I just needed to go down to let them know that wasn't
9 the case. And that was probably only about 10 or
10 15 minutes.
11 MR KEITH: All right, thank you very much, Mr Burnham.
12 Mr Burnham, will you stay there? There may be some
13 further questions for you.
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Mr Burnham?
15 Mr Hill?
16 Questions by MR HILL
17 MR HILL: Just one. This may be a small point. In terms of
18 meetings you held at the scene, I think if you had an
19 initial meeting with LUL staff, it would have been
20 a slightly later meeting at which SO13,
21 Anti-terrorist Branch officers, were present, does that
22 sound right to you?

23 A. Yes.
24 Q. In your statement you referred to a meeting with LUL and
25 then later with SO13 officers. I think -- I don't know


1 whether you can remember the names of officers, but --
2 A. I thought the guy's name was Riordan, but I could be
3 wrong. I mean ...
4 Q. Right. There was a team of SO13 officers, including the
5 crime scene manager, DC Meneely,
who we're going to hear
6 from later today, who was sent to Aldgate and who
7 arrived at about 11.00. So certainly from that time,
8 there would have been Anti-terrorist Branch officers?
9 A. Yes, that would probably be the fellow that I spoke to,
10 then.
11 MR HILL: Thank you.
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No other questions? Just one thing,
13 I think I know who Tube Lines are, but who exactly are
14 Tube Lines?
15 A. Tube Lines are a railway infrastructure company that run
16 the Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly Line as part of
17 London Underground. We're now part of TfL, and the
18 Emergency Response Unit cover the whole of the
19 London Underground system.
[So why were they at Aldgate in 2005?]
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.
21 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady.
22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Burnham. Thank you for
23 coming to assist us.
24 MR KEITH: My Lady, in the light of that evidence, and the
25 absence of any prolonged examination of what Mr Burnham


1 has told us, I don't propose to read out the statement
2 of Gary Fulcher, although he is on the list of reads for
3 this morning, because he covers virtually the same area.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Was there anything -- sorry, before
5 we move on from him, was there anything in Mr Fulcher's
6 statement about putting down short-circuiting devices?
7 MR KEITH: No. From recollection, I don't think there was.
8 He simply says other structures to make sure it was safe
9 for people to work in the tunnel, but doesn't say

10 expressly that they put down short-circuiting devices.
11 I seem to recollect that the short-circuiting
12 devices are apparent from the photographs of the train
13 at Aldgate.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So he doesn't assist on what time he
15 arrived, so that doesn't help anybody.
16 MR KEITH: He says:
17 "On arrival, I met the London Underground duty
18 station manager and there were outer and inner cordons
19 and a large amount of fire, ambulance and police in
20 attendance and was joined by Gary Burnham."
21 On the basis of Mr Burnham's evidence, it doesn't
22 appear that Mr Fulcher had arrived much before him.
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well, thank you. As I say,
24 I was just checking the timings. They were stood down
25 much later, so it doesn't help us.


1 MR KEITH: My Lady, thank you. May I call Andrew Meneely?
2 MR ANDREW MENEELY (affirmed)
3 Questions by MR KEITH
4 A. Andrew Meneely, detective constable attached to the
5 Counter-terrorism Command and New Scotland Yard.
6 In July 2005, I was attached to the
7 Anti-terrorist Branch where I was a forensic scene
8 examiner.

10 MR KEITH: Your duties have not changed insofar as that
11 change of name is a technical change, is it not?
12 A. I'm no longer a forensic scene examiner and I work in
13 what's called the Bomb Data Centre.
14 Q. In July of 2005, on the 7th, I think you received
15 a phone call at about 8.55 in which you were told that
16 there had been a number of incidents around London and
17 you may need to respond to them.

18 A. Yes, I was the duty forensic examiner at that time and
19 I was informed of that by DS Asman.
20 Q. I think you were then told to go to a rendezvous point,
21 the details of which I needn't explore with you, and
22 subsequently, you received a call about 10.30 to go to
23 Aldgate Tube station because it was suspected that there
24 had been an explosion on a train there.
25 A. That's correct, yes.


1 Q. Did you go there with a number of other officers?
2 A. Yes, I did. Initially, it was three officers,
3 Detective Sergeant Davies, Detective Constable Green and
4 Detective Constable Fretwell.

5 Q. What did you understand to be your primary purpose in
6 going to Aldgate?
7 A. At that stage, I was told that there had been explosions
8 and that it was going to be a scene that we would be
9 dealing with.
10 Q. In what way would you be dealing with the scene? What
11 was it you were expected to be doing?
12 A. Okay, my role would be to do the forensic recovery of
13 any evidence at the scene and to deal with any body
14 recovery of bodies that may be there.

15 Q. The issue of the bodies and their recovery and their
16 treatment is outside the scope of these proceedings by
17 order of my Lady earlier in these proceedings,
but [WTF!! Why will they not discuss this!]
18 I want you to tell us, please, because it's of great
19 importance to the families, what the priority was at the
20 time of your arrival.
21 You were an officer, and remain an officer, of the
22 Anti-terrorist Branch and you were, at that time,
23 a forensic scene examiner?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. What was the primary strategy, what was the primary


1 point of your attendance, once all the living casualties
2 had been removed from the scene?
3 A. Okay, when I arrived at the scene, there was actually
4 a standoff period in place. Mr Travers, the explosives
5 officer, had been to the scene. I was informed that he
6 had left there about 10.30. I got to the scene about
7 11.00. He had imposed a one-hour standoff period, so
8 during that period I couldn't do anything until he
9 returned at 11.30.
[What is this 'cooling off' or 'standing down' procedure'??]
10 When he returned, both he and I went into the tunnel
11 because he had informed me that he hadn't cleared the
12 carriage where the device had gone off.
13 Q. You understood that he had been down earlier and had
14 checked the other carriages but had left carriage 2 for
15 further exploration?
16 A. Yes, he was unable to do that because he had been
17 retasked to another incident.

18 Q. So you went down with him and, no doubt, you confirmed
19 that electricity had remained off?
20 A. Yes, we did, yes.
21 Q. You went down to carriage 2. Did he then check that
22 particular carriage for explosive devices?
23 A. As well as checking that, part of the normal procedure
24 would be for him to walk me through the scene, to
25 explain what he had done and as well as -- he then


1 checked the carriage itself.
2 Q. We've heard from him that there came a point at which
3 control of the scene was handed over and we know from
4 your statement that control of the scene was handed to
5 you at midday --

6 A. That's correct, yes.
7 Q. -- once everyone was satisfied that the scene was safe,
8 in terms of whether there was a possibility of
9 a secondary device.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Members of London Underground attended, we have just
12 heard from Mr Burnham, and no doubt they assisted you in
13 ensuring that working conditions in the tunnel were
14 safe, and that you could proceed with your functions?
15 A. Yes, once I had taken control of the scene at about
16 midday, I had a conversation with London Fire Brigade,
17 Mr Fulcher and Mr Burnham and went with those two
18 officers and Mr Steve Smith, who was a divisional
19 commander from London Fire Brigade. I was using their
20 expertise to tell me whether or not the conditions were
21 safe to work in.
22 Q. We know from your statement that Metropolitan Police
23 photographers entered the tunnel during the course of
24 the afternoon and we have seen some of the photographic
25 evidence from that time. Can you just confirm for us


1 that, initially, photographs were taken from the tunnel
2 and from the carriage and then subsequently there was
3 videoing?

4 A. The normal procedure would be that initial scenes
5 photography, still scenes photography, would be taken.
6 I received a phone call later in the day informing me
7 that video would also be required, which was then done.
8 Q. While that task was being carried out, was it your
9 primary role to divide up the scene into a number of
10 zones and to put into place a structure whereby it could
11 be minutely forensically examined?
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 Q. Were you assisted in that by a substantial number of
14 other officers?
15 A. Yes, initially, I limited the number of officers that
16 came into the scene, but as and when they were required.
17 There was a number of officers, I think about a dozen in
18 total, who I utilised for that purpose.

19 Q. Again, the issue of recoveries is outside the scope, but
20 did the fact that there were deceased people in the
21 tunnel have to be considered alongside the fact that it
22 was a crime scene and everything had to be forensically
23 examined?
24 A. Yes, at one stage during the day, I was given priorities
25 as to what my role was, that being recovery of explosive


1 traces, the scene examination and the recovery of
2 bodies, all on an equal par, if you like.

3 Q. Because now, of course, it's obvious to us, because we
4 now know the evidence surrounding the detonation of the
5 bomb and how it got to be on the train. [Do we?] But are we
6 right to presume that, at that time, no conclusions
7 could be drawn with certainty as to what the cause of
8 the explosion had been, other than that it was suspected
9 that there was a bomb on the train?

10 A. I think, after speaking to Mr Travers, we were happy
11 that there had been an explosion on the train. How that
12 had occurred, we didn't know.
13 Q. For example, you didn't know then whether or not it had
14 been placed on the train and the person who had placed
15 it had then left the train before its explosion or
16 whether it was a suicide bomber?
17 A. Exactly. So it was a crime scene in which we had to
18 gather minute evidence in case it was required later for
19 a prosecution.
20 Q. Therefore, did it follow that you could take no chances
21 on what you were searching for, the scene had to be
22 thoroughly forensically examined and that took time?
23 A. Yes, it did.
24 Q. It took a very long time, didn't it?
25 A. I was on the scene for ten days.


1 Q. We've seen in the papers some references to bomb scene
2 managers. What's the distinction between your job and
3 a bomb scene manager?
4 A. My role is the bomb scene examiner. I would be
5 responsible for the forensic recovery inside the inner
6 cordon.
The bomb scene manager would be normally
7 a detective inspector or a detective sergeant who would
8 be responsible for liaising with me, the SIO and the
9 other emergency services and, if I required extra staff
10 or equipment, then they would provide that for me as
11 well as performing the liaison role.
12 Q. Also present in the scene were officers who were
13 responsible for the process of disaster victim
14 identification.

15 A. That's correct, yes, two initially.
16 Q. No doubt you discussed with them repeatedly how the
17 question of disaster victim identification should be
18 approached, bearing in mind your obligation to examine
19 the tunnel forensically?

20 A. Yes, the vast -- victim identification teams are
21 normally for mass disasters and there are a different
22 set of protocols to what would normally be used at
23 a crime scene. We came to a compromise as to what we
24 would both do.

25 Q. Let me put it this way, if I may, to you, Mr Meneely:


1 all the deceased were removed in due course?

2 A. Yes, they were.
3 Q. Were they removed with due regard to the extraordinary
4 sensitivities of the state in which they were in?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. With regard to the feelings and sensitivities of their
7 loved ones?
8 A. All of the dead, at all times, were treated with the
9 greatest of respect.
10 Q. The process continued, as you've told us, for, in your
11 case, some ten days, but it wasn't until, I think,
12 Saturday, 9 July that a significant piece of bone,
13 a piece of a backbone, was discovered in the front of
14 a rear bench seat in carriage 2?
<---------------[So all those previous mentions of seeing a spine were ....??]
15 A. That's correct. Officers were searching that part of
16 carriage 2 and, about 9.30 at night, I was told that
17 a piece of backbone had been recovered.
18 Q. Why was that significant?

19 A. Because all of the bodies I'd seen so far had no real
20 upper body trauma to that degree. Obviously there was
21 a lot of injuries, but everybody was relatively intact
22 in relation to the upper body.

23 Q. No doubt, the discovery of that piece of bone was
24 relevant to the investigation of the crime and
25 information about it was passed to your colleagues?


1 A. Yes, it was.
2 Q. Throughout this period, you received assistance, did you
3 not, from forensic specialists, including, I think,
4 a Ms Lancaster?
5 A. Yes, Ms Sarah Lancaster is from the Forensic Explosives
6 Laboratory which is part of the Ministry of Defence,

8 Q. The work continued very late into night --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- and early again in the morning --
11 A. Yes, it did.
12 Q. -- day after day. At each night, was the scene closed
13 so as to prevent contamination?

14 A. Yes, most of the nights, the scene was closed. There
15 were a number of nights where work had to be undertaken
16 on the train which enabled the scene to stay open, but
17 effectively some of the -- the forensic examination work
18 stopped at some stage.
19 Q. It wasn't until 12 July, the Tuesday, the following
20 Tuesday, that Ms Lancaster, the forensic specialist, was
21 able to complete her examination to a degree that the
22 train could be moved and taken out by
23 London Underground?

24 A. Yes. She did an initial examination on the day, but
25 when it was realised that the train may have to be -- we


1 might have to cut up parts of the train, et cetera, she
2 had to come back to do a further examination before she
3 could complete that.
4 Q. On Thursday, 14 July, did you close the scene between
5 11.45 and 12.15 to allow officers to take part in the
6 national two minutes' silence?
7 A. Yes, I did.
8 Q. Was the scene not returned, in fact, to
9 London Underground until Saturday, 16 July when all the
10 remaining equipment was removed and arrangements were
11 made for the train to be taken to a depot in Acton that
12 night?

13 A. Yes, I handed the scene back to London Underground at
14 19.00 on Saturday night, albeit that the train remained
15 in the scene until later on that evening before it could
16 be moved.

17 Q. In terms of the complexity and difficulties that the
18 scene posed in forensic terms, can you tell us something
19 about the nature of the task you undertook?
20 A. It was a very challenging task. Basically, trying to
21 juggle all of the things. It's a bit like a project
22 manager, you have to think ahead and organise things
23 coming in, but there was a lot of difficulty with the
24 scene.
25 MR KEITH: Will you stay there, please? There may be some


1 further questions for you.
2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions? Yes, Mr Saunders?
3 MR SAUNDERS: Would your Ladyship allow me to deal with
4 a number of the matters? I understand this is the last
5 witness of the morning and I would be very grateful if
6 your Ladyship would allow me -- having spoken with
7 Mrs Stevenson this morning, I know she is anxious about
8 the delay that there was underground.
9 Having seen, not only his statement, but also some
10 of the extra detail from Mr Meneely, I think it may
11 assist her and maybe some of the other families if they
12 understand a little more of the detail as to what the
13 problems were.
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So this is going to matters that
15 I have ruled are not issues?

16 MR SAUNDERS: It will very briefly touch on -- some of which
17 we've already heard; for example, the very last witness
18 who dealt with there was a question of asbestos
19 underground and that was one of the reasons he went
20 back.
21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: If it would assist the families, if
22 you could, of course, limit it, because you will
23 appreciate, the timetable being so tight ...
24 MR SAUNDERS: Of course I will, my Lady. I hope I am right,
25 Mr Keith, that this is, in fact, the last witness of the


1 morning?
2 MR KEITH: He is indeed. We have a witness at 2.00 whose
3 evidence we will receive via videolink from Ireland and,
4 because of the timing of that video appointment, if we
5 don't finish Mr Meneely now, he will have to come back
6 later this afternoon, I'm afraid.
7 MR SAUNDERS: May I press on?
9 Questions by MR SAUNDERS
10 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Meneely, I think it's right that you've
11 told us about a number of the matters and I'm obviously
12 looking principally at your statement, but I've seen
13 some of the other material as well.
14 The last witness mentioned there was a problem
15 during that first phase where there was a concern about
16 asbestos being in the tunnel.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. I think that meant, for obvious reasons, that there had
19 to be a period where all work had to stop whilst it was
20 checked by the relevant team?
21 A. I think from recollection, the work carried on while the
22 team checked the -- whether there was asbestos on the
23 train or not, but then they suggested that we put on
24 white over-suits, masks, et cetera, which we didn't have
25 enough of at the time, so there was a short delay.


1 Q. In fairness to you, Mr Meneely, this is a very
2 considerable statement of some 30 pages, so I'm not
3 expecting you to know everything. I simply was taking
4 it from the advice you received. You stopped the team
5 working and cleared the tunnel area. There was then, as
6 you say, equipment necessary to continue, and I think,
7 on that first day, there were many items that were
8 recovered and the team worked well into the night
9 finishing at half past midnight.

10 A. There were a number of times where asbestos was checked
11 within the tunnels. There were a number of times where
12 work had to stop because of problems with electricity,
13 et cetera. But then we carried on when we could.
14 Q. I think you've listed over a number of pages the number
15 of items. It appears that you started at zone 5 and
16 there were a number of items recovered from there.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Before recommencing the following day, Friday, 8 July,
19 when I think and your team returned to the scene at
20 about 6.05 in the morning.
21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. And again commenced -- I think it was noted that there
23 were no labels on those who had life extinct when you
24 were there
, in terms of priority labels, or whether, in
25 fact, death had been pronounced.


1 A. There were no labels on the bodies. I was just about to
2 start the process of body recovery when I realised that
3 I hadn't had life pronounced extinct.

4 Q. I think that was one of the things you had to take into
5 account in relation to before any of the bodies could be
6 removed. Although it was quite plain that life was
7 extinct, part of what had happened was that that itself
8 needed a formal process?
9 A. It was, but as I put the phone call in, I was informed
10 that the coroner may have given a blanket authority
11 that, if there were bodies still there, that they should
12 be certified as dead. But the process still carried on.

13 Q. It did, and I think that consisted of the witness we're
14 going to hear later, Dr Costello --
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. -- who was able to attend and examine the bodies, one of
17 which was the family, whose interests I represent, of
18 Fiona Stevenson.

19 A. Yes.
20 Q. I think that took place on the morning of the 8th as it
21 did with the other families and those others who were
22 deceased?

23 A. Yes, I think Dr Costello started his examination roughly
24 8.55 in the morning, something like that.
25 Q. I think there were also difficulties in the day and you


1 refer to problems where you received information from
2 Mr Bracken and Mr Rudkin, who I think were engineers?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Again, those are matters that had to be investigated for
5 the safety of the team you had down there, which was
6 a considerable number of people, I think, wasn't it?
7 A. Yes, I had 12, 14 people, something like that.
8 Q. 12 or 14 people you had working throughout the period.
9 You again, for the reasons of the problems -- a bomb
10 going off in a tunnel -- were advised it would be safer
11 to close the site?
12 A. Some of the cabling along the wall had been damaged.
13 I'd been given assurances initially by Mr Burnham and

14 Mr Fulcher that those cables were safe. Another
15 engineer then came along later on the Saturday to say
16 that there was a possibility that there may still be
17 20,000 volts running through those cables and, <----------------
18 therefore, it would be unsafe to continue work.

19 Q. I think there were also problems with having platforms
20 that were sufficient to ensure the work could be done?
21 A. The train itself, when you stand along it at trackside,
22 is some 5 or 6 feet high. So we had to get some sort of
23 platforms to allow us to get -- whilst we were there,
24 there was ladders up to the carriages. You can't carry
25 bodies down ladders in that form. So a platform had to


1 be built to allow access to that.

2 Q. I think there was also a problem with the obtaining of
3 a correct vehicle that had sufficient refrigeration to
4 ensure the proper removal of the bodies?
5 A. Refrigeration units were called for.

6 Q. I think there was a difficulty -- it may be somebody
7 else deals with that, but there were difficulties as to
8 when they could be provided on the scene.
9 A. I understand that the vehicles arrived some time on the
10 Saturday.
11 Q. I think the formal removal of Fiona Stevenson was --
12 A. Some time on the Friday, actually.
13 Q. -- on the Friday, I think.

14 A. Yes.
15 Q. So I think there were those two that were outside,
16 Carrie and Richard Gray were removed initially, and then
17 Fiona Stevenson on the Saturday.
[He just said Friday!]
18 A. Yes, that's correct. Ms Stevenson -- there was four
19 bodies removed on the Friday, two on the trackside and
20 two males in the rear carriage part and then the three
21 other women on the Saturday.

22 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, I'm very grateful, thank you very
23 much for that indulgence.
25 MS SHEFF: My Lady, may I, in the same vein, ask a couple of


1 short questions which are of great interest to those
2 families I represent?
3 Questions by MS SHEFF
4 MS SHEFF: Can I ask you, first of all, about body parts?
5 We know, for example, that there were a lot of limbs
6 which had become detached --
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. -- from bodies. Presumably, ultimately, your aim was to
9 ensure that bodies and body parts were reunited --
10 A. Mm-hmm.
11 Q. -- so that they could be returned to the families for
12 proper burial?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. How did you go about that?

15 A. Okay, each body part is still treated as a body. So the
16 same procedure as a full body would occur. So again,
17 they were all dealt with using the DVI system and
18 exhibited.
19 Q. Can you just explain how you associated a body part with
20 a body?
21 A. We wouldn't. All we would do is we would recover a body
22 piece that would be there. In the notes, we could say
23 if it was alongside a body.
24 Let's say an instance may be that there's a body
25 which has part of a limb removed, there's part of a limb


1 alongside. We may put in the notes that that was
2 alongside a body, but we couldn't say it was from that
3 one. That would be for the pathologist and the coroner.

4 Q. So your job really was just to ascertain the location of
5 bodies and body parts which may be connected?
6 A. And give them a unique number so that they could be
7 traced back later on.
8 Q. Yes, and ultimately, you would expect the forensic
9 examiners and the pathologists later on, if necessary,
10 to do DNA tests to make the further connection between
11 those parts?
12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Finally, can I just ask you similarly about
14 possessions. We see from your statement that there's
15 long lists of items that were found close to the bodies.
16 Was it a similar process, with you ascertaining that
17 certain possessions, which may not, for example, have
18 any identification with them, may be associated to
19 particular bodies, because of where they were found?
20 A. No, they would all be -- I mean, the location of them
21 would be given in general terms, in that they were
22 within a zone, but they would all be treated as an
23 exhibit, and then investigation would be done at a later
24 stage to try and give those back to families, if that's
25 where they were from, or if they were going to be used


1 in evidence.

2 Q. That investigation then, it seems from what you're
3 saying, was outwith your jurisdiction, as it were; yours
4 was just to make sure that the possessions were taken
5 from the scene so that they could later be sent to the
6 relevant families after the investigation had been
7 conducted by others?
8 A. At that stage, they were actually potentially evidence,
9 so I was seizing them as evidence for a potential
10 criminal trial.

11 Q. I see, so all items had to be assessed for their
12 evidential relevance to a possible prosecution?
13 A. Yes.
14 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much indeed, Officer.
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Sheff.
16 Mr Hill?
17 MR HILL: May I, noticing the time, just make an
18 observation, which is that I didn't intervene in the
19 questions either posed by Ms Sheff or by Mr Saunders
20 because it was quite apparent that the purpose of the
21 questions was to allay the concerns very properly
22 expressed on behalf of the families but, as my Lady
23 knows, a report was prepared by the Metropolitan Police,
24 dated 22 September, which we gave the title of
25 "Ancillary Issues" to, because it was intended in that


1 report, as we had first offered at the April hearing, to
2 deal with any matters of concern raised on behalf of any
3 bereaved family which were outside the scope of these
4 proceedings as per your ruling.

5 For the avoidance of doubt, that report of
6 22 September included, for example, the best answers
7 that we, the Metropolitan Police, were able to give to
8 questions raised about items of personal property
9 belonging to Mr Lee Baisden, who Ms Sheff represents.

10 So we have committed that to writing in the past.
11 But knowing that we have three scenes to go and many
12 tragic deaths to go, can I repeat that, although these
13 matters are outside scope,
and in our submission
14 shouldn't delay us, should not delay your programme in
15 court, if there are any further questions on the part of
16 any represented or unrepresented bereaved that go to
17 identification issues or any other issues outside scope,
18 we'd recommend that the proper course is to bring those
19 matters, not to the attention -- not of us, but to your
20 team, Mr Smith or your counsel? We have no doubt
21 they'll be relayed to us and we'll provide, if
22 necessary, further written assistance by way of reports
23 to your order, and we submit that's the best way to
24 proceed, to provide answers to these important
25 questions.
<--------- [Why don't the MPS want his information made public?]


1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Hill.
2 Mr Taylor, you didn't have any questions?
3 MR TAYLOR: No, thank you.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No other questions? Thank you very
5 much, Mr Meneely. You had a horrid job, you and your
6 team, and thank you for taking so much trouble.
7 2.00 pm.
8 (1.00 pm)
9 (The short adjournment)

End of morning session
�To those who are afraid of the truth, I wish to offer a few scary truths; and to those who are not afraid of the truth, I wish to offer proof that the terrorism of truth is the only one that can be of benefit to the proletariat.� -- On Terrorism and the State, Gianfranco Sanguinetti

Joined: 26 Nov 2005, 01:46

03 Nov 2010, 19:31 #3

Afternoon session

Code: Select all

Dr Morgan Costello MPS forensic medical examiner, Chief Inspector Ian Wheeler MPS, Superintendent Alistair Lawson BTP

Statement of: Ian Collins Dog Support Unit Essex, PC Daniel Jones WYP, Nathaniel Cary Pathologist, DC Richard Hall Scotland Yard Terrorist Forensic Scene Examiner and Exhibit Officer (all read)
Hearing transcripts

3 November 2010 - Afternoon session

1 (2.00 pm)
2 MR KEITH: Good afternoon, my Lady. My Lady, we have,
3 I hope, Dr Costello joining us from Ireland in a moment.
4 Good afternoon, can you hear us?
5 THE WITNESS: I can hear you perfectly.
6 MR KEITH: Dr Costello you're about to be sworn by a lady
7 usher. I'm going to surrender the microphone to her to
8 swear you.
9 I hope you have received some papers, you should
10 have some relevant documentation and I'll ask you about
11 those in a moment?
12 THE WITNESS: I have, yes.
14 (Evidence given by videolink)
15 Questions by MR KEITH
16 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?
17 A. It's Dr Morgan James Costello.
18 Q. Are you, or were you, a forensic medical examiner?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In 2005, did your duties include providing medical
21 services and medical assistance in relation to the
22 Metropolitan Police Service, including in relation to
23 deaths in custody?

24 A. Yes, it did. That's correct. Yes, it did.
25 Q. As a result, were you asked, after 7 July 2005, to


1 attend two scenes, Edgware Road and Aldgate, for the
2 purposes of certifying the extinction of life?

3 A. Yes, I was.
4 Q. Could we look at Edgware Road first, please? Did you
5 prepare a statement dated 27 September 2005 in relation
6 to the examinations you carried out at Edgware Road?

7 A. Yes, I did.
8 Q. Did you prepare that statement whilst the events in
9 question were still fresh in your mind?
10 A. Yes, I did.
11 Q. I think, Dr Costello, you've got copies of both
12 statements that you made with you as well as some
13 extracts from our core bundle.
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. I should have asked you also, forgive me, could you just
16 outline your professional qualifications?
17 A. I'm a forensic medical examiner with the London
18 Metropolitan Police. I qualified as a doctor in 1994.
19 I specialised in a specialty of psychiatry. I was
20 a consultant psychiatrist up until 2007. I then worked
21 full-time for the police undertaking extra
22 qualifications in forensic and legal medicine in 2008.

23 Q. Thank you very much. So turning to your first statement
24 of 27 September in relation to Edgware Road, did you go
25 to the scene at around about 00.59 in the morning of


1 8 July?

2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. You no doubt spoke to the police officers who were on
4 the scene, and did they escort you to the carriage?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. In relation to each of the persons whom you found in the
7 tunnel at Edgware Road, in essence, what was the purpose
8 of your examination?
9 A. It was very clearly described to me by the officers on
10 the scene that they didn't want anything other than for
11 me to pronounce life extinct on the victims.

12 Q. You understood that there was a legal obligation to
13 satisfy themselves that life was extinct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Were you allowed free rein into the carriage or were
16 there difficult considerations about giving you access
17 to everybody?
18 A. There were difficult considerations to be taken into
19 account at the time and I was very much led by the crime
20 scene manager, and there was difficulty accessing some
21 of the bodies or even seeing them clearly.

22 Q. But nevertheless, did that prevent you in any way from
23 reaching firm conclusions in relation to everybody?
24 A. No, it didn't.
25 Q. Was the first person you certified as being life extinct


1 a person whom you examined at 01.09, the body of
2 a female, and were you told that she had been moved
3 the scene to the platform of Edgware Road station?
<------------- [JENNY NICHOLSON! Not on the train, but mysteriously on the platform at ER]
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. I don't know whether you know the answer to this
6 question, Dr Costello. Did you know the name and the
7 identity of that person at the time?
8 A. No, I don't know the names of any of the victims, that
9 person included. I just have codes as to the code
10 numbers of the bodies involved.
11 MR KEITH: My Lady, we believe that person to have been
12 Jennifer Nicholson.

13 You then moved along the track to the train. You
14 didn't, I think, enter the train, but you viewed it from
15 the adjacent track.
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Did you then next examine a male? You didn't touch or
18 examine his body but you were able to certify his life
19 as being extinct at 01.12?
20 A. That's correct.
21 MR KEITH: My Lady, we understand that person to have been
22 David Foulkes.[
/b] [On the track or on the train???]
23 To his right, was there another body in relation to
24 whom you certified life extinct at 01.24?
25 A. That's correct.


1 MR KEITH: My Lady, we understand that person to have been
2 Colin Morley.

3 Next, in relation to a lady who was slightly away
4 from the previous person, Colin Morley, but lying on the
5 floor of the bombed carriage face up, did you certify
6 her life extinct at 01.34?
7 A. That's correct.
8 MR KEITH: My Lady, we understand that person to have been
9 Laura Webb.

10 Also on the floor of the carriage, was there a male
11 whose life was certified by you as extinct at 01.44?
12 A. That's correct.
13 MR KEITH: My Lady, Jonathan Downey.
14 Finally, did you then walk along the side of the
15 carriage in order to see a sixth person whose life you
16 certified as extinct at 01.54?

17 A. That's correct.
18 MR KEITH: My Lady, Michael Brewster.
19 In relation to that gentleman, Doctor, did you
20 notice that he still had, in fact, a tourniquet around
21 his right leg? NB Not from the train but looking in from what a window, a door?
22 A. That's correct. [No mention of MSK]
23 Q. Thank you very much. Could we now turn to Aldgate,
24 please, and the second of your two statements, also
25 dated 27 September 2005?


1 Did you go to the Aldgate scene at 08.40 on Friday,
2 8 July?

3 A. Yes, I did.
4 Q. Prior to attending the station, did you, in fact, go
5 home to wash and completely change your clothing, so as
6 to prevent any issue of contamination between the two
7 scenes?

8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. You were similarly met by officers of the Metropolitan
10 Police Service, and did you proceed to carry out the
11 same exercise: namely, certifying life extinct in
12 relation to all the persons you discovered there?
13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Between the platform and the train, did you come across
15 a white female who was lying at the side of a track
16 covered with a towel?
17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. Did she, in fact, have an ECG tab on her thorax?
19 A. Yes, she did.
20 Q. Did you certify life extinct at 08.55?
21 A. Yes, I did.
22 MR KEITH: My Lady, that person is, of course,
23 Carrie Taylor.
24 Did you then see a male on the left of the train, on
25 the railtrack, lying face down and, in relation to him,


1 much of his lower clothing had been blasted off?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Did he have remnants of a pinstriped suit, shirt and
4 tie?
5 A. Yes, he did.
6 Q. Did you certify his death at 09.01?
7 A. Yes, I did.
8 MR KEITH: My Lady, that was Richard Gray.

9 Inside the carriage 6713, did you then turn to the
10 body of a male lying on the floor near to the double
11 doors D7
-- and you should have in front of you, Doctor,
12 a document entitled "Positions of deceased in second
13 carriage post-explosion".
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. Was there a male lying on the floor next to the double
16 door D7 surrounded by debris?
17 A. Yes, there was.
18 Q. Did you certify life extinct at 09.05?
19 A. Yes, I did.
20 MR KEITH: My Lady, that person was Richard Ellery.
21 Also in the train, did you see a male, probably in

22 his 30s, lying face up, again most of his clothes had
23 been blown off him, and you certified life extinct at
24 09.07?
25 A. That's correct.


1 MR KEITH: My Lady, that was Lee Baisden.

2 Then again, still in the carriage, slumped against
3 the seats in the carriage, did you see a lady who had
4 suffered blast injuries who was wearing jeans and a tan
5 belt near seats 21 to 22 on the plan?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Did you certify life extinct at 09.16?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 MR KEITH: My Lady, we assess that that person was
10 Benedetta Ciaccia.

11 I think at that stage, you were advised not to go
12 into the carriage much further?
< --- [Why not?]
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. Was there a difficulty that you faced because of the
15 location of the bodies and the way in which they lay on
16 the floor, that it was difficult, indeed, to tell them
17 apart?
18 A. You could tell how many bodies were there, but it was
19 quite difficult to tell exact, you know, body parts from
20 each other due to clothes being on the area, blast
21 matter, and the positioning of the bodies. It was quite
22 easy to assign how many individuals were there, but just
23 picking out exact details was difficult.
24 Q. But you were able to say that the next person, again
25 a female, who was lying face down, was dressed in black


1 clothing and you were able to certify life extinct at
2 09.16?
3 A. That's correct.
4 MR KEITH: My Lady, that person was Fiona Stevenson.
5 Finally, again, in the same area, did you see
6 a body, a female, lying on the floor very close to the
7 other two persons who had suffered blast damage and she
8 was wearing a black top, did you certify her life
9 extinct at 09.16?
10 A. That's correct.
11 MR KEITH: My Lady, that was Anne Moffat.

12 Thank you very much, Doctor. I don't know whether
13 there are any further questions for you.
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Dr Costello? Any
15 other questions?
16 Dr Costello, there are no other questions for you.
17 Thank you for taking the trouble to join us via the
18 videolink.
19 A. Thank you very much. Thank you.
20 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Hay will read a number of witnesses.
21 MR HAY: My Lady, may I read the statement of Ian Collins,
22 dated 20 June 2006, which has the usual declaration of
23 truth?
24 Statement of MR IAN ANTHONY COLLINS read
25 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was employed in uniform


1 as the base sergeant for 2 Unit, Dog Support Unit,
2 Essex.
3 "I was deployed along with PC Tony Cassidy to
4 Aldgate station to assist SO13 Anti-terrorist Officers
5 with the task of recovering the remains of the human
6 victims. I believe PC Cassidy and I arrived at Aldgate
7 station at approximately 7.30 and there we introduced
8 ourselves to DC Meneely, who was the SO13 Exhibit
9 Officer.
For the next 11 days, PC Cassidy and I,
10 assisted by the SO13 officers, recovered all the
11 available human remains from both the train carriages
12 and the underground tunnel. I supervised the completion
13 of the ACPO victim label booklets and the removal of all
14 the recovered parts from the platform to the cold
15 storage unit parked outside the front of the station at
16 Aldgate High Street.
I would have then obtained the
17 coroner's permission for the transfer of the remains to
18 the temporary mortuary, which had been established at
19 the Honourable Artillery Company grounds. This transfer
20 then took place by van after completion of the necessary
21 paperwork and the bag containing the remains was then
22 released to the mortuary.
23 "After consultation with DC Meneely to ensure that
24 we had not missed even a single piece, thereby ensuring
25 the integrity of our search, I organised for the victim


1 recovery dogs to attend the scene and search the area."

2 My Lady, the next statement to read is that of
3 Daniel Jones, dated 26 March 2006, which has the usual
4 declaration of truth.
5 Statement of PC DANIEL JONES read
6 "I am the above-named person and I am a constable
7 with West Yorkshire Police, currently stationed at
8 Holbeck police station. At 10.55 hours on Sunday,
9 4 April 2004, I was on duty in full uniform at Leeds
10 Bridewell when I took a DNA buccal swab from a man who
11 was booked into custody as Shehzad Tanweer, born
12 5 December 1982, of [address redacted]. Tanweer had
13 received a caution for an offence of public order under
14 section 5, for which I had arrested him earlier.

15 "Tanweer consented to giving the sample by way of
16 mouth swabs, and the buccal swabs were packaged as
17 normal and placed in the freezer at Leeds, Bridewell.
18 I then obtained the fingerprints of Tanweer on the live
19 scan machine and took a digital photograph of him."
20 My Lady, the next two statements are from
21 Andrew McDonald, a forensic scientist, the first dated
22 30 August 2005 and the second dated 16 November 2005.

23 Turning to the first statement, again both have the
24 usual declaration of truth.


1 Statements of MR ANDREW McDONALD read

2 "I hold degrees of Bachelor of Science in Zoology
3 and Master of Science in Forensic Science ... I have
4 been a forensic scientist since 1992. During the course
5 of my career, I have examined many cases using DNA
6 analysis techniques.
7 "Between 13 July 2005 and 28 July 2005, 80 recovered
8 body part samples associated with the bombings of
9 a London Underground Tube train at Aldgate on
10 7 July 2005 together with 20 reference control samples
11 from individuals known to have been present at the time
12 of the explosion were received at the laboratory.
13 items were received in sealed packages.
14 "I was asked to carry out STR profiling tests to
15 determine whether any of the recovered body part samples
16 received in this case could have originated from
17 Shehzad Tanweer. STR profiling is a sensitive DNA
18 analysis technique. An STR profile obtained from
19 a human body fluid, such as blood or saliva, or human
20 body tissue can be compared with an STR profile of
21 a given person. If the profiles are different, then the
22 body fluid or body tissues cannot have originated from
23 the person in question.
24 "If, on the other hand, the STR profiles are the
25 same, then that individual, and anyone else who shares


1 the same STR profile, can be considered as a possible
2 source of the body fluid or body part. The significance
3 of finding such a match can then be assessed.
4 "Reference control sample. The tissue sample taken
5 from Shehzad Tanweer was used to determine his STR
6 profile.
7 "Recovered body part samples:
8 "Tissue analysed from the following recovered body
9 part samples generated full STR profiles which matched
10 that of Shehzad Tanweer."
11 And, my Lady, Mr McDonald then goes on to list 48
12 tissues which were analysed from recovered body part
13 samples:
14 "This means that the body parts could have
15 originated from him. I estimate that the probability of
16 obtaining this profile, if the tissue tested from the
17 body parts did not originate from Shehzad Tanweer, but
18 came from another unrelated person who, by coincidence,
19 had the same profile, is less than 1:1 billion. In
20 addition to these body part samples, the following
21 recovered body part samples generated incomplete STR
22 profiles which matched that of Shehzad Tanweer."
23 My Lady, four are listed.
24 "This means that these body part samples could also
25 have originated from him. I estimate that the


1 probability of obtaining these profiles, if the tissue
2 tested from the body parts did not originate from
3 Shehzad Tanweer but came from another unrelated person
4 who, by coincidence, has the same profile, is less than
5 1:1 billion ..."
6 My Lady, he lists three of the body part samples. < --- [Will this be released?]
7 "... and approximately 1:9 million", in respect of
8 the final body part sample:
9 "These body part tissue samples could not have
10 originated from any of the other individuals for whom
11 reference control samples were analysed. None of the
12 other recovered body part samples that were analysed
13 could have originated from Shehzad Tanweer. In my
14 opinion, the STR profile results provide extremely
15 strong scientific support for the assertion that all of
16 the recovered body part samples listed above originated
17 from Shehzad Tanweer."
18 My Lady, turning to the second statement dated
19 16 November 2005, again from Mr McDonald:
20 "Between 9 September 2005 and 12 September 2005,
21 nine further recovered body part samples associated with
22 the bombing of a London Underground Tube train at
23 Aldgate on 7 July 2005 were received at the laboratory.
24 All items were received in sealed packages. I was asked
25 to carry out the STR profiling test to determine whether


1 any of the further recovered body part samples received
2 in this case could have originated from Shehzad Tanweer.

3 "Reference control sample. The tissue sample taken
4 from Shehzad Tanweer was used to determine his STR
5 profile. The results of the profiling test carried out
6 in this case are tabulated."
7 He then refers to appendix 3 to his statement.
8 "Recovered body part samples:
9 "Tissue analysed from the following recovered body
10 part samples generated full STR profiles which matched
11 that of Shehzad Tanweer."
12 My Lady, six are listed.
13 "This means that these body parts could have
14 originated from him. I estimate that the probability of
15 obtaining this profile, if the tissue tested from the
16 body parts did not originate from Shehzad Tanweer but
17 came from another unrelated person who, by coincidence,
18 has the same profile, is less than 1:1 billion.
19 "These body part tissue samples could not have
20 originated from any of the other individuals for whom
21 reference control samples were analysed. None of the
22 other further recovered body part samples that were
23 analysed and from which STR profiles were obtained could
24 have originated from Shehzad Tanweer.
25 "Conclusions:


1 "In my opinion, the STR profiling results provide an
2 extremely strong scientific support for the assertion
3 that all of the recovered body part samples listed above
4 originated from Shehzad Tanweer."
5 My Lady, the next statement is that of
6 Nathaniel Cary dated 29 April 2007. He is a consultant
7 forensic scientist:
8 Statement of MR NATHANIEL CARY read
9 "Recovered body fragment: Operation Theseus URN
10 60021972 (Shehzad TANWEER). < ---- [No date of when he received this]
11 "Date of death: 7 July 2005 ...
12 "This body part was recovered from the Aldgate
13 scene. This is a fragment consisting of the lower part
14 of the thoracic spine and the upper lumbar spine
15 weighing 1.852 kilograms. There are some signs of
16 decomposition and charring. The specimen is
17 contaminated with glass. It is associated with a piece
18 of cloth.

19 "Measurements: 30 centimetres longitudinally.
20 "Up to 14 centimetres wide.
21 "Up to 10 centimetres deep.
22 "There are attached pieces of posterior rib
23 associated with posterior spinal muscles. It consists
24 of part of the sixth thoracic vertebrae, the seventh
25 thoracic to the second lumbar vertebrae in continuity


1 and part of the third thoracic vertebrae ...
2 "Clinicopathological correlation:
3 "I have subsequently seen a copy of a form entitled
4 'Matched body parts'. This relates to scene 1 Aldgate.
5 Through DNA analysis, this body part, URN 60021972, has
6 been matched to multiple other body parts identified as
7 having come from Shehzad Tanweer.

8 "The nature of this body part and the extreme level
9 of disruption implied by the nature of the other matched
10 body parts is typical of a deceased person having been
11 either in direct contact or very close to an explosive
12 device.
13 "The level of exposive disruption associated with
14 this deceased, when compared with other bodies, both
15 from this scene and other scenes of explosions also
16 occurring on July 7, is entirely in keeping with this
17 deceased having been in possession of the exposive
18 device at the time it exploded
19 "Cause of death:
20 "A cause of death for this deceased person may be
21 recoded as 1A injuries due to an explosion."

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hay, I think you said he was
23 a forensic scientist. Dr Cary is a pathologist.

24 MR HAY: My Lady, I apologise.
25 My Lady, the final statement is that of


1 Richard Hall, dated 6 June 2006, again with the usual
2 declaration of truth.
3 Statement of DC RICHARD HALL read
4 "I am a detective constable attached to the
5 Anti-terrorist Branch at New Scotland Yard where
6 I performed the role of Terrorist Forensic Scene
7 Examiner and Exhibit Officer.

8 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was on duty when
9 a series of incidents took place in London. I was aware
10 that initially there had been explosions on
11 London Underground trains at Russell Square,
12 Edgware Road and Aldgate Underground station. A further
13 explosion had occurred on a London Transport bus at
14 Tavistock Square.
15 "I was tasked by DS Michael Jolly to act as the
16 Deputy Scene Examiner to DC Andrew Meneely,
who had been
17 tasked earlier in the day to attend the scene at Aldgate
18 London Underground station.
19 "I went to the scene where I was met by DC Meneely,
20 who was carrying out tasks in relation to the initial
21 survey of the scene. DC Meneely had devised a zone plan
22 which had been used to structure the search. This was
23 later drawn by DC Neil Fretwell of the
24 Anti-terrorist Branch Bomb Data Centre and exhibited at
25 NF/7."


1 Can we have up on the screen, please, [INQ8361-1]
2 "My role at the scene was to record the exhibits in
3 a series of exhibit books, to examine exhibits as they
4 were produced from the scene and make an assessment of
5 them and to pass any relevant details via the control
6 vehicle initially to the Anti-terrorist Branch
7 intelligence unit, and subsequently to the
8 Anti-terrorist Branch operations room. I had joint
9 control of the exhibits with DC Meneely.
10 "Once the ticket area, zone 1, stairs to the
11 landing, lower level, walk way and platforms 3 and 4,
12 zone 3, had been cleared, I established a working area
13 at the end of the platform at the entrance to the tunnel
14 leading to Liverpool Street station. This was the point
15 at which exhibits would be removed from the tunnel for
16 recording and examination. At all times, I wore
17 forensic barrier clothing whilst handling the exhibits
18 in order to prevent cross-contamination.
19 "During the course of DC Meneely's initial
20 examination of the scene, he seized exhibit AM/11,
21 selected debris from zone 5, the open area to the left
22 of carriages 1, 2 and 3 of the train.
23 "The exhibit contained part of a wallet which
24 appeared to have been close to an explosion. I examined
25 the contents of this wallet and found that it contained


1 fragments of plastic cards, fragments of Bank of England
2 notes, business cards, and other correspondence.
3 "I recorded the following details in the 'Remarks'
4 column of the exhibit book and passed them to the
5 control vehicle for transmission to the ATBIU.
6 "On Monday, 11 July 2005, I conducted a closer
7 examination of exhibit AM/11. A decision had been taken
8 to submit the wallet to the Forensic Explosives
9 Laboratory for explosive trace work to be done. I
10 therefore opened the exhibit and removed all of the
11 fragmented parts from it. I then resealed the exhibit.
12 As a result of this examination, I created the following
13 eleven exhibits:
14 "RABH/1. Fragmented HSBC credit card in the name of
15 Mr Sidique Khan ...
16 "RABH/2. Fragments of a £10 and £5 note split from
17 AM/11 ...
18 "RABH/3. One Excelsior Snooker Club membership card
19 in the name of S Tanweer ...
20 "RABH/4. 1. Two receipts ... One PC World receipt
21 for plantronic audio 15 microph £12.99.
22 "2. B&Q receipt. Print has faded but can be read
23 in part. (H)Eeston Ring Road, Leeds ...
24 "RABH/5. One Northern Snooker Centre membership
25 card in the name of S Tanweer ...


1 "RABH/5A. One Nasim Property Investor business
2 card...
3 "RABH/7. One Halifax Current Account Switch Card in
4 the name of Mr S Khan ...
5 "RABH/8. One Optimum Fitness card in the name of
6 Yasser HALEED ...
7 "RABH/9. One business card ...
8 "Dr GREENTHUMBS Hydroponics Store ... Wakefield ...
9 "RABH/10. One business card in the name of
10 James Squires ...
11 "I also produced exhibit RABH/11 - one nylon bag -
12 for control purposes for the Forensic Exposives
13 Laboratory."

15 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Ian Wheeler?
17 Questions by MR KEITH
18 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?
19 A. Yes, I'm Chief Inspector Ian Wheeler of the Metropolitan
20 Police Service.
21 Q. Mr Wheeler, in July of 2005, you were Inspector Wheeler?

22 A. I was.
23 Q. We know from your witness statement that you were
24 attached to Charing Cross police station and a body
25 known as Response Team 1 and you were in charge of what


1 is called a Serial, Serial 112, from the
2 Commissioners Reserve.

3 We've heard a little bit of evidence about the
4 Commissioners Reserve and the formation of groups of
5 officers called Serials. Could you just tell us,
6 please, as simply as you are able, for us to understand,
7 what a Serial is and what the Commissioners Reserve is?
8 A. Correctly, the Commissioners Reserve is a police support
9 unit comprising three Serials. Each of those Serials
10 would be a team of either six or seven PCs supervised by
11 a sergeant, and overseeing the whole unit would be an
12 inspector.
13 Q. Were you that inspector?
14 A. I was.
15 Q. Were you part of a Serial, or were you a Serial, that
16 was classified as a level 2 Serial, that is to say
17 trained in public order?
18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. The relevancy of your Serial is that, later, when we get
20 to Aldgate, which we know you attended, you deployed
21 some of your officers including a sergeant,
22 Sergeant Nanasi, down into the tunnel, together,
23 I think, with two or three of your constables.
24 I want to explore with you how it was that you came
25 to be briefed to attend Aldgate and, also, what you were


1 doing at the time that you were briefed. Were you being
2 held in reserve for something? Was there a reason for
3 the deployment or putting
into readiness of your
4 officers that morning?

5 A. Yes, on 6 July and 7 July, we were on duty in Central
6 London primarily to cover any potential protests linked
7 to the G8 conference in Scotland. A lot of Territorial
8 Support Group Officers had been deployed to Scotland, so
9 the Commissioners Reserve had been drawn from Borough
10 Officers and that was my unit.
11 Q. The reason that I ask is that there's been some comment
12 in the press and elsewhere, not recently, but nearer the
13 events of 7 July 2005, to the effect that, in some way,
14 the taking place of the G8 Summit in Scotland may have
15 had some adverse impact on the ability of the police, or
16 the emergency services, to respond in London.

17 Do we take it that the making available of your
18 Serial as part of the Commissioners Reserve was part of
19 a step taken by the Metropolitan Police to ensure that
20 there were additional officers on duty available to deal
21 with events in London, if they occurred?
22 A. That's correct. That's my understanding, yes.
23 Q. In the event, were there any protests arising out of the
24 G8 Summit that you were forced to attend to in London?
25 A. No.


1 Q. So you were made available then for any other
2 eventuality that might have arisen?
3 A. Yes. Our prime function was to cover any protests
4 around G8. However, we could have been deployed to any
5 incident requiring a large number of officers anywhere
6 in London.
7 Q. Indeed, as it transpired, that morning, you received
8 a call from the Special Operations Room?
9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. We've seen a large number of logs, Chief Inspector, as
11 you might expect, and we've become familiar with
12 computer-aided dispatch records, CAD records, relating
13 to the general carrying out of Metropolitan Police and
14 City of London Police duties.
15 Because you were assigned to the specific role of
16 being part of the Commissioners Reserve, did you receive
17 your calls from another telephone exchange, another
18 operation, called the Special Operations Room?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. They operate a different telephone system, do they?
21 A. I'm no expert on their telephony. I believe they do
22 primarily use a different command and control system
23 called Met Ops, or was called Met Ops then.
24 Q. In any event, there are different logs relating to the
25 calls made to and from their room which we know as GT


1 logs. Is that your understanding also?
2 A. Yes, it is.
3 Q. Basically, they're dedicated radio channels and means of
4 communication which are put into place to allow the Met
5 to respond to large-scale events?
6 A. Yes, my understanding is that those logs are primarily
7 around the coordination of resources.
8 Q. Could we have on the screen [INQ10587-2]? This is such
9 a GT log. At 08.55, if you could enlarge the bottom
10 half of the page, we can see there a message under the
11 words "Event 125:
12 "Please send a CAD ..."
13 A computer-aided dispatch:
14 "... to City Police asking if they require any
15 assistance."
16 Do you recollect that message?
17 A. I would have had no involvement in that message.
18 I presume that would have gone from GT to the City of
19 London Police.
20 Q. All right. As a result of that message, do you
21 recollect that you received a call asking you to deploy
22 to, initially, Liverpool Street?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. If we go forward to page 3 of this exhibit, [INQ10587-3] please, we
25 can see under "Event 125 GT2" right at the top of the


1 page:
2 "BX1. On way to Liverpool Street station."
3 It's rather hard to discern from the way in which
4 the material is formulated, but does that ring any bells
5 with you as to whether or not you communicated to GT
6 that you were on the way to Liverpool Street?
7 A. I certainly communicated that. Whether that was from me
8 I can't say. BX1 would be the call sign of Bronze.
9 That may have been a chief inspector overseeing all the
10 Central London units.

11 Q. All right. In any event, you didn't go to
12 Liverpool Street or, if you did, I think you were asked
13 to deploy to Aldgate?
14 A. Yes, I'm not that familiar with that area of the city,
15 but we got near to Liverpool Street and we were asked
16 to, yes, redeploy.
17 Q. You reached Aldgate, we know, from the GT logs, around
18 9.30, 09.26, and I want to ask you, please, Chief
19 Inspector, about your impressions of the scene as you
20 arrived. You were the most senior Metropolitan Police
21 officer in attendance on the scene in the early part of
22 the day.

23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. What was your impression on arrival?
25 A. It was apparent that it was a major incident. Many


1 emergency services were there, fire engines, ambulances.
2 I saw some police officers. Several casualties. People
3 that appeared to have been injured sitting outside of
4 the front of Aldgate station, and several walking out of
5 the station across the road.
6 Q. Presumably there were a number of police vehicles in
7 your Serial?
8 A. Yes, we would have had three carriers, three minibuses.

9 Q. Did you have trouble getting into the immediate
10 environment of Aldgate London Underground station?
11 A. Yes, we drove towards Aldgate and I think we got to
12 a cordon, a police cordon, a bit of tape, and I don't
13 recall any more than one, perhaps two officers on that
14 cordon, and due to people in the road and other
15 vehicles, we got out of our carriers and ran up towards
16 Aldgate.
17 Q. Was it apparent to you that there were a large number,
18 therefore, of emergency service vehicles already in
19 attendance at the scene?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Did you see, when you arrived, any other emergency
22 service vehicles attempting to get into the station or
23 get near the station but failing to do so, or did it
24 seem to you that, with a bit of perseverance, you could
25 get access to the station?


1 A. I didn't see any other vehicles having difficulty
2 getting in there. We did have a problem, which is why
3 we got off and ran.
4 Q. Nearer the station, indeed the foyer of the station
5 hall, you obviously saw a large number of walking
6 wounded and casualties from the Aldgate train.
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. We know that they were being attended to by London
9 Ambulance Service personnel.
10 A. Yes, I saw LAS personnel helping people.
11 Q. In your statement, you describe the scene as, if I may
12 be fair to you, perhaps appearing chaotic, but did it
13 seem to you that, in truth, the emergency services were
14 going about doing what they were obliged to do, which
15 was to treat the people in the foyer and the station
16 hall of Aldgate?
17 A. Yes, "chaotic" was the word I used in my statement.
18 Q. It was.
19 A. But recalling what I saw, it appeared to me as everyone
20 doing their job.
21 Q. As you arrived and as the senior officer, did you try to
22 find who else might be in command at that time?
23 A. I and my sergeants went to the entrance of Aldgate with
24 the anticipation of being met and briefed, and very
25 shortly after that, I believe that a PC asked us to help


1 with triaging of casualties and escorting them away from
2 the station, gave me some details about what had
3 occurred in his view and we set about our work.
4 Q. You say in your statement how, when you arrived, no one
5 actually made themselves known to you at that stage as
6 being, we presume, in command. Was it therefore
7 a question of you seeing what you could do to assist and
8 setting priorities for you and your own men?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. What were your priorities, did it seem to you, at the
11 time?
12 A. Having spoken to this officer, I set my strategy for my
13 officers which was preserving life, assisting
14 casualties, preserving the scene and identifying
15 witnesses and evidence.
16 Q. From your viewpoint, was there any question of the main
17 priority of preserving life being made subsidiary to any
18 other consideration, such as forensic scene examination
19 or the risks of secondary devices exploding or anything
20 else?

21 A. No, that was our prime objective.
22 Q. If I may ask you this: is that one of the objectives, if
23 not the primary objective, which is carried out by the
24 police when they come to assist other emergency services
25 in responding to incidents?


1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. So if a Metropolitan police officer attends an incident
3 where there is a question of loss of life, must he defer
4 his usual investigatory talents to the need to preserve
5 life and to make sure that life is preserved first
6 before anything else can be done?

7 A. It does depend on the individual circumstances.
8 I couldn't say that that would always be the prime
9 concern. It would be hard to think of anything that
10 would be more important, because it's a fundamental part
11 of policing generally.
12 Q. Accordingly, I think there came a stage when one of your
13 sergeants, Sergeant Nanasi, was directed by you to go
14 down and help BTP officers who were in the bottom of the
15 station but needed more officers to help them.
16 A. Yes, I received a request to provide some resources,
17 I believe initially I was asked to provide three
18 officers.
19 Q. And they went down?
20 A. I considered that too few for their own safety and the
21 likelihood of them being effective, so I deployed
22 additional officers with a command structure, which was
23 Sergeant Nanasi, and in total I deployed nine officers.

24 Q. One further point, if I may, although unrelated to those
25 who died at Aldgate; I am more concerned with the


1 casualties who were able to be brought out alive: did,
2 a problem subsequently arise when it became plain that
3 there would be an insufficient number of ambulance
4 drivers to drive the ambulances to the
5 Royal London Hospital?
6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. Was that because the ambulance technicians and the
8 medical staff were still deployed in the station or
9 elsewhere?
10 A. It was communicated to me that their prime objective was
11 also to save life and treat the severely injured people,
12 that some casualties had been treated, stabilised,
13 placed in ambulances, but there were insufficient LAS
14 personnel to drive the ambulances.
15 Q. What did you do, Chief Inspector?
16 A. I deployed some of my officers who were qualified police
17 drivers to drive those ambulances to hospital.
18 Q. Can you recall how many were so deployed?
19 A. No. That request came to me and I directed that to one
20 of my sergeants. I'm aware that several officers were
21 then deployed, but my directions all went through my
22 sergeants.
23 Q. I think you also, according to your statement, deployed
24 your officers by way of a marked carrier and driver and
25 perhaps the police vehicles to escort the buses that


1 were used to escort -- to carry the injured to the
2 Royal London?
3 A. That's correct, yes.
4 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Chief Inspector. Will you
5 stay there, please? There may be some further questions
6 for you.
8 Questions by MS SHEFF
9 MS SHEFF: Can I ask you, please, Chief Inspector, about
10 your decision log scene. That's our exhibit 9757.
11 Can I ask you to look at page number 11.
12 It's a different page from the one I've got. It's
13 headed "Event Debrief Report". I'm sorry, I've given
14 the wrong first reference. It's actually, again, part
15 of your log notes, but it's [INQ10428-11].
16 Could you highlight, please, number 3.
17 This is the report that arose out of a debriefing
18 that you had with other officers after the events of
19 7 July were able to be assessed. Is that right?
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 Q. Who was present at the briefing?
22 A. All my officers, myself, the divisional commander at
23 Charing Cross and I think our HR manager as well.
24 Q. So it was just for BTP officers and staff, was it?
25 A. No, it was just for my officers, Metropolitan Police.


1 Q. Sorry, for Met police officers.
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. But it did assess the response of the other officers at
4 the scene, we can see at number 1 the BTP officers being
5 sited and 2 and 3 concern the City of London Police
6 officers.
7 Then at 4 you talk about the mid-term response which
8 you say that's between one to three hours. That
9 presumably comes after what's known as the "golden
10 hour", the first hour of response, the mid-term being
11 the period thereafter, is it?
12 A. The context of these notes, they were an amalgam of my
13 and my officers' experiences. I do recall that my
14 impression still at the time of this debrief was that we
15 had arrived later after the
incident than, in fact, we
16 had, if that makes sense.
17 So one to three hours. Probably more accurately, in
18 reflection, would be an earlier start, that perhaps
19 would have been half an hour to two and a half hours.

20 More or less as soon as we arrived.
21 Q. So you're there at around 9.30ish. So are your comments
22 relevant to the period from 9.30 to, what, about three
23 hours afterwards?

24 A. Yes, I believe so, although they were a combination of
25 comments and feedback I was getting from my officers


1 during that debrief.
2 Q. You talk there about the Command structure, Bronze,
3 Silver, Gold, from COLP, the City of London Police.
4 What was that particular comment aimed at? What did it
5 reflect in terms of what your officers were telling you?

6 A. I think everything we did, either we did of our own
7 initiative or as a result of a request from colleagues
8 from BTP, City of London or the Ambulance Service.
9 My expectations, which perhaps were a little
10 unrealistic, were that we would be slotted into
11 a Command structure as soon as we arrived. Ideally,
12 turning up at a major incident such as this, one would
13 get a briefing from a senior officer around their
14 strategy, what they would like us to do, and then we
15 would have cracked on with it.
16 But that was based, I think, on an assumption that
17 we had arrived later in the event than, in fact, we had.
18 Q. What did you hope a more effective Command structure
19 would have achieved?

20 A. I believe that we acted with a degree of autonomy.
21 There would always be a risk that we weren't perhaps
22 acting or pulling the same way as colleagues. I think
23 our strategy that I set would have been consistent with
24 colleagues' strategies, but ideally, there should be
25 a defined Command structure and we would have slotted


1 into it, bearing in mind we were the
2 Commissioners Reserve, we were the contribution of the
3 Met to BTP and City of London, so I would have certainly
4 looked for a lead to make sure what I was doing wasn't
5 contrary to any of their intentions.
6 Q. So you were looking for a lead at the scene and you
7 found or you perceived that to be lacking, which you're
8 suggesting may have affected the way in which your team
9 reacted to the situation. Is that fair?

10 A. I think we were effective, and I think we were probably
11 consistent, what we did, with their intentions. But
12 there would have been a risk, the longer we acted with
13 autonomy, that we weren't doing exactly what was
14 intended.
15 Q. The fact that it is a Command structure going up to
16 Gold, the Gold Commander, we understand, is not normally
17 on the scene, the Gold Commander being somewhere in
18 Central Command assessing the feedback from the scene.
19 Does that indicate that your comments are relevant,
20 not only to what was going on at the scene and your
21 team's reactions to it, but also what was being reported
22 back to the higher commanding officers?

23 A. In such a dynamic environment as this, bearing in mind
24 what else was going on in London, roles can change very,
25 very quickly. Some of what I did when I arrived around


1 setting a strategy would normally be the role of a Gold,
2 but in reality, those roles aren't always clearly
3 defined until things bed in.
4 Certainly for a preplanned operation, it would be
5 far more distinct. So at that stage, I don't recall
6 putting any particular weight. To be honest, it's rare
7 to write Bronze, Silver, without adding Gold.
8 Q. You're suggesting that, from the point of view of your
9 team, in any event you were acting in some context as
10 a Gold officer and taking those strategic decisions that
11 a Gold officer would take, is that right?

12 A. That's correct. I was, at that time, based at
13 Charing Cross police station covering Central London, as
14 were the officers on my unit, and it was -- I wouldn't
15 say routine, but it was a frequent event for us to act
16 in relatively large numbers and, as inspectors, to set
17 strategies to deal with the sort of demand that occurs
18 in Central London, whether it be a bomb threat,
19 a suspect car or the evacuation of a nightclub.
20 In many ways, I think my officers would have been
21 well-placed to deal with this because of their
22 experiences during their everyday duties.
23 Q. Did your role as a Gold strategy officer in Central
24 London involve any responsibility for public transport,
25 the Tube lines and the buses?


1 A. Certainly buses. If a call was received to a bus, to
2 a suspect package on the bus, that would fall to myself
3 or my fellow inspectors to deal with. As far as the
4 London Underground goes, that would always be the --
5 primarily the jurisdiction of BTP.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think you are meaning a slightly
7 more strategic role in relation to whether or not the
8 chief inspector had the power to order the closure. Is
9 that what you --
10 MS SHEFF: Indeed, my Lady.

11 Obviously, if there was a suspect package, you would
12 be responsible for reacting to that?
13 A. I beg your pardon.
14 Q. I'm considering the strategic aspect, whether you had
15 any responsibility to take into account what was
16 occurring at Aldgate and what you knew of other bombings
17 at other stations and apply that to your role as
18 strategic officer with a power -- or did you have
19 a power or any input into the closing down of the
20 transport system, either the tubes or the buses?

21 A. No. Setting a strategy is an aspect of Gold's
22 traditional responsibilities, but my perception was
23 certainly that we were deployed by the Met to the City
24 of London to assist colleagues there and officers from
25 BTP. We certainly weren't aware of what else was going


1 on in London when we arrived at Aldgate.
And I don't
2 recall being aware of that until the radio traffic
3 started to come through after we were up and running.
4 Q. You were in contact, via your radio, with officers
5 around London, I believe from your log, so that did
6 eventually filter through to you, did it?
7 A. Yes, all my contact would have been with the
8 Special Operations Room.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Did you have any responsibility for
10 any scenes or anything else going on around London other
11 than Aldgate?
12 A. No, my Lady.
13 MS SHEFF: Did you have responsibility for informing other
14 Gold Commanders of what was occurring at Aldgate in
15 relation to strategy decisions generally?
16 A. All my communications would have been with the
17 Special Operations Room where there would have been
18 a Command structure in place and communication coming
19 back to me would have been all from the
20 Special Operations Room.

21 Q. Where's the Special Operations Room based?
22 A. It depends on the event. In 2005, I'm not 100 per cent
23 sure, I think it was still based at New Scotland Yard.

24 There was a period of transition in command and control
25 during the middle of the decade, but I think it was


1 still at New Scotland Yard.
2 Q. Is this a Met Police Special Operations Room or is it
3 a body which covers all emergency responders?
4 A. It's a Metropolitan Police facility which has
5 communication pods within it for partners such as other
6 police services, occasionally armed services, other
7 emergency services as well.
8 Q. Finally this: were you the only, effectively,
9 Gold Commander, a Silver Commander acting as
10 Gold Commander and taking strategy decisions at Aldgate
11 that you were aware of, or did any other services --
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm not really sure, Ms Sheff -- I'm
13 sorry to interrupt you. I'm not really sure that's
14 a fair assessment of the evidence the chief inspector
15 has been giving. I don't think he's really saying he
16 was Gold Commander in the sense that we've been talking
17 about.
18 MS SHEFF: No, I put that badly.
19 You were obviously taking strategic decisions in the
20 context of those that might be taken at Gold level. Was
21 there any -- sorry, did you want to respond to that
22 before I ask the next question?
23 A. At no time would I have considered myself Gold for
24 Aldgate or anywhere else, but by setting a strategy --
25 some people may describe it as a list of tactics -- that


1 was purely around providing direction to my officers and
2 for me to keep a check on what I was doing and making
3 sure that I was adhering to what I intended to do.
4 So I'd never consider myself as a Gold, and I don't
5 know what other senior officers may have been present at
6 Aldgate.
7 Q. Did you have any contact with anybody else who was
8 acting in the same context as you, taking those serious
9 and senior strategy decisions from other emergency
10 services?
11 A. Yes, I believe I spoke or was approached by a colleague
12 from the London Ambulance Service who asked me if
13 I could assist with the driving of ambulances to
14 hospital, and I had subsequent contact with senior
15 officers from City of London Police around what they
16 would like me to do.
17 Q. What about the London Underground, did you have any --
18 or Transport for London?
19 A. I don't recall having had any contact with
20 London Underground, no.

21 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much, Chief Inspector.
22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Chief Inspector, what I've written
23 down is that where you refer to a strategic role, it's
24 essentially limited to the deployment of your units.
25 I prefer, I'm afraid, to call them units than Serials,


1 because Serial is another word I don't recognise in this
2 context, but you were strategically involved for
3 deploying them rather than the strategy affecting what
4 was going on generally at Aldgate?
5 A. Absolutely, my Lady. It would have been problematic for
6 me to take on any command of resources outside of my
7 unit. It was to provide them direction, and by setting
8 that list of the strategy that -- the four points, that
9 was the only element that may have been considered
10 traditionally the role of a Gold, but it was purely us
11 acting with a degree of autonomy.
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You were asked about the comments at
13 the debriefing. We have had the considerable benefit of
14 hindsight, Mr Wheeler. We've seen the comments that you
15 made. Do you think, in fact, had there been the kind of
16 Command structure you say, that you might, in an ideal
17 world, have expected, do you think it would in fact have
18 made any difference to what happened?
19 A. No, I don't. The context of these comments were
20 straight after a debrief with my officers. It was still
21 an ongoing police operation. We still considered that
22 London could have been under attack and, upon
23 reflection, I think I may have been a little harsh in
24 some of them.
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Mr Wheeler?

�To those who are afraid of the truth, I wish to offer a few scary truths; and to those who are not afraid of the truth, I wish to offer proof that the terrorism of truth is the only one that can be of benefit to the proletariat.� -- On Terrorism and the State, Gianfranco Sanguinetti

Joined: 26 Nov 2005, 01:46

03 Nov 2010, 21:29 #4

Afternoon session continued:
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Mr Wheeler?


1 Mr Hill?
2 Questions by MR HILL
3 MR HILL: Chief Inspector, it may seem odd to the
4 uninitiated, given that you're an officer of the
5 Metropolis, but there are some jurisdictional issues,
6 aren't there, particularly when we're talking about the
7 City of London as opposed to Greater London?
8 A. That's correct, yes.
9 Q. Those jurisdictional issues dictate, is this right, that
10 the police service who have primacy in the City of
11 London are, as the name suggests, the City of London
12 Police?

13 A. That's correct, yes.
14 Q. That is why it was an offer for assistance given to the
15 City of London Police on the morning of 7 July that
16 resulted in you being deployed from your holding base
17 for the day of Buckingham Gate?
18 A. That's correct, yes.
19 Q. By the same reason, because of coronial jurisdiction,
20 the jurisdiction in which this particular atrocity
21 occurred was different to the jurisdiction in which the
22 other events in London on that tragic day occurred; you
23 know about that?

24 A. That's also correct.
25 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask a couple more questions about


1 the timing of events that morning from the GT log? If
2 we could have back on screen, please, [INQ10587-2] .
3 This is, as you've told us, a separate system to the
4 computer-aided dispatch system. It's the GT or
5 Special Operations Room system which, as you correctly
6 surmise, was being run from Scotland Yard that day in
7 2005, the Special Ops Room.
So the GT room, is this
8 right, having been put in place for potential events
9 emanating from the demonstrations over the previous days
10 in Scotland, therefore resulted in a dedicated radio
11 channel being set up, which, to officers like you and
12 those under your command, is GT?
13 A. That's correct, yes.
14 Q. So as we look at the entries -- I'm not, of course,
15 going to take you through entries on this log that are
16 being created by others and in relation to the actions
17 of others -- we should imagine, is this right, that
18 you're one spoke in quite a large wheel of
19 communications on this day?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So there are messages that are coming down to you at the
22 end of your spoke and also being relayed back by you
23 under your Serial number?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. So when we read the GT2 log, we should look in


1 particular, is this right, for entries that are recorded
2 as coming from 112A?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Because that's your Serial number?
5 A. Yes, my whole unit was 112A, B and C, but as the
6 inspector, I would be attached to A.
7 Q. Right. Restricting myself almost entirely, then, to
8 those entries which emanate from you, we've already
9 looked on page 2 at the entry timed at 08.55. It's
10 0009, 08.55.07. That is a message that tells us that,
11 at the time, you were still at Buck Gate, next line, or
12 there's a reference to Buck Gate, where in fact you
13 were?
14 A. Yes, Buckingham Gate, I can see.
15 Q. The message then sent from SIL -- do you know what SIL
16 means in this context?
17 A. No, I don't.
18 Q. Don't worry. It's being sent from SIL to CAD:
19 "Please send a CAD to City Police asking if they
20 require any assistance.
21 "GT: Cheers."
22 That's someone in the Special Ops Room offering help
23 to City of London Police?
24 A. It would appear so. However, I wouldn't profess to be
25 an expert on communications within that room.


1 Q. No, as we've already established, that's not an entry
2 that's going to have been made by you. This an entry,
3 as it were, made centrally. If we go over to page 3 [INQ10587-3] ,
4 please, on the screen, the top of the page, do we see at
5 09.07, about six lines down the screen, there is what
6 appears to be -- is this right -- a deployment, and we
7 can see your Serial numbers, 112A, B and C, to:
8 "L pool", Liverpool Street, at the junction with
9 Broad Street?
10 A. That's correct, yes.
11 Q. So that's the indication that, at 09.07, following the
12 offer for assistance, it appears to be taken up and
13 you're deployed forward to Liverpool Street?

14 A. Yes.
15 Q. The next entry on the same page, please, we can come
16 down to 09.09, the very bottom of the screen at the
17 moment, if we could scroll down to that, is not an entry
18 made by you, it's made by BX1. That's not you, is it?
19 A. No, I believe that would have been Elaine van Orden, who
20 was the chief inspector overseeing all the Central
21 London reserves, I believe.

22 Q. Right. That officer is recording that you, as we know,
23 and your three minibuses full of officers are "on way to
24 Liverpool Street station".
25 A. That may have been her saying that she was on way.


1 I don't know. But she wouldn't have travelled with us.
2 Q. Right. All right, thank you. That's 09.09. Could we
3 then go on, I think to page 5 [INQ10587-5] in this log, and come to
4 9.20? At 9.20, middle of the screen now, can we see an
5 entry, two entries:
6 "We are on scene at Liverpool. We've been asked by
7 CP ..."
8 Does that mean City Police?
9 A. I would presume so.
10 Q. Right.
11 "We've been asked by CP to go to rendezvous point at
12 Aldgate LT station."

13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Right. So that's 9.20. Then two lines below that, at
15 the same time, 9.20 still, we see your Serial numbers,
16 "Aldgate station new location".
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 Q. So that appears to help us, does it, to show that you
19 had reached Liverpool Street within, at most, 13 minutes
20 of being brought forward from Buckingham Gate, and then
21 you were deployed onwards at the request of City of
22 London Police to Aldgate?
23 A. Yes, I would presume that that entry would mean that we
24 were en route to Aldgate. We hadn't yet arrived.
25 Q. All right, then same page, bottom of the page, can we


1 come to 09.26? This is where you may be able to help
2 us, can we pick up here an entry recorded on this
3 Special Ops system which appears to emanate from you
4 yourself, 112A:
5 "My Serial now at Aldgate station assisting with
6 casualties."
7 Is that your message in?
8 A. That would have been me, yes.
9 Q. Right. All right. Thank you. Having established that,
10 I think we can go over to page 6 [INQ10587-6] and see the next
11 message that you radioed in. So we've been looking at
12 9.26. Ten minutes later, 09.36, is that you relaying
13 the fact that British Transport Police have, it says
14 "been asked" maybe that should read "have asked"
15 "... asked us to deploy trackside with them at Aldgate"?
16 A. I presume that is me. There is a chance that may have
17 been Sergeant Nanasi.
18 Q. If he radioed in, he might use the serial identifier?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Right. But it was you who detailed Sergeant Nanasi to
21 take the officers you had selected trackside?
22 A. That's correct, yes.
23 Q. So in that ten-minute period, it's apparent, is it, that
24 there is the presence and requests continuing to be made
25 by City of London Police in relation to Aldgate and it's


1 clear that there's the presence of British Transport
2 Police officers, and you have -- would it be right to
3 say you have fed in to their structure at the scene
4 rather than setting up your own structure?
5 A. Yes, we had fed into -- well, we were there to help. We
6 would respond to any request to help. We would
7 obviously want to be as effective as possible, but the
8 reason I put a strategy in was, rather than wait to be
9 asked, there was obviously plenty to do otherwise.
10 Q. For the avoidance of doubt, there was plenty, was there,
11 for you, as the commanding officer of your Serials, and
12 the other two minibus-loads of officers, to stay
13 topside, groundside, as it were, at Aldgate, to help
14 with casualties at the top of the steps?
15 A. Yes, when we arrived, there were casualties coming out
16 and there were also what appear to have been more
17 seriously injured people prone outside of the station as
18 well. So there was plenty to do to help.
19 Q. Let's go forward another 30 minutes, page 7 [INQ10587-7] on the same
20 document, to 10.06. We've been looking at 9.36. By
21 10.06, did you -- or does it appear to be you radioing
22 in:
23 "All my PSU is back together. About to liaise with
24 BTP re what they want us to do next."

25 A. Yes, that would have been me using that term, "all my


1 PSU", yes.
2 Q. PSU means?
3 A. Police Support Unit.
4 Q. Thank you. Bottom of that same page, 10.10, four
5 minutes later, is that you again:
6 "One carrier to escort a bus full of casualties to
7 the London hospital. The rest of my Serials will be
8 driving Ambs [ambulances] to local hospitals."

9 A. That would have been me, yes.
10 Q. Is that use of initiative on your part or a result of
11 a specific tasking from somewhere to permit officers to
12 drive ambulances, how did that come about?
13 A. That was in liaising with a colleague from LAS who asked
14 us if we could help with driving ambulances. I'm not
15 certain with regards to escorting the bus. I think that
16 may have been a decision that we'd both come to.
17 Bearing in mind the trouble we had in getting to Aldgate
18 an hour beforehand, it was obvious that a bus was going
19 to need assistance.
20 Q. All right. That's all I want to ask from that log. So
21 those timings, assuming the log is accurate -- I suggest
22 it is -- give us a shape for the activities that you
23 undertook and the deployments that you made at the scene
24 at Aldgate?
25 A. Yes, there would be a slight delay once I had taken the


1 action to communicating it and then entering.
2 Q. Just in a single question and answer, did you have
3 available to you, by the time of debrief that evening,
4 the precision as to timing that we've now seen on the
5 log --
6 A. No.
7 Q. -- or was the reality somewhat different?
8 A. Yes, I didn't have the precision at all. One's
9 perception of time in circumstances such as these can
10 get distorted.
11 Q. Yes. Thank you. With that, let's come on to INQ10428,
12 please, at page 11 [INQ10428-11]. I want to ask you a few questions
13 about the event debrief report.
14 In fact, this is part of a longer document. You may
15 have a copy available to you, I'm not going to ask we
16 look at every page, but in fact, were we to PTO at the
17 bottom of the screen, which I assume means to go to
18 page 12 [INQ10428-12] of this document, we see time and date, 17.55,
19 7/7/05, CX.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. CX standing for?
22 A. Charing Cross police station.
23 Q. Does that indicate that you signed off this debrief
24 report at 5.55 that evening at Charing Cross or
25 something else?


1 A. Yes, that would have been the time that I made those
2 entries which would have been directly after our debrief
3 at Charing Cross.
4 Q. As to the debrief, are we to imagine a formal,
5 agenda-led, minuted debrief or --
6 A. No.
7 Q. -- was it something other than that?
8 A. No, I asked for that debrief. It was primarily around
9 support for my officers, several of whom were
10 traumatised, and I also wanted to capture any lessons
11 that we may have learnt that would assist with
12 potentially the next bomb.
13 Q. So there you are at Charing Cross as the senior officer
14 in charge of the 20-something officers on the vehicles
15 that deployed forward that day and you're marking down
16 in, as it were, your own document your thoughts at that
17 time?
18 A. That's correct, and the combination of the comments my
19 officers made to me as well.
20 Q. In relation to the efforts of your officers and in
21 particular those who deployed underground in pursuit of
22 your strategy of preserving life, did they respond to
23 your expectation as their senior officer? If they did
24 not, would you say so?
25 A. Absolutely, and they did respond magnificently.


1 Q. Sparing your blushes, is that why you wrote that it was
2 your view that they undoubtedly saved lives and dealt
3 with numerous injured people and fatalities?
4 A. It was my perception, yes.
5 Q. So the answer to the question, "Notwithstanding your
6 comments about structures at the scene, could anything
7 have been done in your view to further pursue the
8 strategy of saving life?", what's your answer?
9 A. I don't believe so. They did exactly what I asked
10 without question and showed a degree of initiative
11 themselves.
12 MR HILL: That's all I ask, thank you.
13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any more questions for
14 Chief Inspector Wheeler?
15 There are no more questions, Chief Inspector. Thank
16 you very much for coming along to help us, and thank you
17 for deploying your troops so effectively that day.
18 A. Thank you, my Lady.
19 MR KEITH: My Lady, the last witness is
20 Superintendent Lawson, please.
22 Questions by MR KEITH
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do I have a statement, Mr Keith?
24 MR KEITH: My Lady is quite right, I'm so sorry, there is an
25 additional statement we prepared very recently.


1 Mr Hay I think will surrender his copy.
2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I will hand it back afterwards.
3 (Handed).
4 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?
5 A. I am Superintendent Alistair Robert Lawson of the
6 British Transport Police.
7 Q. You are a superintendent now, but in July 2005, you were
8 a detective chief inspector?

9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Thank you very much for coming, Mr Lawson. You
11 appreciate that you weren't on the original list of
12 witnesses, but you've kindly come at short notice to
13 deal with some issues arising out of events at
14 Liverpool Street on the morning of 7 July 2005.
15 I understand that you've had a chance to look at
16 certain contemporaneous documents such as decision logs
17 and notes and the like?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. We know from another witness, in particular Mr Glazer,
20 who was the London Underground duty station manager,
21 that, fortuitously, you were travelling through
22 Liverpool Street with a view to catching a westbound
23 Circle Line train to King's Cross and then I think
24 walking to your office in Tavistock Square?

25 A. That's correct.


1 Q. But in Liverpool Street, according to your statement,
2 you heard an evacuation signal and you no doubt noticed
3 people leaving the station and that something was up?

4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. I believe that you met, in the bowels of
6 Liverpool Street, another police officer whom you knew?
7 A. That is correct. I met Detective Inspector
8 Simon Taylor.

9 Q. Did Mr Taylor subsequently keep a log for you when you
10 assumed control a little later, as we'll hear?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. Because you were on the way to work, you didn't have
13 your radio with you?
14 A. I did not.
15 Q. Do you recollect, yourself, seeing smoke or smelling
16 smoke emanating from the Liverpool Street end of the
17 Aldgate tunnel?
18 A. I do not.
19 Q. But you spoke, I think, to the MICC, which is the
20 control room for British Transport Police?
21 A. On several occasions.
22 Q. Do you recollect when you first spoke to them?
23 A. Without referring to my statement, no.
24 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, [BTP167-9]?
25 We can see at the bottom of the page at 08.51.44


1 a call from DI Taylor, that's Mr Taylor of whom you've
2 just spoken, who happens in fact to have been in the
3 Robbery Squad in London south.
We can see there that he
4 calls the controller, and then over the page [BTP167-10]:
5 "Myself and DCI Alistair Lawson, who are on scene,
6 that we've got, yeah, we've got a station evacuated at
7 Liverpool Street, we've got a sound of an explosion ...
8 and there's loads of smoke in the tunnel that's all
9 we've got ...
10 "There's smoke coming from ...
11 "From the tunnel from the Aldgate end of
12 Liverpool Street.
13 "From the Aldgate end."
14 Further down the page, there's a reference to call
15 signs:
16 "But no sign of any damage or any explosion ... it
17 was loads of ... smoke."

18 Did you ask Mr Taylor to phone the control room
19 because you'd received information that there had been
20 smoke coming from the tunnel?
21 A. That's correct, Mr Taylor had spoken to me and briefed
22 me. I then asked him to contact the control room.
23 Q. As a result of what you heard from Mr Taylor, and as
24 a result of the evacuation siren, did you go to the
25 control room for London Underground at Liverpool Street?


1 A. I did.
2 Q. What did you find there?
3 A. There were members of London Underground staff in that
4 control room.
5 Q. One of them we heard was Mr Glazer, who was the duty
6 station manager. Did there come a time when you decided
7 to speak to the duty officer again at MICC, and could we
8 have page 37 of BTP167 [BTP167-37], 08.57:
9 "It's Al Lawson, DCI here.
10 "I'm at Liverpool Street ..."
11 Then over the page:
12 "We've got a problem here which you should be aware
13 about. Do you have a log running?
14 " ... I'm the only senior officer on scene just now,
15 so a quick update on what's happening. The station's
16 been closed, scene secured. I'm assuming the Alpha cars
17 are coming ..."

18 What are Alpha cars?
19 A. Alpha cars are specialist units within BTP that have got
20 experience and special equipment for dealing with
21 explosive incidents.

22 Q. So do we take it that, at this time, at 08.57, you
23 already knew, not only that it was smoke, but there was
24 the possibility of an exposive device?
25 A. That is not the case.


1 Q. That's not the case. Was this a precautionary step for
2 you, then, to ask for Alpha cars?
3 A. There was a member of staff from London Underground who
4 had witnessed what happened and the smoke and the bang
5 in the tunnel, and my aim at this point was to get my
6 specialist officers to debrief him to give a better
7 understanding of what may have happened.
8 Q. So you wanted them to come to Liverpool Street to speak
9 to him?

10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Is that why you say there [BTP167-38]:
12 "Where we have the Underground member of staff who
13 was on the platform waiting and ready to brief them"?

14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Further down the page you make a reference to being with
16 a duty station manager, and over the page, you then ask
17 to speak to the duty officer. Is the duty officer
18 somebody else, not the controller?
19 A. I was asked if I wanted to speak to the duty officer.
20 "We have an officer of inspector rank within the control
21 room".

22 Q. Could we have page 20 of this exhibit [BTP167-20]? Did you speak to
23 a man called Inspector Young?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. "I'm probably the most senior person here [at


1 Liverpool Street] ... I'm just waiting for the Alpha
2 car ... we don't know if it's an explosion under a train
3 ...

4 "... we think there's a power loss at some
5 point ..."
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Further down the page:
8 "I suspect it's an operating rather than a CT ..."
9 Is that a counter-terrorism problem?
10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Over the page [BTP167-21]:
12 "We've just had a report", he tells you:
13 "... or ask for an ambulance to go to Aldgate ...
14 because of 3 or 4 walking wounded."
15 When he told you that there was an ambulance going
16 to Aldgate, because of walking wounded, did that change
17 your understanding of the situation?
18 A. That absolutely changed the dynamics.
19 Q. So what, as we can see from here, did you decide to do?
20 A. I decided that I would take command at Liverpool Street
21 station.
22 Q. What about your rank and your service in the British
23 Transport Police entitled you to take command at
24 Liverpool Street?
25 A. I was the most senior officer on scene.


1 Q. The most senior British Transport Police officer on
2 scene?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And the British Transport Police is the police service
5 for the Underground?

6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. What did you envisage you would do by way of taking
8 command and getting it sorted out, as we can see there?
9 A. By taking command, my primary aim was to bring some
10 control to the situation.
11 Q. In what way?
12 A. By making decisions that were relevant, based on the
13 information that was open to me at that point.
14 Q. You didn't know very much at that point, Superintendent,
15 because you knew there was smoke, there was
16 a London Underground member of staff --
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. -- who could talk of that. You'd heard talk of an
19 explosion or a bang and you knew there were walking
20 wounded at Aldgate.
21 Did you know that there was a train trapped
22 somewhere between Liverpool Street and Aldgate?
23 A. I assumed that I did on the ground, sir, there were
24 three or four walking wounded detraining towards
25 Aldgate.


1 Q. Can we have INQ10241, please [INQ10241-2]? At 09.11, a note was made
2 by the loggist for the London Underground staff present
3 in the control room.
4 At the top left-hand corner of the screen you can
5 see 09.11:
6 "Silver control implemented. People on train at
7 Aldgate. Supervisor at Aldgate to liaise. Are there
8 any injuries at Aldgate? Is there anybody in tunnel?
9 Need to know if train can move. Train is between
10 Aldgate and Liverpool Street. Aldgate waiting for
11 medic."
12 The first entry on the page, Superintendent, we know
13 from evidence was written in later because, at 08.55, [How is it known? The first entry says 08.55 approx bomb blast on train - or was everything written in later?]
14 there was no knowledge of there being a bomb blast.
15 the entry at 09.11 appears to be broadly right.
16 From your recollection, did you shortly discover
17 that there was a train in the tunnel, shortly after
18 taking command that is?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. We know that the British Transport Police log, if we
21 could have [BTP168-17]now, please, shows that at 09.14 --
22 so around about the same time, if perhaps a couple of
23 minutes later, it shows that you received a call from
24 the duty inspector at MICC, and you refer there:
25 "We've got two trains trapped between here and


1 Aldgate ... and we've got injuries ... so I'm told
2 that's getting evacuated towards Aldgate ..."

3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. It seems that you did discover that there were trains,
5 in fact two trains, and you knew that there was an
6 evacuation towards Aldgate?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. With that -- I apologise -- rather lengthy introduction,
9 I want to ask you about what, if any, steps you took to
10 find out more about the nature of the incident in the
11 tunnel and what the position was for the train which you
12 knew was there.

13 A. I was reliant on a number of sources of information
14 coming in to me, primarily from London Underground and
15 the staff that were on duty there, but also from radio
16 traffic going across the airwaves.
17 Q. You were dependent on information. Present in
18 Liverpool Street, could you not have taken any steps to
19 ascertain more about what was going on in the tunnel as
20 opposed to, in addition, evacuating Liverpool Street?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Could you tell us, please, why not?
23 A. I had access to all the information sources which, at
24 that time, I believed I could have access to.
25 Q. What about the information to which you were privy


1 appeared to preclude you from taking steps to find out
2 what was in the tunnel?

3 A. No, that's not the case. I -- the information that was
4 available to me was that there was a train in the
5 tunnel, there were casualties and there was a rescue
6 operation being mounted from Aldgate.
7 Q. They were being evacuated towards Aldgate?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did you consider whether or not assistance could be
10 given to the people on the train by virtue of access
11 from the other side of the train?
12 A. I would have considered that.
13 Q. Tell us, please, if you did consider it, why you
14 rejected it as an option.

15 A. In relation to the -- any rescue operation, it is
16 better --
17 Q. First, ascertaining what the position was in the tunnel
18 by way of sending somebody down to see what the position
19 was and, secondly, the rescue operation.

20 A. Sorry, could you explain it again, please?
21 Q. Yes. What was it, what factors, influenced your
22 decision-making process in leading you to decide that
23 there was nothing to be gained in either sending
24 somebody down to the tunnel to see what the position was
25 with their own eyes or, secondly, conducting a rescue


1 operation from the Liverpool Street end?

2 A. The factors were I was aware that there was a rescue
3 operation being mounted from Aldgate. I am familiar
4 with the area, having travelled on the Circle Line.
5 I was aware of the distance between Liverpool Street and
6 Aldgate and, bearing in mind that it was getting
7 evacuated towards Aldgate, one of the factors was that
8 to mount another attempt from Liverpool Street may have
9 caused confusion.
10 Q. I don't think you claimed any special interest or
11 expertise in the Liverpool Street station area, did you?
12 A. Absolutely not.

13 Q. I think you were in charge of the Association of Chief
14 Police Officers crime business
area at that time? <--------------
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Do you recall London Underground staff recommending that
17 somebody be sent down to investigate what was actually
18 happening in the tunnel?
19 A. No, I do not.
20 Q. We've heard evidence from the duty station manager that
21 he planned to, and started to, find out the exact
22 location of the incident but was stopped from doing so
23 by you. Do you recollect that?

24 A. I do not.
25 Q. Was there any discussion between the Silvers -- you were


1 Silver BTP, he was Silver London Underground and there
2 was a Silver LFB, I think a Mr Clarke -- as to the
3 desirability or the efficacy of sending somebody into
4 the tunnel?

5 A. I had constant discussions with all the other Silvers
6 there. In relation to the specifics about sending
7 people down the tunnel, I cannot recollect that, but had
8 there been any disagreement, that would have been
9 significant and would have been entered on to my log.
10 Q. We've heard some evidence about how the duty station
11 manager asked one of his deputies, a Mr Ray Wood, to put
12 together a group of volunteers to go down and he started
13 writing out names on a whiteboard but you intervened,
14 according to him, to say you wouldn't allow anybody to
15 go down, and we subsequently discovered from him because
16 of the risk of secondary devices. Do you recollect that
17 at all?
18 A. I have got no recollection of that whatsoever.

19 Q. Can we have on the screen [INQ10241-3]?
20 On the left-hand side, you will see there under the
21 heading of "09.22, Fire Brigade", some writing and then
22 in the middle of the page, just before 09.25:
23 "Fire Brigade to enter tunnel from
24 Liverpool Street."

25 A. That is correct.


1 Q. Do you recollect there being a discussion of the
2 Fire Brigade entering the tunnel from Liverpool Street?
3 A. If I may comment on that, I think that's referring to
4 two lines above that, the train at Moorgate.
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ah, the ghost train.
6 MR KEITH: The ghost train?

7 A. Yes, my Lady.
8 Q. Was the ghost train already an issue at that time at
9 09.22?
10 A. It was.
11 Q. So did the Fire Brigade enter the tunnel from
12 Liverpool Street?
13 A. No, they did not.
14 Q. Why did they not?
15 A. I made a decision that I had to put in place some kind
16 of investigation or rescue in relation to the train that
17 I believed was trapped between Liverpool Street and
18 Moorgate, and I decided the best place to mount that
19 from would have been at Moorgate.

20 Q. Do you specifically recall setting your face against
21 there being an entrance into the Moorgate tunnel from
22 Liverpool Street because of factors such as the risk of
23 a secondary device?
24 A. There were a number of considerations, that is correct.
25 Q. Is that one of them?


1 A. That was one of them.
2 Q. Is it possible, Superintendent, that the same
3 consideration: namely, the risk of a secondary device,
4 also influenced the decision not to go the other way,
5 eastbound, into the tunnel to Aldgate?
6 A. That is not the case.
7 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Superintendent, I have no
8 further questions for you.
9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for
10 Superintendent Lawson? Yes, Ms Sheff?
11 Questions by MS SHEFF
12 MS SHEFF: You were in contact both directly with MICC and
13 through other officers that you directed to have contact
14 with them. Is that correct?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. We saw on the CAD message the fact that you were
17 responsible for calling the Alpha team. By 09.13 the
18 Alpha unit had arrived. You knew enough by then about
19 the situation to tell them to contact MICC and declare
20 a major incident?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. What was the purpose of you declaring that major
23 incident in terms of Command structure?
24 A. As soon as a major incident is declared, a structured
25 Command structure takes place.


1 Q. Does that involve appointment of Gold, Silver and Bronze
2 Commanders and does it also release additional
3 resources?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. In fact it's an upgrading of an emergency services
6 response, isn't it, to send more resources and to take
7 the entire situation much more seriously?
8 A. In essence, yes.
9 Q. Thank you. Your concern was with the safety and
10 security of the station at which you were then located,
11 Liverpool Street.
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. Did you have any connection with or any responsibility
14 for the wider transport system generally?
15 A. No.
16 Q. But in relation to Liverpool Street, you were concerned
17 that the environment should be safe and, as a result,
18 there was the decision taken at 09.23 to evacuate the
19 station?
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. Was that a decision taken under your auspices?
22 A. That was my decision.
23 Q. By 09.30, you were aware of other explosions that had
24 been reported. Can I show you that, please, on your
25 log, [BTP391-1]?


1 So 09.30, this was the log opened on your behalf by
2 DI Taylor. 09.23, we can see:
3 "Decision Liverpool Street to be evacuated."
4 09.30:
5 "More explosions reported."
6 That presumably related to the explosions at the
7 other Tube stations, the information for which was
8 coming through on the traffic, the radio traffic?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Yes. But in fact, had that information come through,
11 according to your statement, at 09.14, when you had been
12 telephoned from MICC by Gary Young who wanted an update
13 from you? You say in your statement:
14 "By that time, we knew there had been a number of
15 explosions at different locations."

16 A. I believe that is the case, yes.
17 Q. So how do you explain the difference then in the timing?
18 On your log you say that that information was available
19 at 9.30; in your statement that you were aware of that
20 at 9.14?

21 A. I don't believe there is any discrepancy there.
22 Q. So it's correct, is it, that at 9.14 the information was
23 available to you, as the senior officer at
24 Liverpool Street, about other explosions at other sites?

25 A. I believe there was a discussion around about that time


1 between myself and Inspector Young in the control room
2 which indicates that.
3 Q. Thank you. You say in your statement that at 9.23, when
4 you took that decision to evacuate Liverpool Street
5 mainline station, you realised that there had been
6 several bombs on Underground trains and the transport
7 network was under attack. Did that inform, at least in
8 part, your decision to close Liverpool Street?
9 A. Again, that was a consideration.
10 Q. Knowing, as you did then, of the threats that had in
11 fact been activated to other stations you thought it
12 would be safer to close Liverpool Street to prevent any
13 further threat to that particular station?
14 A. That was my decision, yes.
15 Q. You also say that, at 9.30, which is the time noted on
16 your log as the time more explosions were reported, that
17 you thought the transport network in London was under
18 attack?
19 A. I was aware of several bombings on the transport
20 network, yes, that is correct.
21 Q. As a senior officer aware of the running of the network
22 and the risks to it, you took the view that this was
23 a risk to the entire transport network system?
24 A. I took a decision in relation to what I was responsible
25 for, to close Liverpool Street station.


1 Q. Yes, because of the risk to the transport network in
2 general and because of what you knew of the other bombs?
3 A. I took my decision in relation to Liverpool Street
4 station, yes.
5 Q. You were regularly having Silver meetings with the other
6 Silver Commanders at the scene. The first formal
7 meeting you held at 09.39, as we can see on your log,
8 Silver meetings, but in fact, had you been regularly
9 meeting with the other Silver Commanders at
10 Liverpool Street station throughout the period that
11 you'd been there, the first formal meeting only being at
12 9.39?
13 A. The 9.39 was the first formal meeting, that is correct.
14 Q. So you'd been discussing the situation with them in
15 order to establish in your mind what was going on at
16 Liverpool Street and generally?
17 A. That is correct.
18 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much, Superintendent. No further
19 questions.
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Any more questions for
21 Superintendent Lawson?
22 MS CANBY: Sorry, my Lady, just one matter.
24 Questions by MS CANBY
25 MS CANBY: Just in relation to that last point, your


1 decision to close the Liverpool Street mainline station,
2 not the Underground station,
I think you say in your
3 statement that that was partly based on the fact that
4 the Circle Line is a cut-and-shut?
5 A. That was one of the considerations, yes.
6 Q. Can you just explain to us the significance of that
7 consideration?
8 A. From --
9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Explain the expression, first of all.
10 MS CANBY: Yes.
11 A. If I may -- and please forgive me for a lack of
12 technical knowledge around about this -- but my
13 understanding is that there are two types of tunnel on
14 London Underground, one which is deep bore, which is
15 very, very deep, and one which was a Victorian
16 construction which is called cut-and-shut.
17 Q. We also he know it's cut-and-cover.
18 A. It may well be. That's my terminology, cut-and-cover.
19 In relation to that, I understand that a hole was dug,
20 a tunnel was made, and then it was covered over and is
21 very near the surface.
22 Q. It was the fact that the Circle Line is so near the
23 surface that fed into your consideration to close
24 Liverpool Street mainline station?

25 A. That was a consideration, yes.


1 MS CANBY: Thank you very much.
2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Mr Gibbs?
3 Questions by MR GIBBS
4 MR GIBBS: Superintendent, may we just pick up in outline
5 what you did thereafter?
6 If we go back please to [BTP168-17], this is the call
7 at 09.14. Can we look at your large paragraph there.
8 "... from what I'm told, we've got two trains
9 trapped, one between here and Aldgate ... injuries on
10 there ... that's getting evacuated towards Aldgate."
11 Pausing there, as you understood it, there was
12 a rescue operation being attempted at Aldgate in
13 relation to that train?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Will we see, if we follow your actions through your log,
16 that you have hereafter attempted to create a safe and
17 a secure environment at Liverpool Street so as to
18 release resources to the rescue attempt at Aldgate?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. Picking up your telephone call, you say:
21 "I've got LFB here taking control cos it's a rescue
22 stage just now. They're with me just now."
23 Then the second train you speak about is:
24 "One trapped between here and Moorgate ... we've got
25 to establish at Moorgate that's safe and secure. At


1 that point. Then -- they'll -- the train will be
2 evacuated from Moorgate ..."
3 It turned out later, didn't it, about an hour or
4 more later, that actually there wasn't any such train?
5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. But there were no resources at the time at Moorgate but
7 you freed some up to go there, am I right?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. In particular, a BTP officer called Mr Jiggins was sent
10 there --
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. -- in order to supervise things at Moorgate?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. You were at Liverpool Street consulting, I imagine, with
15 your partners, by which I mean London Underground, the
16 London Fire Brigade, the Ambulance Service and also the
17 operators of the overground railway?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. I don't know whether they were called -- were they
20 called Network Rail at the time?
21 A. I can't recall whether it was Network Rail or Railtrack.
22 Q. But whoever was responsible for running Liverpool Street
23 mainline station?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. May we then briefly pick up what you did by going to the


1 log, which is [BTP391-1]?
2 At 09.23, a decision is made that Liverpool Street
3 be evacuated.
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. At 09.29, a decision is made that a train in the
6 platform -- was that an Underground train in the
7 platform at Liverpool Street be searched?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. That was an evacuated, empty but as yet unsearched train
10 at Liverpool Street?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. The buildings above were to be searched in liaison with
13 the City of London Police?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. You've been taken to the 9.30 entry about you picking up
16 information about further explosions, and then at 9.39
17 you have your first formal Silver meeting, and we see
18 that there are representatives from your other agencies
19 there at the meeting. Is that right?
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. The last entry on that page is:
22 "Mainline closed down."
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. Who looked after that for you?
25 A. In what respect, sir?


1 Q. Who is in charge of closing down a mainline station?
2 A. I made the decision that the station should be closed,
3 and then Network Rail or Railtrack, whoever it was, were
4 responsible for actually closing it down.

5 Q. Did they do that promptly and efficiently?
6 A. They did, sir.
7 Q. Can we go over the page, please? City of London Police
8 were going to deal with the buildings above the station.
9 We have, again, the reference to "train trapped in
10 tunnel and people being" -- I think that's "detrained
11 elsewhere". The next meeting is fixed for 20 minutes'
12 time.
13 Can we go then to that next meeting at the bottom of
14 the page at 10.02? Again, we see who's present from the
15 other agencies, and if we go over the page, please, and < ---- [No ref given for this evidence]
16 under the heading -- this may help us with understanding
17 Mr Glazer's evidence -- "LUL":
18 "Train between Aldgate and Liverpool Street.
19 Explosion - fatalities. Aldgate is a scene. Detrains
20 are via Aldgate. Nothing going on at Liverpool Street.
21 Nothing at Moorgate."
22 That I think, at that time, probably meant we had no
23 resources at Moorgate. Am I right?
24 A. It may, sir.
25 Q. Then your decision:


1 "London Underground relocate to Moorgate when safe
2 at Liverpool Street."
3 You're getting information from the mainline
4 operator:
5 "Trains are heading into Liverpool Street", but
6 they're being turned around outside London, is that
7 right?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. You kept, I think, the control room at MICC updated on
10 the hour at 11.00 and on the hour at noon, from
11 Liverpool Street, as to the safety and the security of
12 that mainline station?
13 A. That is correct
14 MR GIBBS: Thank you.
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Gibbs. Any other
16 questions?
17 Thank you very much, Superintendent Lawson. Thank
18 you for coming at such short notice.
19 A. Thank you, my Lady.
20 MR KEITH: My Lady, that concludes the list of witnesses for
21 today.
22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As far as tomorrow is concerned,
23 Mr Keith, how many do we have?
24 MR KEITH: My Lady, we have three in the morning, and two in
25 the afternoon, but I'm just about to enquire of my


1 learned friends whether or not their examination of the
2 afternoon witnesses, or rather the morning witnesses,
3 may allow those afternoon witnesses to be brought
4 forward.
5 I was going to do it privately, but I'm prepared to
6 do it publicly.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It was the way you looked across the
8 room.
9 MR COLTART: I'm perfectly happy to do it either way.
10 I don't anticipate being very long with either Mr Rigby
11 or Mr Smith. In relation to Mr Edmondson, he might, in
12 due course, be a lengthy witness, but he's one of those
13 who's going to come back. For the purposes of tomorrow,
14 certainly I don't propose to be very long with him at
15 all.
16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think, as Mr Keith said, he's happy
17 to deal with this privately. The only reason I was
18 asking, Mr Keith, is a question of timing, whether you
19 wanted me to sit at 10.00 or 10.30 tomorrow.
20 MR KEITH: My Lady, the temptation is almost too great to
21 resist, but I think if we start at 10.00 and I can bring
22 the afternoon witnesses forward, then there is some
23 chance that we may be able to use the afternoon for
24 other equally pressing matters.
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly. Thank you very much.


1 10.00 am.
2 (3.48 pm)
3 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

�To those who are afraid of the truth, I wish to offer a few scary truths; and to those who are not afraid of the truth, I wish to offer proof that the terrorism of truth is the only one that can be of benefit to the proletariat.� -- On Terrorism and the State, Gianfranco Sanguinetti